King v. Kansas City Public Service Co.

• Decision Date: 06 January 1936
• Citation: 91 S.W.2d 89,233 Mo.App. 82
• Parties: GEORGE KING, RESPONDENT, v. KANSAS CITY PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, APPELLANT
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

91 S.W.2d 89

233 Mo.App. 82

GEORGE KING, RESPONDENT, v. KANSAS CITY PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, APPELLANT

Court of Appeals of Missouri, Kansas City

January 6, 1936

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County.--Hon. Thomas J Seehorn, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Judgment affirmed.

Charles L. Carr, Cooper, Neel, Kemp & Sutherland and E. E. Ball, for appellant.

(1) The court erred in giving to the jury Instruction No. 1, as requested by plaintiff. (a) An instruction that gives a jury a roving commission to return a verdict for plaintiff and base its verdict on speculation, constitutes prejudicial error against a defendant. Brashear v. Mo. Power & L Co., 49 S.W.2d 639, l. c. 644. (b) An instruction predicating a verdict for plaintiff, that does not submit the surrounding circumstances to the jury to identify the instruction with the particular accident and to properly apply the law with respect thereto, constitutes prejudicial error against the defendant. Alexander v. Hoenshell, 66 S.W.2d 164, l. c. 167-168; Owen v. Chicago, G. W. R Co., 47 S.W.2d 195, l. c. 196-197; Northern v. Chesapeake & G. F. Co. (Mo.), 8 S.W.2d 982, l. c. 995. (c) Where two vehicles are traveling in opposite directions on their respective right sides of the street, the humanitarian doctrine in its broadest scope does no commence to operate until the one vehicle (the one in which plaintiff was riding in this case) makes a lefthand turn to go in front of the other vehicle. Plaintiff's Instruction No. 1 does not so limit the humanitarian doctrine herein. Phillips v. Henson, 326 Mo. 282, l. c. 289, 30 S.W.2d 1065, l. c. 1067; McCoy v. Home Oil & Gas Co., 48 S.W.2d 113, l. c. 117. (d) Instruction No. 1, requested by plaintiff, constitutes prejudicial error against defendant in that the instruction does not submit the facts pleaded (and shown by the evidence) and is not limited to such facts. Milliken v. Thyson Com. Co., 202 Mo. 637, l. c. 654, 100 S.W. 604, l. c. 608; State ex rel. Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Ellison, 270 Mo. 645, l. c. 654-655, 195 S.W. 722, l. c. 723-724; State ex rel. Hurley v. Becker (Mo.), 66 S.W.2d 524, l. c. 525-526; Bennett v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 80 S.W.2d 914, l. c. 919; Mitchell v. Wabash Ry. Co. (Mo.), 69 S.W.2d 286, l. c. 290; Gandy v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 329 Mo. 459, l. c. 467, 44 S.W.2d 634, l. c. 637-638. (e) When a case is submitted to a jury solely on the humanitarian doctrine, as here, it is prejudicial error to inject--submit or advise the jury--in an instruction that contributory negligence is or is not a defense--the humanitarian doctrine issues alone should be submitted. (f) Where primary negligence is not submitted to the jury the humanitarian doctrine issues alone should be submitted and negligence on the part of plaintiff or his auto driver should not be submitted or included. Schulz v. Smercina, 318 Mo. 486, l. c. 498-501, 1 S.W.2d 113, l. c. 118-120; Reith v. Tober (Mo.), 8 S.W. 607, l. c. 611-612; Gettys v. American Car & Foundry Co. (Mo.), 14 S.W.2d 