King v. Reid

Decision Date04 March 1983
PartiesJulia Ann KING v. Kathi REID. 81-721.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Sarah S. Frierson of Collins, Galloway & Smith, Mobile, for appellant.

Beth Marietta, Mobile, for appellee.

BEATTY, Justice.

This is an appeal by the defendant, Julia King, from an adverse judgment rendered against her in an unlawful detainer action. We reverse and remand.

Mrs. Julia King, age 77, is the second wife and widow of Forest A. King who died testate on June 21, 1978. Forest King's first wife died after their marriage of some 47 years, leaving two daughters, Katherine (now Kathi Reid) and Edith (now Edith Brown). Subsequently Forest King married the defendant and they lived together for about eight years at his residence located at 3001 East Riverside Drive in Mobile.

On July 5, 1972, when Mrs. Julia King was approximately 67 years of age, Mr. King executed a last will and testament containing six articles. Article Two devised to Julia King "all clothing, jewelry, household goods, personal effects, automobiles and all other tangible property owned by me at the time of my death." Article Three left to Julia King "all cash on hand or on deposit and all securities, choses in action or other intangibles." Article Five devised the residue to Mrs. King. Article Four devised "to my daughters, Katherine K. Reid and Edith K. Brown, equally, my real property and improvements thereon located in Mobile, Alabama, used by me as my residence, located at 3001 East Riverside Drive, Mobile, Alabama." Article Six appointed Katherine K. Reid as executrix.

On that same day and following the execution of this will Julia King executed the following document:

"I, Julia Ann King, the wife of Forest A. King, the Testator, have read the contents of the foregoing Last Will and Testament executed by him this day. With full knowledge of the contents of the foregoing Last Will and Testament, I do hereby consent to the provisions contained therein and waive my rights as a widow vested in me under the laws of intestate succession and dower and homestead in the State of Alabama. I consent to the provisions of my husband's will, even though the same may result in less benefits to me than would be provided in the case of my husband's intestacy." (Emphasis added.)

Shortly after Forest King's death this will was admitted to probate and Kathi Reid was appointed executrix. Mrs. King continued to live in the house at 3001 East Riverside Drive under circumstances to be discussed. A dispute arose between Kathi Reid and Mrs. King concerning the latter's continuing residence there, ultimately resulting in a wrongful detainer action being brought by Mrs. Reid against Mrs. King in the Mobile County District Court. In that action Mrs. King denied, inter alia, that her residence was as a tenant but claimed a life estate in the property under Code of Ala.1975, §§ 6-10-60 and -62. The district court awarded the plaintiff Reid a judgment for the premises. Mrs. King appealed from that judgment to the circuit court. On the day appointed for trial in that court, Mrs. King admitted signing the waiver document, alluded to earlier, but asserted by counter affidavit that she "did not read it nor understand its ramifications," that she "was told to sign and ... did sign;" that she "did not receive any consideration for signing it;" and "was not aware of the value of [her] husband's estate nor what amount [she] was legally entitled to receive."

Following a hearing, the circuit court awarded a judgment for the plaintiff for the property. This appeal ensued.

The defendant has raised three issues which we will consider seriatim:

I. Whether or not plaintiff could properly bring an action of unlawful detainer.

Under this issue the defendant argues that the plaintiff has failed to show either (1) lawful entitlement to the premises, or (2) the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship.

On the first point, the authorities are collected in Murphree v. Griffis, 215 Ala. 98, 109 So. 746 (1926), showing that real property devised passes immediately on the death of the testator to the devisee. Accordingly, title passed to the devisees Reid and Brown.

No issue is made concerning the right of Kathi Reid to bring this action, either as executrix or as a co-owner. The only issue raised in this context is whether a landlord-tenant relationship existed between Reid and Mrs. King. Although it is not absolutely clear from the record, we believe that the facts justify the conclusion that a landlord-tenant relationship was established between Reid and Brown, on one hand, and Mrs. King on the other. We quote from the record:

"Q. After your father's death, did you and your sister and Mrs. King have some conversations about the property on which she resided at the time?

