King v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co.

• Decision Date: 04 October 1978
• Docket Number: No. 77 C 3392.,77 C 3392.
• Citation: 476 F. Supp. 495
• Parties: William C. KING, Plaintiff, v. ILLINOIS BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, an Illinois Corporation, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

476 F. Supp. 495

William C. KING, Plaintiff, v. ILLINOIS BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, an Illinois Corporation, Defendant.

No. 77 C 3392.

United States District Court, N. D. Illinois, E. D.

October 4, 1978.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Robert S. Bailey, James R. Bellman, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.

L. Bow Pritchett, Thomas H. W. Sawyer, Chicago, Ill., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MARSHALL, District Judge.

This is a civil rights action brought by the plaintiff, William King, against his former employer, Illinois Bell Telephone Company under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. King's complaint alleges that the company violated Section 704(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), when it discharged King and refused to rehire him in retaliation for his participation in a picket line protesting Illinois Bell's racial practices. In his prayer for relief, King requests reinstatement, back pay and benefits, and all other appropriate relief. Jurisdiction is conferred by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4). In its motion to dismiss King's complaint, Illinois Bell argues that (1) Section 704(a) does not protect work stoppages in violation of a collective bargaining agreement; (2) that plaintiff's complaint lacks the necessary jurisdictional allegations to state a claim for relief under Title VII;¹ and (3) that plaintiff's action is barred by laches. Additionally, Illinois Bell has filed a motion to strike certain exhibits attached to plaintiff's memorandum of law.

According to the allegations of the complaint, plaintiff was hired as a draftsman by defendant in January, 1969. On May 4, 1970, a group of black employees presented a list of grievances to defendant's representatives. These grievances contained numerous allegations of racial discrimination by defendant. The employees refused to return to work until their grievances were resolved. As a consequence, they were suspended from their positions with defendant. In response to their suspensions, the group formed a picket line outside of defendant's corporate headquarters in Chicago. Up to this point William King was not involved in the activities.

On May 5, 1970, King and other employees, both black and white, joined the picket line. The picketing occurred during working hours. Two days later, King represented the demonstrators as their spokesperson in a meeting with defendant's officials, who warned King that the demonstrators would be fired if they did not return to work. According to the collective bargaining agreement between the employees' union and defendant, work stoppages were expressly prohibited and each party had the power to discipline violators of this provision.²

On May 11, 1970, King and other demonstrators were terminated as employees of Illinois Bell. Approximately one month after their termination, King and other terminated employees, acting at the request of defendant, returned to be considered for re-employment. Eight of the fifteen employees who returned were re-hired. King was not. In explaining this decision, Illinois Bell stated that King was a poor worker and had a poor attitude. King, however, alleges that these reasons were false and racially motivated, and that Illinois Bell's refusal to re-hire him was caused by his participation in the work stoppage and picketing. King further alleges that his participation in these activities was protected under Section 704(a) from any form of employer retaliation or discrimination. Thus, we come to the issue presented by this case: whether a work stoppage by union members, during working hours to protest an employer's alleged racial discrimination in employment practices, is protected by Section 704(a), even though the work stoppage contravenes a collective bargaining agreement between the company and the employees' union.

This issue raises significant questions concerning the interplay and accommodation of important policies embodied in the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The former is designed to eliminate economic warfare between employer and employee, such as strikes and lockouts, through the use of collective bargaining and peaceful arbitration of labor disputes. See, e. g., Boys Markets v. Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 243, 90 S.Ct. 1583, 26 L.Ed.2d 199 (1969) and Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957). The latter manifests a Congressional intent to achieve equality of employment opportunity by eliminating those practices that discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. See, e. g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973) and Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1969). Before attempting to integrate these policies, we will review the existing boundaries of the protection afforded by Section 704(a).

Section 704(a) provides in pertinent part:

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).

A cursory analysis of the statute's wording reveals two types of activity which are protected from employer retaliation: one, opposition to employment discrimination, and two, participation in any administrative or judicial proceeding under the Act. For purposes of convenience, the former will be referred to as the "opposition" clause and the latter as the "participation" clause. Plaintiff claims that his actions were within the purview of the opposition clause.

The legislative history of the Act provides no illumination on the parameters of the opposition clause.³ Consequently, we turn our attention to those cases which have attempted to delineate its contours.

In Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972), vac. on other grounds, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1972), plaintiff, a black civil rights activist, was laid off by the defendant during a general reduction in its work force. Green protested his discharge as being racially motivated. As part of this protest, he participated in an illegal "stall-in" on the access roads to the defendant's plant. Shortly after the demonstration, defendant publicly advertised for mechanics, a position for which the plaintiff was fully qualified. Plaintiff promptly applied for re-employment in this position. Defendant refused to rehire the plaintiff because of his participation in the "stall-in." Plaintiff's complaint alleged that the defendant violated both section 703(a) and 704(a) of Title VII in refusing to rehire him. In considering plaintiff's section 704(a) allegation, the Green court stated lawful demonstrators who oppose employment discrimination as well as those who complain to the EEOC are protected from employer retaliation by section 704(a). 463 F.2d at 341. Participants in unlawful conduct, however, were held to be outside of the protective umbrella of the opposition clause. 463 F.2d at 341. See also Bullock v. Mumford, 166 U.S.App. D.C. 59, 74, 509 F.2d 384, 399 (D.C.Cir. 1975). Thus, the protection afforded by the opposition clause is limited by state criminal laws, assuming that those laws are otherwise valid.

On certiorari, the issue of whether these unlawful protests were protected activities under Section 704(a) was not presented to the Supreme Court. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 797 n. 6, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1972).⁴ However, in passing, the Court implicitly commented on the limits of section 704(a) as follows: "Nothing in Title VII compels an employer to absolve and rehire one who has engaged in such deliberate, unlawful activity against it." 411 U.S. at 803, 93 S.Ct. at 1825. Thus, we believe it clear that the opposition clause of section 704(a) is limited to lawful activities.

Moreover, it appears that even some forms of lawful opposition to alleged employment discrimination may be unprotected. In Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976) a senior scientist at the Worcester Foundation persistently and vociferously complained of alleged sex discrimination being practiced by the Foundation. Her aggressive opposition was so vehement and pervasive that it seriously disturbed her colleagues and disrupted the working environment. The Hochstadt court faced the issue of whether lawful opposition to employment discrimination may lose the protection of the opposition clause when it becomes excessively disruptive and upsets the employer's interests in securing loyal and cooperative employees. In resolving this question, the court applied a balancing test which explores the tolerable limits of conduct in each particular employment setting:

In such instances, we think courts have in each case to balance the purpose of the Act to protect persons engaging reasonably in the activities opposing sexual discrimination, against Congress' equally manifest desire not to tie the hands of employers in the objective selection and control of personnel. 545 F.2d at 231.

The court concluded that plaintiff had gone "too far" and plaintiff's opposition activities had impermissibly damaged the employer's legitimate interests "in maintaining a harmonious and congenial working environment" at the Foundation. 545 F.2d at 233. The Green and Hochstadt decisions teach us that the opposition clause does not give an employee an unlimited license to complain, but only protects lawful opposition which is deemed reasonable in light of the employment setting and interests at stake.⁵

In the case at bar, Illinois Bell urges that strikes by...