85, l. c. 88; Sillman v. Munger Laundry Co. (Mo.), 44 S.W.2d 159, l. c. 162, 163; Gray v. Columbia Terminals Co., 52 S.W.2d 809, l. c. 813; Clayton v. Hydraulic Press Brick Co., 27 S.W.2d 52, l. c. 56; Galvin v. Forrest, 72 S.W.2d 177, l. c. 182; Freeman v. Berberich (Mo.), 60 S.W.2d 393, l. c. 395; Wholf v. K. C., Clay County & St. J. Ry. Co. (Mo.), 73 S.W.2d 195, l. c. 196-199, particularly 198; Willhauck v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (Mo.), 61 S.W.2d 336, l. c. 339; Wolfson v. Cohen (Mo.), 55 S.W.2d 677, l. c. 680; Pence v. K. C. Laundry Service Co. (Mo.), 59 S.W.2d 633, l. c. 638; Kleinlein v. Foskin, 321 Mo. 887, l. c. 899-900, 904-905, 13 S.W.2d 648, l. c. 649, 653-654, 656-657; Quinn v. Berberich, 51 S.W. 2d 153, l. c. 154-156; State ex rel. Berberich v. Haid (Mo.), 64 S.W.2d 667, l. c. 669. (g) The same facts which tend to convict a person of contributory negligence ofttimes tend to demonstrate defendant's non-liability (or liability) for humanitarian negligence. Freeman v. Berberich (Mo.), 60 S.W.2d 393, l. c. 395, 396; Iman v. Walter Freund Bread Co. (Mo.), 58 S.W.2d 477, l. c. 480-481; Pentecost v. St. L. Merchants' B. T. R. R. Co. (Mo.), 66 S.W.2d 533, l. c. 535; Payne v. Reed (Mo.), 59 S.W.2d 43, l. c. 47. (h) When a case is submitted to a jury solely on the humanitarian doctrine, as here, it is prejudicial error to submit or advise the jury in an instruction, as here, that the verdict should be for the plaintiff "regardless of whether you believe the Ford driver or plaintiff were sober or not"--the humanitarian doctrine issue alone should be submitted. Freeman v. Berberich (Mo.), 60 S.W.2d 393, l. c. 395. (i) A court (whether by instruction or otherwise) should not, as here, invade the province of the jury by passing or commenting upon the credibility of witnesses. Larsen v. Webb (Mo.), 58 S.W.2d 967, l. c. 971; Rearden, Admr., v. St. L. & S. F. R. R. Co., 215 Mo. 105, l. c. 140, 114 S.W. 961, l. c. 972; Granby M. & S. Co. v. Davis, 156 Mo. 422, l. c. 430, 57 S.W. 126, l. c. 129; Bryan v. Wear, 4 Mo. 106, l. c. 110; Sanders v. Armour & Co., 292 S.W. 443, l. c. 446-447; Wigmore on Evidence, 1935, pages 171-172. (j) Said Instruction No. 1 is argumentative and improperly comments on and singles out the evidence. Causey v. Wittig (Mo.), 11 S.W.2d 11, l. c. 14-15; State v. Poor, 286 Mo. 644, l. c. 658, 228 S.W. 810, l. c. 814-815; Jones v. St. L.-S. F. Ry. Co., 287 Mo. 64, l. c. 78, 228 S.W. 780, l. c. 784; Imboden v. St. L. Union Tr. Co., 111 Mo.App. 220, l. c. 242-243, 86 S.W. 263, l. c. 269; Rice v. Jefferson City B. & Tr. Co. (Mo.), 216 S.W. 746, l. c. 751, 753; Costello v. Kansas City, 280 Mo. 576, l. c. 587, 219 S.W. 386, l. c. 389; Messer v. Gentry, 220 Mo.App. 1294, l. c. 1301, 290 S.W. 1014, l. c. 1016-1017; Rock v. Keller, 312 Mo. 458, l. c. 477, 489, 278 S.W. 759, l. c. 764, 768; Phares v. Century Electric Co. (Mo.), 82 S.W.2d 91, l. c. 94-95; Smith v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 84 S.W.2d 161, l. c. 165-166; Graesser v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 78 S.W.2d 551, l. c. 553-554. (k) Instruction No. 1, given at the request of plaintiff, and which predicates a verdict for plaintiff, considered either as a whole or in its various parts, as herein pointed out, is erroneous, being confusing, inconsistent, ambiguous and misleading to the prejudice of defendant. Freeman v. Berberich (Mo.), 60 S.W.2d 393, l. c. 395 and other