King v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 04 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 13-14794,13-14794 |
| Parties | MICHAEL KING, Plaintiff-Appellant, PHYLLIS KING, Plaintiff, v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
MICHAEL KING, Plaintiff-Appellant,
PHYLLIS KING, Plaintiff,
v.
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 13-14794
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
September 4, 2014
Non-Argument Calendar
D.C. Docket No. 8:10-cv-00977-JSM-AEP
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Michael King appeals the judgment in favor of the Government Employees Insurance Company ("GEICO") on King's claim against GEICO for bad-faith failure to settle a claim, brought pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 624.155. A federal jury returned a verdict finding that GEICO had not acted in bad faith. Upon entry of judgment on the verdict, this appeal followed. After a careful review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
Michael King was injured in a three-car accident on August 11, 2004. King was driving a vehicle owned by Donna Buttermore, a passenger in the vehicle at the time of the accident who was insured by GEICO, when he was rear-ended by a car driven by Holly Hahto, who was insured by Liberty Mutual. At some point, Hahto was rear-ended by a car driven by Kristin Livingston, who was insured by USAA. The precise causal chain of events was disputed, but it is immaterial to our resolution of this appeal. Hahto and Livingston were both cited for careless driving; King was not. Buttermore reported the accident to GEICO the same day.
Immediately after the accident, King sought treatment and was diagnosed with lumbar strain, contusion to the right knee and left elbow, and wrist strains. Between the time of the accident and April 2006, King continued to receive medical treatment, described by the district court as follows:
Over the next eighteen months, King presented to multiple physicians. Dr. Rog, King's primary physician[,] referred him to Dr. Fiore, an
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orthopedic specialist, who recommended physical therapy and chiropractic care after reviewing a whole body bone scan and MRI which indicated degeneration in the lumbar spine. King then treated with Dr. Valdes, a chiropractor, and Dr. Garner, a neurologist. Dr. Garner identified a herniated nucleus polposus at L4-5 that made him a surgical candidate, as well as ascribing him with a 25% permanent impairment rating. She referred him to the Laser Spine Institute where he was recommended for a nerve root decompression surgery. King returned to Dr. Fiore who disagreed with immediate surgical intervention, rather suggesting that conservative care first be exhausted, although recognizing the probable necessity of surgery in the future. Finally, Dr. Turner, another orthopedic surgeon, recommended a lumbar percutaneous discectomy.
On April 13, 2006, King's attorney, Joseph R. Bryant, submitted offers of settlement to each of the three insurance carriers implicated in the accident. The offers recounted the medical treatment that King had received, resulting in $19,515.15 in medical bills, and that he was likely to require in the future, and advised that King had exhausted his Personal Injury Protection benefits with GEICO.1 King demanded the $100,000 liability policy limits from Liberty Mutual, $50,000 of the $100,000 liability policy limits from USAA, and the full $25,000 underinsured/uninsured motorist ("UM") policy limits from GEICO. King then settled with USAA.
Walter Dunn, a GEICO claims examiner, reviewed King's UM policy limits demand and evaluated his claim. Dunn determined that the value of King's claim was within one of the tortfeasor's $100,000 policy limits. After consulting with his
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claims manager, Dunn advised King in a letter dated May 8, 2006, that GEICO would not make an offer under the UM policy because the value of King's claim was within the "within the available tort limits."
Approximately one month later, in June 2006, King filed his initial complaint in the underlying litigation in Florida state court against GEICO and Hahto.2 At the same time, he filed a Civil Remedy Notice ("CRN") with the Department of Insurance asserting that GEICO had not attempted to settle his claim in good faith. In response to the CRN, GEICO again denied King's demand for UM benefits. Later, in 2007, GEICO attempted to tender the full $25,000 UM policy limits to King after receiving his medical records, which showed that King had undergone a more serious surgery, but King did not accept the tender on the basis that it was untimely. At some point in 2008, Liberty Mutual settled King's claim against Hahto for payment of its $100,000 policy limits and also paid an undisclosed sum to settle a potential bad-faith claim against Liberty Mutual.
In July 2009, the UM claim was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of King. The jury found that King had sustained damages in the amount of $1,638,171.00,3 and determined that Hahto was fully at fault. The state court then entered a partial final judgment against GEICO on July 28, 2009, reducing the
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judgment amount to GEICO's $25,000 UM policy limits, and reserved jurisdiction over bad-faith claims. GEICO appealed, and the Florida Second District Court of Appeal issued a per curiam affirmance without a written opinion.
In April 2010, King amended his complaint to add a claim for statutory bad faith against GEICO under Fla. Stat. § 624.155. Later that month, GEICO removed King's bad-faith claim from state court to federal district court in the Middle District of Florida. The district court then denied King's motion to remand the claim. The case proceeded to trial before a federal jury, which found that GEICO had not acted in bad faith. King timely brings this appeal.
King raises four main contentions on appeal, arguing that the district court erred by (1) failing to remand the bad-faith claim to state court because GEICO's notice of removal was not timely filed within one year of the commencement of the UM action under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2010) (amended 2011)4; (2) failing to give preclusive effect, for purposes of determining damages for the bad-faith claim, to the state-court jury verdict in excess of the policy limits; (3) failing to give certain requested jury instructions; and (4) admitting evidence of Liberty Mutual's evaluation of King's claim but refusing to admit evidence of King's settlement with Liberty Mutual.
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We review de novo the denial of a motion to remand to state court. Moore v. N. Am. Sports, Inc., 623 F.3d 1325, 1328 (11th Cir. 2010). The question whether to give preclusive effect to a state court's judgment is a question of law reviewed de novo. Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 578 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 2009). A district court's refusal to give a requested jury instruction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Burchfield v. CSX Transp., Inc., 636 F.3d 1330, 1333 (11th Cir. 2011). A court abuses its discretion if "(1) the requested instruction correctly stated the law, (2) the instruction dealt with an issue properly before the jury, and (3) the failure to give the instruction resulted in prejudicial harm to the requesting party." Id. at 1333-34 (quotation marks omitted). We review the district court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1333.
A. Timeliness of Removal
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. A defendant's right to remove an action against it from state to federal court is created and defined by statute, and removal statutes are strictly construed. Global Satellite Commc'n Co. v. Starmill U.K. Ltd., 378 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 2004); Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411 (11th Cir. 1999). Consequently, all doubts about
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the propriety of removal should be resolved in favor of remand. See Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1328-29 (11th Cir. 2006).
Section 1446 contains two time restrictions on removing cases from state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2010) (amended 2011). First, the notice of removal must be filed within thirty days of the initial pleading showing that the action is removable. Second, a case may not be removed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction more than one year after "commencement of the action." Id.
Here, GEICO removed the bad-faith claim to federal court in April 2010, well over three years after King filed the initial complaint in state court in June 2006. As a result, King asserts, GEICO's notice of removal was untimely, the judgment should be vacated, and this action should be remanded to state court. GEICO responds that its notice of removal was timely because the bad-faith claim is a "separate and independent" cause of action under Florida law that was separately removable from the underlying action for purposes of § 1446(b).
The federal district courts of Florida are divided on this question. In line with King's position on appeal, some courts have concluded that the action is "commenced" when the initial complaint is filed because, even if the bad-faith claim is a separate and independent claim, amending the complaint to add such a claim does not start the action anew. See, e.g.,...
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