King v. State

• Decision Date: 01 September 1983
• Docket Number: No. 151,151
• Citation: 477 A.2d 768,300 Md. 218
• Parties: Maurice KING v. STATE of Maryland. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 218

300 Md. 218

477 A.2d 768

Maurice KING v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 151, Sept. Term, 1983.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

July 12, 1984.

Howard L. Cardin, Baltimore, for appellant.

Stephanie J. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., ELDRIDGE, COLE, DAVIDSON, RODOWSKY and COUCH, JJ., and JAMES C. MORTON, Jr., Associate Judge of the Court of Special Appeals (retired), Specially Assigned.

JAMES C. MORTON, Jr., Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals (retired), Specially Assigned.

In this case, we are confronted with the question whether the State's failure to provide appellant with adequate notice, pursuant to Maryland Rule 734 b, of its intent to seek enhanced punishment under Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol., 1983 Supp.) Art. 27, § 36B(b), mandates reversal of appellant's sentence as a subsequent offender for unlawful possession and transportation of a handgun. We conclude that although the State's notice was defective, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we shall uphold the sentence and affirm the decision of the Court of Special Appeals in King v. State, 55 Md.App. 672, 466 A.2d 1292 (1983).

Because the issue presented on this appeal involves only the propriety of the sentence imposed, it is unnecessary to delineate the facts underlying King's conviction. King was arrested for a violation of Art. 27, § 36B(b) ¹ in July 1981. After praying for a jury trial, King was arraigned in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on September 14, 1981. At this time, the State served King with notice of its intent to seek additional or mandatory sentence as authorized by Art. 27, § 36B(b)(ii). ² Under this statute, if a defendant has previously been convicted of unlawful possession and transportation of a handgun then the Court must impose at least a sentence of one year imprisonment, but may impose a sentence of up to ten years imprisonment. The notice in this case provided:

"[T]he State will seek increased punishment as authorized by law since Maurice King, Defendant, was convicted of the violation(s) of Art. 27 Sections 36; 36B of the State of Maryland.

"The maximum increased/mandatory punishment, if the Court determines that the Defendant is a subsequent offender, is imprisonment for 10 years and/or a fine of __________, or both on the above stated charges."

King was convicted by a jury on August 10, 1982. The court deferred sentencing proceedings until September 17, 1982. At the sentencing hearing, appellant objected for the first time to the State's attempt to seek enhanced punishment. Appellant asserted that the notice of his prior conviction for unlawful possession of a handgun was inadequate under Maryland Rule 734. ³ King contended in particular that the State's notice failed to comply with the requirement in Rule 734 b that "[t]he notice shall set forth each prior conviction to be relied upon." Appellant's counsel admitted to the trial court that there was no surprise, and indeed that there was full knowledge on the part of both appellant and his attorney, with respect to the prior conviction. Nevertheless, he claimed that the technical failure to comply with the rule was itself prejudicial and should result in rendering the enhanced punishment statute inapplicable. The trial court dismissed this objection on the basis that, although the State's failure to serve adequate notice pursuant to Rule 734 b was "inexcusable," the lack of surprise as well as prejudice to the defendant's ability to prepare his defense necessitated a finding of substantial compliance with the purpose of the rule. The trial court sentenced appellant to ten years imprisonment.

The Court of Special Appeals affirmed King's sentence in King v. State, 55 Md.App. 672, 466 A.2d 1292 (1983). The court determined that the notice served King was timely and informed him that the State intended to seek enhanced punishment based on the prior conviction. Therefore, the notice was sufficient to allow the defendant to competently plead to and defend the current charge, especially given his actual knowledge of the prior conviction relied on by the State. The court concluded that the underlying purpose and function of Rule 734 were satisfied in this case. 55 Md.App. at 687, 466 A.2d at 1300. Because the intermediate appellate court apparently relied on the trial court's conclusion that there was "substantial compliance" with the rule, we issued a writ of certiorari in order to clarify two points: First, that the State did not substantially comply with the notice provision contained in Rule 734 b; and second, that the failure to comply with the rule constitutes, given the facts of the present case, harmless rather than reversible error.

