King v. Hubbard
| Decision Date | 10 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | AC 44600 |
| Citation | 217 Conn.App. 191,288 A.3d 218 |
| Parties | Laura KING et al. v. Matthew HUBBARD |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Anthony R. Minchella, Middlebury, for the appellant (defendant).
Anthony J. Febles, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
Moll, Suarez and Seeley, Js.
The defendant, Matthew Hubbard, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to restore to the active docket a civil action that was brought against him by the plaintiffs, Laura King and Richard King, and later voluntarily withdrawn. The defendant claims that (1) the court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to restore the action to the active docket and (2) this court should fashion a procedural mechanism to guide trial courts when a plaintiff withdraws an action in response to a special motion to dismiss pursuant to General Statutes § 52-196a, which affords protection against so-called SLAPP lawsuits.1 We affirm the judgment of the court.
The following procedural history is relevant to the claims raised on appeal. On July 9, 2020, the plaintiffs filed an application for an ex parte temporary injunction and an order to show cause together with a verified complaint. The verified complaint alleged the following facts. The Catherine V. Hubbard Foundation (CVHF) is a nonprofit charitable foundation dedicated to the memory of the defendant's daughter, a child victim of the Sandy Hook mass school shooting. Laura King is a consultant to CVHF. The Stanwich Club, a nonparty private social organization, employed Richard King as its executive chef. "On June 27, 2020, the defendant published a publicly viewable statement on the Stanwich Club's Facebook page commenting on a CVHF benefit golf tournament that the Stanwich Club [would] be hosting on July 16, 2020." In commenting negatively on the event, the defendant posted as follows:
In count one of the verified complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that "[b]y publicly and falsely describing this event as ‘corrupt,’ chastising the Stanwich Club for hosting the event, and wrongfully associating the plaintiff Richard King and his wife, the plaintiff Laura King, with an event [the defendant] described as ‘corrupt,’ [the defendant] has caused or is likely to cause reputational harm to each plaintiff in that this statement will lower them in the estimation of the community or deter third persons from associating or dealing with them." The plaintiffs further alleged that the statements made by the defendant were not privileged and were published to third parties. In count two, Laura King alleged that she "had an expectation of privacy with respect to her compensation from CVHF." She further alleged that her compensation was confidential information, that the defendant "had a continuing obligation to protect th[at] confidential and private information," that its disclosure was "not a matter of legitimate public concern," and that the defendant invaded her privacy "by publicly disclosing" this information.2 She alleged irreparable harm as the disclosure "will impact her continued work with CVHF as well as her ability to consult for other organizations." By way of relief, the plaintiffs requested the issuance of "[a]n ex parte temporary and permanent injunction restraining [the defendant] from making or publishing any statements about either plaintiff, the Stanwich Club or CVHF...."
On July 9, 2020, the court denied the application for an ex parte temporary injunction and scheduled the matter for a hearing at a date to be determined. On July 15, 2020, the court scheduled a remote hearing on the application for a temporary injunction to be held on August 11, 2020. On August 10, 2020, the defendant filed a caseflow request in which he requested that the hearing be converted "into a status or scheduling conference." The court granted the motion and, on August 11, 2020, held a remote status conference.
On August 27, 2020, the defendant filed a special motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to § 52-196a,3 together with a memorandum of law and a supporting affidavit. In his motion to dismiss, the defendant asserted that each count in the complaint was "based on [the defendant's] exercise of rights protected under § 52-196a—namely, his right of free speech in connection with a matter of public concern—and [that the] plaintiffs [could not] show probable cause that they [would] prevail upon the merits of their claims." The defendant argued that the complaint should be dismissed in its entirety pursuant to § 52-196a (e) (3) and the defendant should be awarded costs and reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to § 52-196a (f) (1). In the accompanying affidavit, the defendant attested that the factual statements he had made concerning the CVHF event and the plaintiffs were truthful.
On August 31, 2020, the court issued a scheduling order in which it noted that the defendant had filed a special motion to dismiss, and it ordered that any opposition briefs, affidavits, or exhibits were to be filed on or before September 15, 2020. The court further ordered that any reply to the opposition filings was to be filed on or before September 21, 2020. The court ultimately ordered that a hearing on the defendant's special motion to dismiss was to be held on September 24, 2020. On September 4, 2020, four days after the court issued its scheduling order, the plaintiffs withdrew the action.
On October 1, 2020, the defendant filed a motion to restore the case to the docket and a memorandum of law in support thereof.4 In the defendant's memorandum of law, he first asserted that, "[o]nce [the defendant] filed his special motion to dismiss, his right to attorney's fees and costs became vested (or, minimally, his right to have the court determine his entitlement to fees and costs), and the plaintiffs’ unilateral withdrawal ‘unduly jeopardized that right and the proper administration of justice.’ "
Additionally, the defendant argued that a hearing on an issue of fact had commenced when he filed his motion to dismiss, and, therefore, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-80, the plaintiffs were required to obtain permission of the court to withdraw the action after establishing cause.5 He argued that, when ruling on a special motion to dismiss pursuant to § 52-196a, the court is required to consider the pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits of the parties attesting to the facts upon which liability or a defense, as the case may be, is based. Therefore, the defendant claimed that the affidavit that he submitted with the special motion to dismiss was testimony that the court was required to consider under § 52-196a, and, thus, a hearing commenced upon its submission to the court.
The plaintiffs filed an objection to the motion to restore, as well as an accompanying memorandum of law. In their memorandum of law, the plaintiffs argued that the action was brought to enjoin the defendant from further engaging in unprotected speech that was injurious to the plaintiffs’ good names and reputations. Additionally, they argued that they had a unilateral right to withdraw their action pursuant to § 52-80 as a hearing on the merits or, alternatively, a hearing on an issue of fact, had not commenced. The plaintiffs argued that they did not abuse their right to withdraw the action only to avoid an adverse ruling. They maintained that, had the hearing occurred, they would have "set forth with particularity the circumstances giving rise to the complaint and demonstrated probable cause within the meaning of ... § 52-196[a]." Finally, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendant was not entitled to attorney's fees because, under § 52-196a, such fees may only be awarded after the granting of a special motion to dismiss.
The court held a hearing on the defendant's motion to restore on December 1, 2020, at which both parties presented oral arguments. On March 2, 2021, the court issued a memorandum of decision denying the motion to restore. In its memorandum of decision, the court noted that a hearing of fact does not commence until "the presiding authority begins its consideration of the merits of the claim." It also noted that, at the time the plaintiffs withdrew their action, "the plaintiffs’ time frame for responding to the special motion to dismiss had not passed and no consideration of the special motion to dismiss or affidavit by the presiding authority had begun." The court concluded that, in light of the fact that a hearing on an issue of fact had not commenced, the plaintiffs had a unilateral right to withdraw the action.
Having determined that the plaintiffs were entitled to unilaterally withdraw their action, the court then considered whether to exercise its discretion to restore the action to the active docket. In doing so, the court noted that, although "[i]n many circumstances, [it] ... would be inclined [to] exercise its discretion and restore a case to the docket to allow a SLAPP defendant the opportunity to recover attorney's fees and costs," this was not such a case. The court concluded that its "decision [was] quite fact specific and not intended to reflect a reluctance to restore cases to the docket to provide SLAPP defendants with the relief provided by ... [§] 52-196a when appropriate" and that its "decision should not be construed one way or another to reflect on the merits of the underlying case or to suggest that citizens do not have the right to challenge the propriety of charitable fundraising practices."
This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
First, the defendant claims that the court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to restore the...
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