King v. State
| Decision Date | 17 February 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 1D11–5136.,1D11–5136. |
| Citation | 79 So.3d 236 |
| Parties | Michael Anthony KING, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Glenna Joyce Reeves, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jay Kubica, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Appellant seeks review of his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. We reverse because the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress.
The facts adduced at the motion hearing established that an officer was dispatched to appellant's home following a domestic disturbance call. When the officer arrived, only the wife remained in the home. The officer, who knew appellant was a convicted felon, asked the wife if her husband had any guns in the home. The wife responded in the affirmative. The officer asked where the gun was located. The wife led him to the bedroom she shared with appellant and to the master closet which contained both her and appellant's clothing. The wife told the officer that the gun was in a safe on the floor of the closet, and she did not have a key. The officer removed the safe from the closet and took it to his patrol car. He then pried it open with a screwdriver. A gun was found inside, and appellant was subsequently arrested. Only appellant's belongings were found in the safe. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding the gun would have inevitably been discovered because probable cause existed to obtain a search warrant.
As a threshold matter, the trial court erred in denying the motion by relying on the inevitable discovery doctrine because the facts do not support its application. Specifically, the inevitable discovery doctrine may be employed to deem a search lawful if probable cause to obtain a warrant existed and officers are “in the process of obtaining a warrant” when the search occurs. In McDonnell v. State, 981 So.2d 585, 592–93 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), this court recognized that the inevitable discovery doctrine will not be applied in every case where the police had probable cause for a search warrant; the focus is on whether officers made an effort to get a warrant prior to searching and whether strong probable cause existed for the warrant. “ ‘[T]o excuse the failure to obtain a warrant merely because the officers had probable cause and could have inevitably obtained a warrant would completely obviate the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment.’ ” U.S. v. Reilly, 224 F.3d 986, 995 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting U.S. v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271, 1280 n. 7 (9th Cir.1986)). Here, the officer testified that he did not attempt to get a warrant, and the State presented no evidence suggesting that he did. Accordingly, the trial court could not rely on the doctrine to support its denial of the motion to suppress.
On appeal, the State does not address the inevitable discovery doctrine but asserts affirmance is the correct result for two reasons. First, the State asserts the wife had authority to consent to the search of the safe because it was common property between her and her spouse. “[W]hen the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search by proof of voluntary consent, it ... may show that permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises.” U.S. v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974). However, common authority to consent does not, in and of itself, “permit search of any personal property contained within the premises.” Kelly v. State, 77 So.3d 818, 825 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). “ ‘[T]here is no right on the part of a third party to consent to a search of personal property belonging to another person unless there is evidence of both common authority over and mutual usage of the property.’ ” Id. (quoting Marganet v. State, 927 So.2d 52, 57–58 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)). This is so because “ ‘the right to consent rests not on the law of property but rests rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.’ ” Id. Further, a marital relationship, without something more, will...
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Thomas v. State
...conduct,” the Fourth District determined the inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply. Id. at 995–96. Finally, in King v. State, 79 So.3d 236, 238 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), we squarely held that the inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply where police “did not attempt to get a warrant.” T......
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Rodriguez v. State
...cause to obtain a warrant existed and officers are ‘in the process of obtaining a warrant’ when the search occurs." King v. State, 79 So.3d 236, 238 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). In King, the First District found that the trial court erred in relying on the inevitable discovery doctrine where "the o......
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