King v. Gen. Motors Corp.
| Decision Date | 18 April 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action Number 5:11-cv-2269-AKK |
| Parties | HUBERT GLYNN KING, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Willie Lyle King, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
Before the court is General Motors of Canada, Ltd.'s ("GM Canada") motion to dismiss Hubert Glynn King's ("King") complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), or, in the alternative, motion for a judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) or Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56. Doc. 11. For the reasons stated herein, GM Canada's motion for summary judgment is due to be GRANTED.
This litigation arises from the death of King's wife, Willie Lyle King, in an automobile accident occurring on November 16, 2008. King alleges that, as he and his wife drove their 2001 Chevrolet Silverado from Tuscaloosa, Alabama toMadison County, Alabama on Interstate 65, he "maneuvered his vehicle to avoid hitting a deer crossing the road when the vehicle left the roadway and struck a tree." Doc. 1, at 13. The collision killed Willie Lyle King. Id. On November 15, 2010, King filed suit against General Motors Corporation ("GM Corporation"), Bill Heard Chevrolet, Inc.-Huntsville ("Bill Heard Chevrolet"), and eighteen (18) fictitious parties including "those entities who or which manufactured or assembled the General Motors vehicle involved in the occurrence made the basis of this lawsuit, any component part thereof, or any attendant equipment used or available for use therewith." See id. at 11-12. Moreover, King provided that "the identities of the fictitious party defendants herein are otherwise unknown to the plaintiff at this time or, if their names are known to plaintiff, their identities as proper party defendants are not known to the plaintiff at this time and their true names will be substituted by amendment when ascertained." Id. at 12. King, as the personal representative of his wife's estate, alleges negligence and violations of Alabama's Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine, and seeks punitive damages pursuant to Alabama's Wrongful Death Act. See id. at 14-16. King also seeks compensatory damages for mental anguish. See id. at 16.
On May 10, 2011, while this action was still pending in the Circuit Court of Madison County, Alabama, King substituted GM Canada for all fictitious parties. Id. at 10. King asserts that he performed such substitution "[u]pon information received by counsel for Plaintiff regarding the proper identity of the manufacturer of the subject vehicle." Doc. 15, at 3.
After King amended his complaint, GM Canada removed the case from Madison County to this court on June 24, 2011 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, and 1446. Doc. 1, at 1-2. In its notice of removal, GM Canada first asserted that "because plaintiff filed this action after both [GM Corporation and Bill Heard Chevrolet] filed petitions for Chapter 11 bankruptcy . . . this action as to these entities is void ab initio." Id. at 2-3 (citing id. at 19-54) (bankruptcy petitions of GM Corporation and Bill Heard Chevrolet). GM Canada further contends that it is a Canadian Corporation with its principle office and place of business in Ontario, Canada, doc. 12, at 33, and that it Id. GM Canada admits that, prior to GM Corporation's bankruptcy filing, it operated as a wholly-owned subsidiary of GM Corporation. Id. at 34. Currently, GM Canada operates as a wholly-owned subsidiary of General Motors Holdings LLC. Id.
While GM Canada is a wholly-owned subsidiary, "GM Canada has always had its own Board of Directors and Officers, performed its own accounting, and been responsible for its own financial performance." Id. Additionally, prior to GM Corporation's bankruptcy, GM Canada manufactured vehicles and component parts in Canadian plants and then sold these products to GM Corporation in Canada, with transfer of title also occurring in Canada. Id. GM Corporation, inturn, imported and distributed these vehicles in the United States. Id. at 34-35. As it relates to the vehicle at issue here, GM Canada assembled the 2001 Chevrolet Silverado in Canada and subsequently sold it to GM Corporation in Canada. Id. at 35. "GM Canada did not design the 2001 Chevrolet Silverado . . . GM Canada also did not advertise or market the subject vehicle and did not distribute or sell it, or any of its component parts, to the decedent or plaintiffs in this action or to any dealership or member of the general public in Alabama or elsewhere." Id.
On the other hand, King maintains that GM Canada operates "'under the auspices of GM [Corporation].'" Doc. 15, at 4 (quoting doc. 15-7, at 6). King contends that the same corporate representatives assist both GM Corporation and GM Canada in litigation matters. Id. at 5 (citing doc. 15-7, at 9). Moreover, "GM [Corporation], who designed the subject vehicle platform, oversees the production of vehicles at GM Canada, promulgates standards and demonstrates the assembly of various components of the vehicle." Id. (citing doc. 15-7, at 27). Finally, King alleges that GM Canada "specifically manufactured" the vehicle at issue "to be in compliance with the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards" as opposed to complying with Canadian safety standards. Id. at 6 (citing doc. 12, at 61).
Furthermore, King's Silverado had VIN #2GCEC19T411183134. Doc. 1, at 13. GM Canada contends that, pursuant to regulations issued by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"), "the first three characters of a VIN number must identify the manufacturer of the vehicle using its unique World Manufacturer Identifier, or WMI code." Doc. 12, at 13 (citing 49 C.F.R.565.6(a)). Accordingly, "2GC" refers to GM Canada as the Silverado's manufacturer. Id. The Silverado also contains a certification label on the driver's door edge, which provides the standard "GM logo," the vehicle's VIN number, that "General Motors of Canada LTD" manufactured the vehicle, the date of manufacture, and that the vehicle "conforms to all applicable U.S. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards in effect on the date of manufacture shown above." See doc. 12, at 61. King does not dispute that "[t]here was a sticker on the inside of the driver's side door on the wrecked vehicle that contains" this information. Doc. 15, at 9 n.2.
On November 22, 2011, GM Canada filed the current motion seeking to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or, in the alternative, for a judgment in its favor due to an expired statute of limitations. Doc. 11. This motion is fully briefed, docs. 15, 16, and ripe for review.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), "'[a] plaintiff seeking the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant bears the initial burden of alleging in the complaint sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case of jurisdiction.'" Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Int'l, Inc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1257 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009)). If the nonresident defendant "'challenges jurisdiction by submitting affidavit evidence in support of its position, "the burden traditionally shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence supportingjurisdiction."'" Id. (quoting Mazer, 556 F.3d at 1274 (quoting Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int'l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1269 (11th Cir. 2002))). If "'the plaintiff's complaint and supporting evidence conflict with the defendant's affidavits, the court must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.'" Id. (quoting Meier, 288 F.3d at 1269).
Moreover, "[j]udgment on the pleadings is appropriate when there are no material facts in dispute, and judgment may be rendered by considering the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts." Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustment, Inc., 140 F.3d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c)). The court must "accept the facts in the complaint as true" and "view them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. As such, the "complaint must not be dismissed 'unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Id. (quoting Slagle v. ITT Hartford, 102 F.3d 494, 497 (11th Cir. 1996)).
Finally, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." To support a summary judgment motion, the parties must cite to "particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials." Id. The moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323(1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who is required to "go beyond the pleadings" to establish that there is a "genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A dispute about a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The court must construe the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it in the light most...
To continue reading
Request your trial