King v. United States

• Decision Date: 21 December 1966
• Docket Number: No. 19641.,19641.
• Parties: Francina KING, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

125 US App. DC 318, 372 F.2d 383 (1966)

Francina KING, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 19641.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued March 10, 1966.

Decided December 21, 1966.

As Amended February 1, 1967.

Petition for Rehearing Denied February 1, 1967.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Mr. Mac Asbill, Jr., Washington, D. C. (appointed by this Court), with whom Mr. Murray S. Simpson, Jr., Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.

Mr. Allan M. Palmer, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. David G. Bress, U. S. Atty., and Frank Q. Nebeker and Victor W. Caputy, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before WILBUR K. MILLER, Senior Circuit Judge, and FAHY and LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judges.

LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judge:

Appellant was charged with second degree murder, but convicted of manslaughter for the fatal stabbing of her brother, Benjamin King, on November 22, 1964. She was sentenced to imprisonment for two to ten years.

The salient physical facts with respect to the crime are briefly as follows: On the afternoon of November 22, 1964, appellant went out to get some wine and beer. She returned to the residence she shared with her mother, drank the wine and beer, and was more or less "high" at the time her brother returned to the house. Benjamin hit her, apparently out of anger because appellant was drinking again and talking loudly. Appellant and her mother presented differing testimony as to the nature of Benjamin's assault — whether a mere slap, or a reeling blow followed by his pursuit of appellant into the kitchen. In response to this assault by a large and powerful man, appellant, a tiny woman, plunged a small knife used for peeling potatoes into his heart. Testimony conflicts as to the timing of the fatal blow — whether in immediate reaction to the assault by the decedent, or only after having been backed into the kitchen by him.

I

Appellant's main contention on appeal is that the District Judge should have granted her motion for a directed verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. She urges that a reasonable doubt of sanity must be held to exist in this case, in view of the "uncontradicted and inherently credible expert testimony" of two St. Elizabeths psychiatrists who had examined appellant — Dr. Charles Ruch, then assistant clinical director of the Dix Pavilion, and Dr. Alkinoos Vourlekis.

The two psychiatrists, Dr. Ruch and Dr. Vourlekis, agreed that appellant suffered from a personality disorder — described as passive-aggressive personality, with organic and alcoholic features — severe enough to be classified as a mental illness.¹ Dr. Vourlekis testified that the crime was "probably" the product of appellant's mental disease, while Dr. Ruch stated that the killing was "possibly" the product of her mental disease. Their testimony as to the dynamics of appellant's mental illness and its relation to the crime was in substance the same as this excerpt from the official hospital report filed with the court before the trial began:

The possible relationship between the alleged offense and the patient\'s personality disorder is best described in the following manner. The patient has extreme difficulty in getting her dependency needs met and tends to respond to aggression by passive obstructionism and by using alcohol to excess. However, when intoxicated her aggression is liberated and violent acts may occur such as the stabbing of her brother. Along with this, her lowered intellectual quotient causes her to display very poor judgment and not to consider alternative ways of dealing with situations.

Both doctors were asked about their observations of appellant in the hospital. Dr. Ruch noted that appellant was quiet and tended to stay to herself, showed an overly cooperative attitude, had "kind of a bland expression," rarely showed emotion, tended to be circumstantial, and exhibited a "kind of farawayness to her appearance, as though she was not particularly concerned about her rather difficult spot." Dr. Vourlekis testified that appellant was withdrawn and reclusive in the ward, that "she did not display the usual emotional range average people do," that her judgment was poor, and that she exhibited complete displacement of responsibility.

Both doctors testified as to the existence of some organic brain damage. This testimony will be considered in greater detail below. Appellant's history was also the subject of testimony by the psychiatrists. Dr. Ruch noted that appellant had a history of "pretty severe deprivation," had suffered "quite a bit of physical abuse" from the deceased and another man, and had been drinking heavily since she was 25 (she was then 40). Dr. Vourlekis testified appellant "felt always inferior," that she resented being treated as a baby and slapped around by her brother, that her children had been taken from her custody by court order in 1959.

