King v. Prospect Point Fishing Club

• Decision Date: 05 May 1915
• Docket Number: 1.
• Citation: King v. Prospect Point Fishing Club, 94 A. 780, 126 Md. 213 (Md. 1915)
• Parties: KING v. PROSPECT POINT FISHING CLUB.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

94 A. 780

126 Md. 213

KING v. PROSPECT POINT FISHING CLUB.

No. 1.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

May 5, 1915

Appeal from Circuit CourtNo. 2 of Baltimore City; James M. Ambler Judge.

Suit by the Prospect Point Fishing Club against James King.Decree for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.Affirmed in part reversed in part, and remanded.

Daniel S. Sullivan and Albert S. J. Owens, both of Baltimore, for appellant.Charles Morris Howard, of Baltimore, for appellees.

STOCKBRIDGE J.

The question presented by the record in this case is the right of the appellees to the specific performance of an agreement for renewal, contained in a lease from the predecessor in title of the present appellant, to the appellees, 11 in number.The paper out of which the controversy arises is as follows:

"Baltimore, Md. April 30, 1908.

This lease, made this 30th day of April, one thousand nine hundred and eight, by Louis Sinsheimer, of Baltimore city, as party of the first part, and Ernest Kaiser, Henry HarmanWilliam Kerner, Louis Hugel, Henry Hugel, Thomas Little, William Hugel, John Walz, John Eigner and William Pfaffenberger, trading as the Prospect Point Fishing Club, as parties of the second part.

Now whereas, in consideration of the payment of the annual rent of fifty dollars payable by the parties of the second part to Louis Sinsheimer, quarterly in advance, beginning on the first day of May, 1908, the said Louis Sinsheimer does hereby lease for a period of five years renewable for an additional period of twenty years at sixty dollars per year, unto the said Ernest Kaiser, Henry Harman, William Kerner, Louis Hugel, Henry Hugel, Thomas Little, Wm. Hugel, John Walz, John Eigner and Wm. Pfaffenberger, trading as Prospect Point Fishing Club, all that tract or parcel of land lying in Baltimore county, and described as follows, viz.: Beginning for the same at a stone placed at a pine tree at a head of a small cove emptying into Dark Head and running northeasterly alongside said cove ninety feet to a pine tree marked 'S.E.,' thence southeasterly along said cove one hundred and thirty-six feet to a stone alongside of a tree on the bank of Dark Head, thence running southwesterly along Dark Head two hundred and eighty feet to a stake in the bank on said Dark Head; thence running westerly two hundred feet to a stone, thence northeasterly by a straight line to the place of beginning.

Being the same piece or parcel of ground which by lease dated the 30th day of April, 1903, was leased by the parties of the second part, viz.: Ernest Kaiser, Henry Harman, Wm. Kerner, Louis Hugel, Henry Hugel, Thomas Little, Wm. Hugel, John Walz, John Eigner and Wm. Pfaffenberger, trading as the Prospect Point Fishing Club.

The parties of the second part do further agree that they will not conduct upon said premises any saloon, hotel, or bawdyhouse, and will not interfere with other tenants on said premises.

It is also further agreed that if the said rent shall be in arrears thirty days, then the said Louis Sinsheimer shall have the right to distrain for the same.

It is also further agreed that the said parties of the second part shall not assign this lease without the written consent of said Louis Sinsheimer, nor sublet a portion of said ground leased.

It is further agreed that the improvements placed by the parties of the second part shall be removable by them at the expiration of their term.

Witness our hands and seals this thirtieth day of April, one thousand nine hundred and eight.Jno.E. Eigner.

Louis Sinsheimer.

Wm. Pfaffenberger.

Ernest Kaiser.

Geo. W. Kerner.

Henry Harman.

Louis Hugel.

Henry Hugel.

William Hugel

John Walz, Jr.

Thomas Little."

