King v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Co.

Citation996 F.2d 1346
Decision Date08 April 1993
Docket NumberNo. 92-2381,92-2381
Parties, 62 USLW 2064, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. 21,282, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 13,646 Ernest L. KING, Sr., et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, et al., Defendants, Appellees. . Heard
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)

James F. Freeley, III with whom James F. Freeley, Jr. and Freeley & Freeley, Boston, MA, were on brief, for plaintiffs, appellants.

George S. Isaacson with whom Peter D. Lowe, Brann & Isaacson, Lewiston, ME, Charles A. Harvey, Jr., Christopher D. Byrne, Verrill & Dana, Peter J. Rubin, Diane S. Lukac, and Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer & Nelson, Portland, ME, were on brief, for defendants, appellees.

Before BREYER, Chief Judge, FRIEDMAN, * Senior Circuit Judge, and STAHL, Circuit Judge.

FRIEDMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

The issue in this case, on appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maine, 806 F.Supp. 1030 (D.Me.1992), is whether the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988), preempts state tort law claims based upon the alleged failure of the manufacturers of herbicides to provide adequate warning language on the products' labels, which the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approved in accordance with FIFRA's requirements. The district court held that FIFRA preempts those state law claims. We affirm.

I

The plaintiffs, King and Higgins (and their wives) filed this diversity tort damage suit against four manufacturers of chemical herbicides. Their second amended complaint alleged that, as part of their duties as employees of the State of Maine, King and Higgins were engaged in the "seasonal spraying of chemical herbicides"; that "[d]uring the chemical spraying operations [they] performed," King and Higgins "were exposed to significant amounts" of specified "chemical products" manufactured by the defendants; and that, "as the direct result of their exposure to the herbicides," King and Higgins have suffered various ailments.

The complaint contained two counts. Count I charged the defendants with negligence because they "failed to warn the Plaintiffs ... of the harm and danger of exposure to the chemical products listed above, failed to advise them how to safely use the products and failed to warn them of the long term, permanent physical injuries which would follow said exposure." Count II alleged strict liability and tort theories, based upon the defendants having "placed into the stream of commerce unreasonably dangerous and defective chemical products, rendered unreasonably dangerous by the absence of an adequate warning to the ultimate consumers and users thereof of the short term and long term permanent physical injuries resulting from exposure thereto." At oral argument, the plaintiffs admitted that the sole basis of their complaint was the defendants' failure to provide adequate warnings.

The parties stipulated that the labels on all the herbicides involved had been submitted to and approved by the EPA, as FIFRA required.

The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that FIFRA preempted the plaintiffs' claims. 806 F.Supp. at 1037. The court, following the preemption standards the Supreme Court applied in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2617, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992), held:

Because the language of FIFRA mandates the preemption of the establishment or enforcement or any common law duty that would impose a labeling requirement inconsistent with those established by the Act, or the EPA's regulations, Plaintiffs' common law failure to warn claims are preempted as a matter of law.

806 F.Supp. at 1037.

II

A. FIFRA provides a detailed scheme for regulating the content of an herbicide's label. All herbicides sold in the United States must be registered for use by the EPA. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a). The EPA has promulgated comprehensive labeling requirements governing the scope, content, wording and format of herbicide labeling. 40 C.F.R. § 156 (1992). The manufacturer itself designs and formulates the content of the label, and must file with the EPA a statement which includes "the name of the pesticide," "a complete copy of the labeling of the pesticide, a statement of all claims to be made for it and any directions for its use," and "a full description of the tests made and the results thereof upon which the claims are based." 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(B)-(D).

Section 136v provides in pertinent part:

(a) In general. A State may regulate the sale or use of any federally registered pesticide or device in the State, but only if and to the extent the regulation does not permit any sale or use prohibited by this subchapter.

(b) Uniformity. Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter.

Id. § 136v.

B. Cipollone recently summarized the standards governing preemption analysis:

The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone of preemption analysis.

Congress' intent may be explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose. In the absence of an express congressional command, state law is pre-empted if that law actually conflicts with federal law, or if federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.

Cipollone, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2617 (citations and internal quotations omitted).

Cipollone involved similar preemption provisions of the federal statutes governing cigarette labelling and advertising. The suit concerned a woman who died of lung cancer after smoking for many years. It was a state tort law diversity suit against the cigarette manufacturers, charging them with responsibility for her death because, among other things, "they failed to warn consumers about the hazards of smoking." Id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2613. The defendants contended that the Federal Cigarette Labelling and Advertising Act (1965 Act), Pub.L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1988)), and its successor, the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 (1969 Act), Pub.L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1969) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340), preempted the claims. Those Acts required health warnings on cigarette packaging, but barred the requirement of such warnings in cigarette advertising.

Section 5 of the 1965 Act, captioned "Preemption," provided in relevant part:

(b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in the advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act.

Federal Cigarette Labelling and Advertising Act, quoted in Cipollone, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2616.

The Court held that this provision "only pre-empted state and federal rulemaking bodies from mandating particular cautionary statements and did not pre-empt state law damages actions." Cipollone, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2619 (footnote omitted).

This provision was changed by the 1969 Act to read:

(b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act.

Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, quoted in Cipollone, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2616. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988).

The Court held that this provision preempted the plaintiff's state law tort claims based on the defendants' failure to warn of the hazards of cigarette smoking. The Court stated that "[t]he phrase '[n]o requirement or prohibition' sweeps broadly and suggests no distinction between positive enactments and common law; to the contrary, those words easily encompass obligations that take the form of common law rules." Cipollone, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2620. It, therefore, "reject[ed] petitioner's argument that the phrase 'requirement or prohibition' limits the 1969 Act's pre-emptive scope to positive enactments by legislatures and agencies." Id. The Court held that "insofar as claims under either failure to warn theory require a showing that respondents' post-1969 advertising or promotions should have included additional, or more clearly stated, warnings, those claims are pre-empted. The Act does not, however, pre-empt petitioner's claims that rely solely on respondents' testing or research practices or other actions unrelated to advertising or promotion." Id. at ---- - ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2621-22.

Only four Justices joined in the portion of the opinion that held that the 1969 Act preempted the failure to warn tort claims. In his opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part (in which Justice Thomas joined), however, Justice Scalia stated that he "agree[d]" with the following statements in the plurality opinion: "that 'the language of the [1969] Act plainly reaches beyond [positive] enactments,'; that the general tort-law duties petitioner invokes against the cigarette companies can, as a general matter, impose 'requirement[s] or prohibition[s]' within the meaning of § 5(b) of the 1969 Act; and that the phrase 'State law' as used in that provision embraces state common law." Id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2634 (citations omitted). Justice Scalia also referred to the plurality opinion's "correct disposition of petitioner's post-1969 failure to warn claims." Id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2637. Justice Scalia's partial disagreement with the plurality was that he would have held that the failure to warn claims under the 1965 Act and all of the claims under the 1969 Act were preempted. Id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2632.

In these circumstances, the holding in the plurality opinion that the 1969 Act preempted the...

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