This Court delineated the dimensions of the harmless error doctrine in Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 350 A.2d 665 (1976). We stated, "[W]hen an appellant, in a criminal case, establishes error, unless a reviewing court, upon its own independent review of the record, is able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict, such error cannot be deemed 'harmless' and a reversal is mandated." 276 Md. at 659, 350 A.2d at 678. In Dorsey, we determined that the erroneous admission of a detective's testimony, which included his opinion as to the basis of defendant's guilt, directly influenced the jury's verdict of guilty and, thus, constituted reversible error. 276 Md. at 659-60, 350 A.2d at 678-79.

Since our decision in Dorsey, we have applied the harmless error doctrine in several cases which involved alleged violations of the various Maryland Rules applicable to criminal actions. For example, in Noble v. State, 293 Md. 549, 446 A.2d 844 (1982), the appellant claimed that his absence from the voir dire of a juror at the bench violated his right under Maryland Rule 724 to be present at every stage of his trial. Judge Eldridge noted for the Court, "This Court has firmly adhered to the principle that the rules of procedure are precise rubrics to be strictly followed, and we shall continue to do so. A violation of one of these rules constitutes error, normally requiring such curative action or sanction as may be appropriate." 293 Md. at 557, 446 A.2d at 848. He went on to say, "It does not follow, however, that the harmless error doctrine has no application to the Maryland Rules and that a violation of a procedural rule can never be harmless. There is no basis in authority or logic for such a holding." 293 Md. at 558, 446 A.2d at 848. After determining that a violation of a procedural rule will not result in reversal of a criminal conviction if the standard for harmless error is satisfied, we held in Noble that the defendant's absence from the voir dire of a juror did not result in prejudice to him. Therefore, there was no reversible error. 293 Md. at 571-72, 446 A.2d at 856. For other cases involving violations of criminal rules in which the harmless error doctrine was considered, see, e.g., Broadway v. State, 298 Md. 237, 468 A.2d 351 (1983) (Rule 775 c: notice with respect to grounds for revocation of probation); Sherman v. State, 288 Md. 636, 421 A.2d 80 (1980) (Rule 758 a: previously dismissed indictments in jury room during deliberation); Johnson v. State, 283 Md. 196, 388 A.2d 926 (1978) (Rule 753 (now Rule 755): sequestration of witnesses).

The Dorsey standard for harmless error has been applied most frequently in cases raising questions concerning those proceedings which lead to the determination of a criminal defendant's guilt or innocence. Nothing in the cases, however, suggests that application of the standard should be limited to pretrial or trial proceedings. We note for purposes of clarification, therefore, that the harmless error doctrine as delineated in Dorsey applies not only to proceedings involving the determination of an individual's guilt or innocence, but also to proceedings involving his sentence after conviction. See Wiener v. State, 290 Md. 425, 450-51, 430 A.2d 588, 602 (1981).

Having established that the harmless error doctrine applies to the instant case, we turn to an analysis of the underlying purpose and function of the notice requirement contained in Rule 734 b. The propriety of subjecting repeat offenders to enhanced punishment "has long been recognized in this country and in England." See Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 623, 32 S.Ct. 583, 56 L.Ed. 917 (1912) (Court upheld constitutionality of bifurcated procedure, whereby fact of prior conviction was alleged in information and was proved at a proceeding subsequent to the current conviction). This Court first recognized the validity of imposing increased sanctions for repeat offenders in Maguire v. State, 47 Md. 485 (1878). In that case, the defendant was indicted for three counts of liquor law violations; each count was alleged to have been the defendant's second such offense. In his opening statement, the prosecutor read that part of the indictment containing the allegations of prior convictions. The Court rejected defendant's objection to this practice on the basis that it exposed him to double punishment. First, the Court noted that the rationale underlying enhanced punishment statutes is that a person who has previously been convicted of the crime with which he is currently charged is presumed to be aware of the penalties attaching to the offense. 47 Md. at 495. Judge Alvey remarked that if the first conviction was "insufficient to restrain his vicious propensities," a defendant "has no reasonable cause of complaint that his former transgressions, under the same law, are brought up in judgment against him." 47 Md. at 496. The Court further stated, "No constitutional objection exists to such regulation of punishment; and provisions in statutes similar to that under which the present indictment was framed, have been uniformly sustained, whenever...