King v. L & L Investors, Inc., 61-30

• Citation: 136 So.2d 671
• Decision Date: 29 January 1962
• Docket Number: No. 61-30,61-30
• Court: Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
• Parties: Lillian S. KING and Isabelle S. Blue, Appellants, v. L & L INVESTORS, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee.

Page 671

136 So.2d 671

Lillian S. KING and Isabelle S. Blue, Appellants, v. L & L INVESTORS, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee.

No. 61-30.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Jan. 29, 1962.

Paul A. Louis, Bertha Ciaire Lee and N. J. Durant, Miami, for appellants.

Glasel, Meyer & Leben Hollywood, and Joseph Pardo, Miami, for appellee.

Before CARROLL, BARKDULL and HENDRY, JJ.

CARROLL, Judge.

In King v. L & L Investors, Inc., Fla.App.1961, 133 So.2d 744, we reversed a final decree of foreclosure and remanded the cause to the trial court with directions to enter a summary final decree for the defendants dismissing the complaint. A petition for rehearing, petition for modification and/or clarification of opinion, and a motion to supplement the record by adding certain new evidence, all filed by the appellee, were denied, and the mandate of this court issued and was filed in the circuit court on November 15, 1961.

On January 4, 1962, on motion of the appellants, who were the defendants below, the chancellor entered an order on the mandate, setting aside the foreclosure decree and the sale made thereunder, dismissing the complaint and directing that possession be restored to defendants. More than 15 days after the filing of the mandate, and without having sought permission of the appellate court, the appellee-plaintiff through new counsel filed a motion in the trial court suggesting that appellants had made false representations to the district court of appeal, and moving the trial court to set aside the order on the mandate and, in effect, reject the judgment of the appellate court for that reason. The plaintiff also moved the trial court to stay proceedings on the mandate pending a proposed petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court from the decision of this court. The chancellor granted the motion for stay, fixed a supersedeas bond of $1,000, and, proceeding on the motion to set aside this court's decision for supposed fraud on the appellate court, ordered the defendant-appellants to appear before him on a named day to be questioned regarding the matters in the plaintiff's said motion.

The cause is now before us on appellants' petition for prohibition and for a writ to carry into effect the mandate.

In the case of State ex rel. Mortgage Investment Foundation, Inc. v. Knott, Fla.1957, 97 So.2d 265, the Supreme Court dealt with a similar situation and granted prohibition. In that case the Supreme Court had reversed the trial court and directed it to enter a decree for specific performance of a contract. A petition for rehearing and a motion to file a bill of review in the lower court were filed in the Supreme Court and denied, after which the mandate of the court was issued and filed in the trial court. Thereafter the trial court granted the appellee's motion to proceed there to review the cause by a bill of review. As a preface to granting prohibition the Supreme Court said (97 So.2d at 266):

'The trial court had no jurisdiction to enter the questioned order. The rendition of the opinion and judgment and the issuance of the mandate of this Court directing the entry of a decree of specific performance removed any discretion which the trial court had in the matter and left him vested only with the power to enter such decree in accordance with the requirements of the mandate. Our judgment superseded and nullified the previous judgment of the circuit court and the only power remaining in that court over the proceedings was to carry out and place into effect the order and judgment of this Court. State v. Citrus County, 1935, 117 Fla. 792, 158 So. 705. Moreover, had this Court not acted adversely upon a motion for leave to file a bill of review, the lower court would have had no power to enter the questioned order without being first authorized to do so by leave granted by this Court. Bloxham v. Florida Cent. & P. R. Co., 1897, 39 Fla. 243, 22 So. 697; State ex rel. Reynolds v. White, 1898, 40 Fla. 297, 24 So. 160; Reynolds v. Florida Cent. & P. R. Co., 1900, 42 Fla. 387, 28 So. 861.'

In State ex rel. Gibbs, v. Circuit Court of Eleventh Judicial Circuit, 140 Fla. 378, 191 So. 699, 700, the Supreme Court said:

'The law is settled in this State that when a cause has been appealed and judgment rendered by the Appellate Court, interference therewith on the part of the lower Court by any proceeding other than such as is directed by the Appellate Court will be prohibited. * * *'

In Petition of Vermeulen, Fla.App.1960, 122 So.2d 318, 320, the district court of appeal in the first district, speaking through Chief Judge Wigginton, said:

'Courts are the mere instruments of the law and can will nothing. In the over-all scheme for administering justice courts at the various levels of authority are required to discharge their lawful duties within the orbit of their respective jurisdictions. When one court has completed its judicial functions with respect to any matter brought before it, its responsibility as to such matter ends. If on appeal the result reached by the court of original jurisdiction is reversed or modified, that court is required to effectuate with fidelity and dispatch the mandate of the superior court. The reason for this rule is obvious. When a particular judgment is directed by the appellate court, the lower court is not acting on its own motion, but in obedience to the order of its superior. What that superior says it shall do, it must do, and that alone. Public interest require that an end shall be put to litigation, and when a given cause has received consideration on appeal, its merits determined, and the cause remanded with specific directions, the court to which such mandate is directed has no power to do anything but obey the mandate. Under any other rule of procedure litigation would never be ended, the harmony of the whole judicial system would be inevitably marred, its integral parts brought into conflict, resulting in disorganization, disorder, incalculable mischief and confusion. The end product of any other rule would by a government of men instead of a government of law.'

In the present case the trial court had no jurisdiction to enter the questioned orders. When this court had rendered its opinion and judgment and issued its mandate with directions to the trial court to enter a decree for the defendants and dismiss the complaint, the chancellor was without discretion to do otherwise, and was vested only with power to enter such decree in accordance with the requirements of the mandate.

The matter set forth in plaintiff's motion to the trial court which was the basis for the order to defendants to appear for proceedings aimed at setting aside the judgment of the appellate court, had been presented to this court in a motion with the ...