King v. Sharpe
| Decision Date | 14 June 1957 |
| Docket Number | No. 36749,No. 1,36749,1 |
| Citation | 99 S.E.2d 283,96 Ga.App. 71 |
| Parties | D. C. KING v. W. P. SHARPE et al |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Where there is competent evidence in the record to support the verdict it will
not be set aside for insufficiency of the evidence.
2. The effect of permitting evidence of the same legal import as that to which an objection is interposed is to waive the objection.
3. While the practice has been repeatedly disapproved by our appellate courts, it is not ordinarily harmful error for the trial judge to state that instructions he gives in charge to the jury are requested by the plaintiff or defendant.
4. Where a portion of the court's charge excepted to on the ground that it is not correct as an abstract statement of law contains several distinct propositions of law, some of which are abstractly correct the exception cannot be sustained. Chandler v. Mutual Life & Ind. Ass'n, 131 Ga. 82(6), 61 S.E. 1036.
Suit was filed by D. C. King against William Paul Sharpe and James K. Puckett in the City Court of Gwinnett County. The petition, omitting reference to jurisdictional averments, alleged in substance: that the defendant Sharpe was the owner of a 1953 Ford tractor and 'pole trailer'; on December 22, 1954, James K. Puckett, an employee of Sharpe, at about 7:30 in the morning was driving the truck to which the trailer was attached north on U. S. Highway No. 29 in the direction of Lawrenceville, and reached a point approximately 7.1 miles from Lawrenceville; that the plaintiff at the same hour was driving his 1950 G.M.C. truck in a southerly direction on the hishway and was crossing the bridge over Jackson Creek; that the plaintiff's pickup truck and the defendant Sharpe's trailer-truck then being operated by James K. Puckett reached the bridge at the same instant; that suddenly the pole trailer came loose from the tractor and flew through the air for approximately six feet swerving sharply to the plaintiff's side of the road onto the hood and front part of the plaintiff's truck; that the tractor and trailer were of the type used in hauling heavy loads of logs and timber; when the plaintiff saw the trailer was loose from the tractor he immediately applied his brakes and attempted to stop and get out of the trailer's way but was unable to prevent the collision; that the impact of the trailer striking the plaintiff's truck demolished its front end and inflicted certain severe and permanent injuries on the plaintiff; the speed at which the plaintiff was driving when approaching the bridge was approximately 25 or 30 miles per hour; the plaintiff was at that time and when the collision occurred operating his truck in the west lane and on his side of the highway; that on the south side of Jackson Greek Bridge there is a hill that slopes in the direction of the bridge from which direction the tractor and pole trailer approached at a high and excessive rate of speed; the collision resulting in injury to the plaintiff and damage to his truck were proximately caused by certain acts of negligence on the defendant Puckett's part, for whose conduct the defendant Sharpe was under the doctrine of respondeat superior responsible; the acts of negligence as specifically alleged in the petition were: '(a) In driving said tractor and pole trailer on said hishway at a speed greater than was reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having no regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing; (b) By failing to have the speed of the tractor and pole trailer so controlled to avoid colliding with other vehicles or conveyances on said highway; (c) By failing to have equipment upon the tractor, pole trailer, and combination thereof in good working order and adjustment and in safe mechanical condition so as not to endanger other persons and vehicles upon said highway; (d) By failing to have the tractor, pole trailer and combination thereof equipped to control the movements of and to stop and hold such vehicle, including two separate means in applying the brakes each of which to be effective to apply the brakes to at least two wheels; (e) By failing to anticipate the presence of other motor vehicles on said highway; (f) By failing to drive said tractor and trailer on the right side or east side of said highway in order not to block the southbound lane of traffic on said highway; and not having the coupling or other equipment of the tractor and pole trailer in good working order so as not to let the same come loose; (g) In letting the pole trailer come loose from the tractor and fly through the air into petitioner's lane of traffic and into and against the front end of the said G.M.C. truck; (h) In failing to reduce the said speed of the tractor and trailer as he approached the bridge of said highway.' The petition particularly described the plaintiff's injuries and showed the damage to his truck in detail; it also alleged that the plaintiff had by reason of the defendant's negligence and the resultant injury to him suffered severe pain over a named period of time, and that the plaintiff had sustained other special damages as a consequence of the collision negligently caused by the defendants. The petition related that the injuries negligently inflicted upon him by the defendants were permanent, serious and of such disabling nature that he would never again be able to labor and earn money. There were allegations as to the nature of the plaintiff's employment at the time of the collision, his average earnings, his age and other data showing the amount he was entitled to recover for loss of earning capacity.