The prosecutor elicited from Dr. Ruch that appellant was generally able to recognize the difference between right and wrong, although at the time of the stabbing she was "probably overwhelmed by emotion" and was "certainly emotional and pretty much out of control of herself."

Both on direct, and in particular on probing cross-examination, the psychiatrists testified on the issue of productivity — whether there was such causal connection that the offense could be regarded as the product of the mental illness. Dr. Ruch testified as follows on direct:

Where we have a personality disturbance, there are so many things involved that it is hard to say what caused her to do what she did. I say possibly on the basis that her passive-aggressive personality — frequently someone with a relatively severe illness like this will turn to the use of alcohol.

* * * * * *

Once someone is drinking — the drinking being related now to the personality disorder — once someone is drinking, there is a lessening of their inhibitions. Someone who is particularly angry for instance, when intoxicated may have a tendency to be more explosive, both verbally and possibly physically, and this is possibly what happened in this case.

On cross-examination he testified:

Once under the influence of alcohol a personality disturbance like this, where one tends to sit on one\'s anger, the person is in trouble emotionally in controlling their anger, and hence an act like this can occur. Now, whether — I can\'t say for certain it is a product. I can\'t say for certain that it isn\'t.

Dr. Vourlekis testified that in his opinion the crime was probably the result of appellant's mental illness. Persons with a passive-aggressive personality condition manage to have their strong dependency needs taken care of. But he continued Tr. 126-27:

Such people also have difficulties in varying degrees with authority figures. They harbor quite often a great amount of resentment towards authoritative figures, which when their controls get lower, this resentment can be acted out, can be manifested in other words.

Now, in Miss King\'s case, there seems to be an additional factor there, mainly alcohol which is well known for its effect in lowering controls. A person under the influence of alcohol does not control his actions as well as a person who is not under the influence.

The following colloquy on productivity between prosecutor and witness occurred after Dr. Vourlekis testified that appellant had told him that on November 22, 1964, she had consumed about a fifth and a pint of wine, plus six beers:

Q Was she capable of exercising the freedom of choice of having that first drink or not having that first drink that day?

A Well, I don\'t know.

Q You don\'t know. Why not?

A I don\'t know whether she had the freedom of choice.

Q Was she suffering from any mental defect which would impair her behavior so that she couldn\'t make that choice of taking that drink or not taking that drink?

A I am afraid I can\'t relate the two.

* * * * * *

Q It has been testified here that her brother reprimanded her for making too much noise, that he slapped her and she stabbed him with a knife. Was she capable of exercising the freedom of choice of stabbing or not stabbing?

A I would doubt it very much simply because she was under the influence of alcohol at that time.

On the insanity issue the Government also relied on the fact that appellant exhibited an excellent memory and the ability to respond logically to sustained questioning. As direct evidence, the Government produced only an officer who testified that on appellant's arrest shortly after the homicide she gave clear answers to all questions asked her, and that he thought she was of sound mind and not intoxicated.

Although the testimony in support of the insanity defense was impressive, we conclude that it was not sufficient "to compel a reasonable juror to entertain a reasonable doubt concerning the accused's responsibility," and hence not sufficient to require the judge to direct a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. McDonald v. United States, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 120, 123, 312 F.2d 847, 850 (1962) (en banc). Since McDonald, where we examined at some length the problem of expert testimony and jury consideration of the insanity question, this court has been chary of directed verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity, even where expert testimony is uncontradicted.² The case at bar seems a particularly apt occasion to recall, by quotation rather than attempt at paraphrase, this court's reasoning in McDonald, supra at 124, 312 F.2d at 851:

What psychiatrists may consider a "mental disease or defect" for clinical purposes, where their concern is treatment, may or may not be the same as mental disease or defect for the jury\'s purpose in determining criminal responsibility. Consequently, for that purpose the jury should be told that a mental disease or defect includes any abnormal condition of the mind which substantially affects mental or emotional processes and substantially

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