King v. Schaeffer

• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: FRANKUM; FELTON, C.J., and PANNELL
• Citation: King v. Schaeffer, 115 Ga.App. 344, 154 S.E.2d 819 (Ga. App. 1967)
• Decision Date: 01 February 1967
• Docket Number: No. 42324,No. 1,42324,1
• Parties: John B. KING v. E. H. SCHAEFFER et al

Page 819

154 S.E.2d 819

115 Ga.App. 344

John B. KING v. E. H. SCHAEFFER et al.

No. 42324.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 1.

Feb. 1, 1967.

Rehearing Denied March 3, 1967.

Certiorari Granted May 4, 1967.

Judgment Modified July 6, 1967. See 155 S.E.2d 815.

Grant, Spears & Duckworth, William H. Duckworth, Jr., Atlanta, for appellant.

King & Spalding, Charles H. Kirbo, Robert L. Steed, John C. Staton, Jr., Atlanta, for appellees.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

FRANKUM, Judge.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the trial court sustaining the defendants' motion for a summary judgment. The petition was originally in 3 counts, but since the plaintiff fails to argue or insist upon Count 3 before this court, it will be treated as having been abandoned. Count 1 is, in substance, an action for damages on account of the defendants' tortious procurement of the plaintiff's discharge from his employment as superintendent of the trim shop at the Fisher Body plant in Atlanta, a division of the General Motors Corporation. Count 2 is an action for slander. It appears from the recore before this court that at all times material hereto the defendant Schaeffer was manager of the plant wherein the plaintiff was employed, and the defendant Doran was shift plant superintendent of the plant. Plaintiff contended, in substance, that the defendants Schaeffer and Doran, shortly after being transferred to their positions of authority over the plaintiff, developed animosity toward, and dislike for, the plaintiff, without the plaintiff having given them any cause therefor, and that they embarked upon a scheme of intimidation and coercion of the plaintiff to induce him to resign, and that failing in that scheme, they thereupon conspired to procure, and did procure, his discharge or dismissal by higher authority. The defendants moved for a summary judgment relying upon affidavits and depositions of the defendants and of the plaintiff and of various witnesses. The trial court granted that motion as to all counts.

1. 'As a general rule, one who maliciously or without just cause or excuse procures the discharge of a servant from his employment is liable to him for the resulting damages, since an employee has a property right in his contract of employment which may not be unlawfully interfered with by another.' 57 C.J.S. Master and Servant § 630 a, p. 434. The fact that the employment is at the will of the employer does not alter this rule, because where a third person induces an employer to discharge an employee under a contract terminable at will but under which the employment would have continued indefinitely, the right to terminate the employment reposes in the will of the employer, unaffected by the will of such third person. And if it be shown that the employer's determination to discharge the employee was in fact induced by the wrongful act of such third person, then such act will afford the employee a right of action against such third person. Ott v. Gandy, 66 Ga.App. 684, 19 S.E.2d 180; Studdard v. Evans, 108 Ga.App. 819, 135 S.E.2d 60.

2. Upon consideration of a motion for summary judgment the evidence adduced thereon in the form fo depositions, affidavits, etc., should be construed most strongly against the movant, and, if under any view of the case there appears to be a dispute as to any material issue of fact, a summary judgment should not be granted. Motorola, etc., Electronics v. South Ga. Natural Gas Co., 104 Ga.App. 376, 381-382, 121 S.E.2d 672; McCarty v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 107 Ga.App. 178(1), 129 S.E.2d 408; Simmons v. State Farm, etc., Ins. Co., 111 Ga.App. 738, 739, 143 S.E.2d 55; Malcom v. Malcolm, 112 Ga.App. 151, 153, 144 S.E.2d 188.

3. With respect to Count 1 the appellees contend that the grant of the summary judgment was correct because the affidavit and deposition of J. C. Owens, who was general factory manager of the...