The defendants filed their joint answer. It was admitted that the collision occurred. The ownership of all the vehicles involved in the collision was admitted, as was the fact that the defendant Puckett was the servant of the defendant Sharpe, acting within the scope of his employment on the occasion of the collision. The fact that the plaintiff was injured and his pickup truck damaged was admitted, but the nature and extent of the plaintiff's injuries was neither admitted nor denied, both defendants professing not to be informed as to those matters. The answer denied that the road lay north and south and averred that it led east and west, denied that the collision was caused by the negligence of the defendants, or either of them. The answer then set out the defendants' version of the collision substantially as follows: that at the time of the collision the defendant, James K. Puckett, was operating the truck and trailer along the highway toward Lawrenceville at a safe, careful and lawful rate of speed; that he entered upon said bridge across Jackson Creek when the way was clear ahead and no vehicle was on the said bridge, and that the tractor trailer had almost cleared the bridge when the plaintiff, D. C. King, driving his 1950 one-half ton G.M.C. pickup truck, traveling at a rapid rate of speed, after pulling his pickup truck suddenly to the left undertook to enter and pass defendants' vehicle on the bridge and in so doing pulled the left front of the pickup truck into the front wheel on the left side of the trailer attached to defendants' truck; that at the time this contact was made defendant Puckett had his truck and trailer as far to the right side of the road in the direction in which he was going as possible; that at the time of and prior to the collision the pole trailer attached to defendants' truck was securely attached in the normal way and with the usual connections used in the vehicle, and defendant Puckett had complete and safe control thereof until it was struck by the front of plaintiff's pickup truck with such forceful impact that it broke completely in two the coupling pole that attached the pole trailer to defendants' truck; defendants show that the reason that the coupling of the trailer came loose from defendants' tractor was solely because of the force of the impact of it being run into by the pickup truck of plaintiff; that the vehicle he was operating on this occasion was an ordinary two ton truck and trailer of very ordinary size, not exceeding 25 or 26 feet in length over all, with usual and lawful width of such vehicles, and while it was ordinarily used for the hauling of lumber, the vehicle was empty on this occasion; the defendants show that plaintiff did not undertake to reduce the speed of the pickup truck he was operating, which speed was high and excessive, until he had gotten within a few feet of the bridge, he then drove onto the narrow bridge which the defendants' truck had already entered, and for some reason, by suddenly applying his brakes or pulling his pickup truck to the left to miss the abutment of the bridge, drove the front part of his pickup truck into the trailer of the defendants; with ordinary care and caution plaintiff could have reduced the speed of his pickup truck and permitted the vehicle which defendant Puckett was driving to have cleared the narrow bridge; that plaintiff was operating his pickup truck at a high and unlawful speed of more than 60 miles per hour, and without having his pickup truck under control, taking into consideration the circumstances and conditions existing as required by law; that all of the injury and damage sustained by plaintiff was brought about by his own negligence and his failure to use due care in the operation of his pickup truck, and that in the premises the defendants, and each of them, were without fault.
The defendants in the same answer set up a cross-action, the allegations of which are now of no concern in deciding the questions involved in the case.
Both the plaintiff and the defendants submitted evidence in support of their respective contentions.
The jury returned a general verdict for the defendants. The plaintiff's amended motion for new trial was denied, and he excepts.
J. Ray Merritt and Handsel Morgan, Buford, for plaintiff in error.
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Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Power
...correct or the erroneous--it is intended to take exception.' Burden v. Gates, 190 Ga. 300(2), 9 S.E.2d 245; King v. Sharpe, 96 Ga.App. 71, 83, 99 S.E.2d 283. The judgment of this court in Liberty National Life Ins. Co. v. Power, 111 Ga.App. 458, 142 S.E.2d 103, supra, is The trial judge did......
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...of the law, and, therefore, was not subject to the criticism that it was unsound as an abstract principle of law. King v. Sharpe, 96 Ga.App. 71, 83, 99 S.E.2d 283. In view of the judge's cautionary instructions as set forth above, coupled with his instructions that the burden was upon the p......
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