King v. S.R. Smith, Inc.

• Decision Date: 26 April 1991
• Citation: 578 So.2d 1285
• Parties: Barbara Briant KING v. S.R. SMITH, INC., et al. 89-1704.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 1285

578 So.2d 1285

Barbara Briant KING v. S.R. SMITH, INC., et al.

89-1704.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

April 26, 1991.

Jere L. Beasley and Kenneth J. Mendelsohn of Beasley, Wilson, Allen, Mendelsohn & Jemison, Montgomery, for appellant.

Peter V. Sintz and Mark S. Gober of Sintz, Campbell, Duke, Taylor & Cunningham, Mobile, and William Mudd of McDaniel, Hall, Conerly & Lusk, Birmingham, for appellees.

KENNEDY, Justice.

Barbara Briant King, as administratrix of the estate of her son, Kenneth Halpern, filed an action under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine (AEMLD) against S.R. Smith, Inc., and S.R. Smith Company, Inc., as well as other defendants not involved in this appeal. The parties have agreed that for purposes of this appeal the relationship of the companies is not an issue, and we refer to the companies together as "S.R. Smith." Ms. King claimed that S.R. Smith failed to warn of the danger associated with diving from a diving board that it manufactured and sold. The trial court entered a summary judgment for S.R. Smith and, pursuant to Rule 54(b), A.R.Civ.P., made the judgment final.

Ms. King's action was before this Court on an appeal from a summary judgment for another defendant in King v. National Spa & Pool Institute, Inc., 570 So.2d 612 (Ala.1990). In that case we stated the facts as follows:

"In the fall of 1987, Ms. King's intestate purchased a house and a lot in Mobile, Alabama. There was an in-ground, vinyl-lined swimming pool that had been constructed in 1981 by Southern Leisure Pool and Supply Corporation ("Southern Leisure"), a defendant not involved in this appeal. The evidence before the trial court showed that the swimming pool met the ... 'Suggested Minimum Standards for Residential Swimming Pools' ('standards') [of the National Spa and Pool Institute, which we refer to as 'the trade association'] and was of the size, shape, and dimensions that the trade association prescribed for allowing the type of diving board that had been installed with the pool. In May, 1988, Ms. King's intestate dove into the pool from the diving board. He did not slip, trip, or otherwise go into the pool unintentionally. It can reasonably be inferred that Ms. King's intestate hit his head on the bottom or side of the pool and sustained a broken neck that caused permanent quadriplegia. Approximately eight and one-half months later, he died of pneumonia secondary to quadriplegia."

570 So.2d at 613.

The standard used to determine the propriety of a summary judgment is found in Rule 56(c), A.R.Civ.P.:

"The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."

The burdens placed on the parties by this rule have often been described:

"The burden is on one moving for summary judgment to demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact is left for consideration by the jury. The burden does not shift to the opposing party to establish a genuine issue of material fact until the moving part has made a prima facie showing that there is no such issue of material fact. Woodham v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 349 So.2d 1110 (Ala.1977); Shades Ridge Holding Co. v. Cobbs, Allen & Hall Mortg. Co., 390 So.2d 601 (Ala.1980); Fulton v. Advertiser Co., 388 So.2d 533 (Ala.1980)."

Schoen v. Gulledge, 481 So.2d 1094, 1096-97 (Ala.1985).

In determining whether there is substantial evidence to defeat a summary judgment motion, this Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and resolves all reasonable doubts against the movant. Sanders v. Kirkland & Co., 510 So.2d 138 (Ala.1987).

Ms. King alleges that S.R. Smith failed to warn Mr. Halpern of the dangers associated with diving from its board into the pool. Under the AEMLD, if a manufacturer or seller places goods on the market that are imminently dangerous when put to their intended purpose and the defendant knows or should know that the goods can create danger when used in their customary manner, the defendant must exercise reasonable diligence to make such danger known to the persons likely to be injured by the product. Hawkins v. Montgomery Industries International, Inc., 536 So.2d 922 (Ala.1988); Gurley v. American Honda Motor Co., 505 So.2d 358 (Ala.1988); Cazalas v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 435 So.2d 55, 58 (Ala.1983).

S.R. Smith argues that it did "everything within its power to comply with its duty to warn," because, it argues, it places a warning sticker on each diving board sold that reads as follows: "Danger: Control your dive. Serious injury or death can result if head strikes bottom." That warning sticker...