"A. Yes, we did.

"Q. And what were those conversations?

"A. Well, the day of the funeral we sat down as a family group and tried to make some decisions about what we would do with the property. It was my father's original intention that either my sister or myself buy each other out and use it as a home residence, or make it accessible to the grandchildren, but we neither--she lived in Iowa. I lived in Baldwin County, and neither one of us at that time knew exactly what we would like to do with the property.

"Q. Did you make any agreement with Mrs. King so far as her remaining on the property?

"A. Yes, we asked that she pay the taxes and insurance to make it economically feasible for us to do that.

"Q. Did you ever at any time say that she could continue--or tell her that she could continue to live there for the rest of her life?

"A. No, I did not.

"Q. And did I, if you know, write her a letter--

"A. Yes, I have a copy of that letter.

"Q. --confirming that agreement?

"[Plaintiff's Counsel]: Your witness.

"THE COURT: How long was this to go on that she was to stay there and pay the taxes and the mortgage?

"THE WITNESS: Sir, we never made that decision because I felt at that time that that wasn't a decision that I could make due to her age, and we didn't know what our continuing financial situation would be, and we would have loved to have kept it forever, but we just simply can't afford to.

"[Plaintiff's Counsel]:

"Q. Did she repay the mortgage and taxes--

"A. She paid the insurance one time prior to the hurricane in 1979, and we've received nothing since that time.

"Q. And since that time, have you made the taxes and insurance payments?

"A. Yes, I've had to.

Because of its relation to the payment of taxes and insurance on the premises by Mrs. King in exchange for her residence on the property, this arrangement at most became a tenancy from year to year, and possibly could have been a tenancy for a term of months. In any case, there was no objection to this evidence for the plaintiff establishing a landlord-tenant relationship nor to the plaintiff's evidence concerning the defendant's default. See generally, East v. Tingley, 254 Ala. 309, 48 So.2d 316 (1950). However, the fact that the trial court could have found such a relationship, for the purpose of deciding whether unlawful detainer would lie, does not necessarily control the outcome, as the ensuing discussion will show.

II. Whether or not the widow is entitled to reside on the premises until the devisees clear the property of the homestead rights or until the homestead is sold.

For this proposition the defendant cites us to Code of Ala.1975, §§ 6-10-60 and -62, and § 6-10-99. The defendant concedes, however, that the homestead here was in fact devised, and hence that §§ 6-10-60 and -62 have no operative effect. Defendant maintains, however, that § 6-10-99 nevertheless requires entitlement in the widow to the homestead until it is either cleared or sold. Section 6-10-99 states:

"Where a homestead right exists in property devised by will, the person or persons to whom said property is devised may clear the said property of such homestead right by paying to the personal representative, in lieu of such...

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7 cases
  • KITCHENS BY AND THROUGH KITCHENS v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
    • March 6, 1985
    ...and tenant." Osborn v. Brown, 361 So.2d 82, 87 (Ala.1978); see also Hackney v. Griffin, 244 Ala. 360, 13 So.2d 772 (1943). In King v. Reid, 428 So.2d 611 (Ala.1983), an agreement simply to pay the taxes and insurance in return for permission to stay in the premises created a landlord-tenant......
  • Smith v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
    • June 9, 1995
    ...Act was not properly raised and ruled upon at the trial level, and that it is, therefore, not properly before this court. See King v. Reid, 428 So.2d 611 (Ala.1983); Williams v. State, 504 So.2d 282 The merchants, likewise, filed motions for summary judgment; they argued that this action wa......
  • Williams v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
    • July 16, 1986
    ...... King v. Reid, 428 So.2d 611 . Page 284. (Ala.1983). Appellant's argument that plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the equitable doctrine of laches, ......
  • King v. Reid
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Alabama
    • July 27, 1984
    ...Smith, Mobile, for appellant. Beth Marietta, Mobile, for appellee. ALMON, Justice. This is the second appeal of this case. In King v. Reid, 428 So.2d 611 (Ala.1984), this Court held that if equity required that Mrs. King be relieved from her waiver of her homestead rights, "the homestead la......
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