cases cited supra, under Point 1. (2) The court erred in modifying instruction lettered "G," as requested by defendant (appellant)--in refusing said instruction lettered "G," as requested by defendant, in modifying the same and giving same to the jury as modified. Bryant v. K. C. Rys. Co., 286 Mo. 342, l. c. 351-352, 228 S.W. 472, l. c. 474-475; McClanahan v. St. Louis-S. F. R. Co., 147 Mo.App. 386, l. c. 403, 409-410, 126 S.W. 535, l. c. 540, 541-542, and many cases cited; Copeland v. Wabash R. R. Co., 175 Mo. 650, l. c. 667, 75 S.W. 106, l. c. 110. (a) Testimony contrary to known physical facts cannot be regarded otherwise than impotent to establish any fact other than its own utter futility and can have no probative force to support a verdict. The court should so rule in passing upon a demurrer to the evidence and, if the case is submitted to a jury, the court, upon request for an instruction concerning testimony contrary to physical facts, should advise the jury that it is their duty to disregard such testimony so contrary to the physical facts. Sexton v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 245 Mo. 254, l. c. 272-274, 149 S.W. 21, l. c. 25; Huss v. Heydt Bakery Co., 210 Mo. 44, l. c. 69, 108 S.W. 63, l. c. 71; Gray v. Levy, 48 S.W.2d 20, l. c. 23; Maxwell v. Kansas City, 52 S.W.2d 487, l. c. 492-493; Aldridge v. Mo. P. R. R. Co., 215 Mo.App. 217, l. c. 231, 256 S.W. 93, l. c. 97; Nugent v. Kauffman Milling Co., 131 Mo. 241, l. c. 252-253, 33 S.W. 428, l. c. 430-431; Zalotuchin v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 127 Mo.App. 577, l. c. 584-585, 106 S.W. 548, l. c. 550. (b) An instruction, as here, before being modified by the court, advising a jury that "it is the duty of the jury . . . to be governed by . . . physical facts" and also advising the jury that "you may ignore and disregard" testimony to the contrary, in fact and in effect tells the jury that testimony contrary to physical facts must be ignored and disregarded; the word "may" necessarily being construed as "must." 39 Corpus Juris 1392-1394; McMillan v. Barnard F. S. & C. Hospital, 304 Mo. 635, l. c. 651-652, 264 S.W. 410, l. c. 415; State ex rel. Connor v. St. Louis, 158 Mo. 505, l. c. 509-511, 59 S.W. 1101, l. c. 1102; Spaulding v. Suss, 4 Mo.App. 541, l. c. 551. (c) An instruction, as here, after being modified by the court, advising a jury that "it is the privilege of the jury . . . to be governed by . . . physical facts" and advising the jury that "you may ignore and disregard" testimony to the contrary, in fact and in effect tells the jury that testimony contrary to physical facts may or may not be ignored and disregarded in the discretion of the jury; the word "may" in connection with the word "privilege" necessarily being construed to leave a discretion in the jury as to whether the jury will or will not base the verdict upon such impossible evidence. 39 C. J. 1392-1394; Conduitt v. Trenton Gas & E. Co. (Mo.), 31 S.W.2d 21, l. c. 26; High v. Quincy, O. & K. C. R. R. Co., 318 Mo. 444, l. c. 452-453, 300 S.W. 1102, l. c. 1105; Hall & Robinson v. Wabash R. R. Co., 80 Mo.App. 463, l. c. 470-471; State ex rel. Mackey v. Hyde, 315 Mo. 681, l. c. 690, 286 S.W. 363, l. c. 366; State ex rel. Prewitt v. Thompson (Mo.), 66 S.W.2d 109, l. c. 112. (3) The court erred in overruling defendant's (appellant's) motion for new trial.

Cowgill & Popham, John F. Cook and Louis Wagner for respondent.

(1) There...