The appellee had originally entered upon the property referred to in the lease in April, 1903, five years before the signing of the paper just quoted.Sinsheimer, who is named as lessor in the paper, in April, 1909, conveyed a tract of 53 acres, including that leased to and occupied by the appellees, to the present appellant.The lease was therefore in force, and the appellees in occupancy of the property at the time of the transfer from Sinsheimer to King.The five-year period named in the lease having expired, the appellees filed a bill to require King to carry out the agreement embodied in the following language contained in the lease:

"The said Louis Sinsheimer does hereby lease for a period of five years renewable for an additional period of twenty years at sixty dollars per year *** all that tract or parcel of land," etc.

Mr. King seeks to avoid the execution of a renewal lease for a period of 20 years, and various grounds are set up to sustain his contention.

To maintain a bill for specific performance it is requisite, and conceded, that the agreement which the court is asked to require to be performed must be fair, just, reasonable, bona fide, certain in all its parts, and made upon a good and valuable consideration.Griffith v. Bank, 6 Gill & J. 424, and numerous cases since.While a decree for specific performance is never ex debito justitiæ, the rules controlling a court of equity, where this nature of relief is asked, have been so often and so clearly stated that it is unnecessary now to repeat them.

The first contention on behalf of the appellant is that the agreement is too uncertain in its character to admit of a decree for specific performance.Several grounds are urged as to the supposed indefiniteness of the agreement; thus the fact that the property is in the state of Maryland nowhere appears in the agreement is given as a basis for the supposed indefiniteness, and the case of Ellis v. Park,8 Tex. 205, is relied on to support the proposition, a decision which the editor of Cyc., in a note on page 859 of vol. 16, characterizes as "anomalous."The general rule in that respect is stated in Cyc. vol. 16, pp. 858, 859, as follows:

"Courts have judicial notice of the prominent geographical features of the territory over which or state in which they exercise jurisdiction.*** Courts sitting in a particular state or territory have judicial knowledge of the geographical position of its political divisions, such as counties, cities and villages."

This rule was expressly adopted in this state in Acton v. State,80 Md. 551, 31 A. 419, and numerous cases might be cited from nearly every state in the country.For example, in Higgins v. Bullock,66 Ill. 37, andBailey v. Birkhofer,123 Iowa, 59, 98 N.W. 594, it was held that the names of the counties of a state are a matter of judicial knowledge.In this respect, therefore, the contention of Mr. King cannot be sustained.

Objection is also made to the description as contained in the lease.While it may well be that the description could have been more precise, it cannot be assumed, as the appellant does, that a surveyor could not go upon the ground and identify and mark it out definitely.Certain distinct landmarks are called for, and if any one of them should not be found, it would be a comparatively easy matter to reverse the call from another, and so fully locate the premises.The case largely relied on in this contention is the case of Gorter v. Gale,86 Md. 687, 39 A. 527, in which this court held an agreement too indefinite for enforcement which described the land simply as 13,650 acres more or less in Rockingham county, Va.There was no further description attempted to be given in that case, either by reference to the title, by a specification of metes and bounds, or as adjoining or bounding upon other tracts or lots.The case was therefore widely different from that now presented.

In the case of Duvall v. Myers, 2 Md. Ch. 401, which was a bill filed alleging a contract with regard to the cutting of wood, the paper set up as the contract was not signed by one of the parties, and the signature of the other was disputed, and the case did not present one in which there was any contract or agreement shown.In Geiger v. Green, 4 Gill, 472, there was no contract, merely a license for the digging of ore, and it was therefore properly held not to present a case for the specific performance of a contract.

In Gelston v. Sigmund,27 Md. 334, where there was a rental by written memorandum for 1 year, under which the tenant had occupied the property for 10 years, upon a verbal understanding that Gelston would, from time to time, renew the lease upon Sigmund's paying the same rent as could be obtained from other parties, our predecessors refused to decree specific performance upon the ground of indefiniteness, no certain amount of rent being alleged or shown, and no obligation upon Sigmund to remain in the property or to pay any definite rent.In the present lease there was a definite term, five years, provided for; the rent, a certain sum, $50, during that period; and then an agreement which is the basis of this action, which provided for a renewal of a period of 20 years at an increased rental, namely, $60 per annum.The decree cannot, therefore, under recognized equity rules be refused upon the ground of the uncertainty of the contract.

The argument further is that the appellees...