Kingan Packing Ass'n v. Lloyd
| Decision Date | 29 June 1909 |
| Citation | 73 A. 887,110 Md. 619 |
| Parties | KINGAN PACKING ASS'N v. LLOYD et al. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit Court of Baltimore City; Chas. W. Heuisler Judge.
Suit by the Kingan Packing Association against Annie E. Lloyd and others. From a decree dismissing the bill on demurrer plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
Argued before BOYD, C.J., and BRISCOE, PEARCE, SCHMUCKER, BURKE WORTHINGTON, and THOMAS, JJ.
Henry C. Kennard, for appellant.
Charles McH. Howard, for appellees.
This appeal raises the question of the constitutionality of chapter 337, p. 614, of the Acts of 1906. The purpose of that act is to provide a simple proceeding for the redemption of ground rents when their title is vested in trustees, or life tenants, or holders of a defeasible estate who have no power of sale.
The provisions of the act material to the present controversy are that "whenever a ground rent reserved by lease or sublease heretofore or hereafter created becomes redeemable," and the owner of the leasehold estate out of which the rent issues desires to redeem the same "and at the time of such desired redemption the title to said rent is vested in a trustee under a will, deed or other instrument for any trust, use or purpose, but without a power of sale in such trustee, or is vested in a life tenant with remainder over, vested or contingent, or is vested in the holder of a defeasible estate, but without a power of sale in such life tenant or such holder of a defeasible estate, any court of chancery having jurisdiction in the city or county" where the land subject to the rent lies "may, upon the exparte petition of such trustee, life tenant or holder of a defeasible estate, or upon petition of the owner of the leasehold or subleasehold who is entitled to redeem, and, after notice by service of process upon such trustee, life tenant, or holder of a defeasible estate" (or by order of publication if he be a nonresident), "order the conveyance of the reversion or subreversion and rent or subrent in such land by such trustee or life tenant or holder of a defeasible estate to the owner of the leasehold or subleasehold interests therein, upon the payment of the sum of money for which the said rent or subrent may be redeemable, together with a due proportion of the accruing rent to the date of such payment." The act then declares that a conveyance of the rent made under such an order of court shall, when duly recorded, vest in the grantee, not only the title of the trustee, life tenant, or owner of a defeasible estate who makes the deed, but also "of all other persons who are or may be entitled to any right, title, interest or estate in and to such reversion or subreversion, rent or subrent, either at law or in equity, and whether such person or persons so entitled may have vested or contingent interests therein, or whether such persons or any of them are or are not in being at the date of such redemption," and that the grantee shall not be liable to see to the application of the redemption money. It is further provided that it shall not be necessary to make parties to the petition to be filed under the provisions of the act any persons "beneficially interested in the subject-matter" thereof, other than such trustee, life tenant, or holder of a defeasible estate, who shall represent for the purposes of the proceedings upon the petition all parties interested in the subject-matter thereof. The trustee, life tenant, or holder of a defeasible estate, who may be authorized in any such proceeding to convey the rent to the leaseholder and collect the redemption money, is required to give bond for the faithful discharge of his duty, unless he has been excused from doing so by the instrument creating the trust, and to account for the money to the court, which is directed to require it to be so invested as to be held in the place and stead of the redeemed reversion, and rent "so as to inure in like manner to the benefit of the persons entitled to said reversion and rent." The act also authorizes the court, under certain conditions, to appoint a trustee to execute the deed and receive the redemption money, and provides that the costs of the proceedings be paid out of the redemption money.
This act is brought to us for construction in the present case under the following circumstances: The appellant owned three contiguous lots of ground on Holliday street, in Baltimore, which were subject to ground rents created by the same lease aggregating $120 per annum which became redeemable at a capitalization of 6 per cent., amounting to $2,000, on the 1st day of February, 1909, under Acts 1888, p. 645, c. 395. The reversionary estate in the lots, together with the rents, belonged to A. Parlett Lloyd. The appellant notified Mr. Lloyd of his intention to exercise his right of redeeming the rents, and Mr. Lloyd accepted the notice without objection, but died before the actual redemption was made, leaving surviving him a widow and two unmarried sons, and also two sisters. By his will he gave one-third interest in his reversionary estate in the lots, with the ground rents issuing therefrom, to his wife in her own right for life. The other two-thirds, together with the remainder in one-third, he gave to his wife in trust for his two sons for their respective lives, with remainders over to their children, with contingent remainder over to the right heirs of the testator. After the probate of Mr. Lloyd's will his wife, as trustee under his will, filed in the circuit court of Baltimore city a petition under Acts 1906, p. 614, c. 337, for authority to convey to the appellant by way of redemption the interest which she held as trustee under her husband's will in the ground rents in question. Having obtained an order of court for the conveyance and given bond as required by the statute, she, as trustee and in her own right, and the two sons of the testator, offered to unite in a conveyance of the rents to the appellant by way of redemption upon receipt of the redemption money. The appellant, desiring to redeem the rents, but being in doubt as to the soundness of the title which it would get to the rents under the proposed deed, declined to accept it and filed the bill in the present case, which the appellant's brief informs us was intended to invoke the jurisdiction conferred on the court by Acts 1868, p. 475, c. 273. In the bill, after setting forth the facts stated by us, and averring its desire to redeem the rents and readiness to pay the redemption price therefor, and its inability to secure a good title thereto under the proposed deed, the appellant prayed for a decree declaring its right to redeem the rents and the appointment of a trustee to receive the redemption money and execute a deed for them. The widow of Mr. Lloyd, in her own right and as trustee, and his two sons, and his two sisters, as his heirs at law, and also the husband of the one sister who was married, were made defendants to the bill, and were by it alleged to be all of the parties in esse interested in the rents. The defendants demurred to the bill, and the court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the bill, whereupon the plaintiff appealed.
Without pausing to inquire whether a bill like the present one by a leaseholder for the redemption of a ground rent falls within the contemplation of Acts 1868, p. 475, c. 273, which was primarily intended to provide for the sale of land and reinvestment of the proceeds of sale upon the application of a party interested therein, because of the advantage to be derived from the change of investment, we will proceed to the consideration of the efficacy of the ex parte proceedings for the redemption of the rents taken by Mrs. Lloyd as trustee under her husband's will in pursuance of Acts 1906, p. 614, c. 337. Those proceedings are conceded to have been in conformity with the provisions of that act, and therefore the question of its constitutionality is directly presented by the record. The appellant contends that the act is unconstitutional because its purpose is not sufficiently described in its title, and also because the proceeding authorized by it amounts to a taking without due process of law of the property of the persons not made parties to it who are beneficially interested in the rent to be redeemed. It is further recontended that the act was intended to apply only to cases in which the entire estate in the rent was held by a trustee, and not to those where some of the parties interested in the rent held the legal title to their estate.
The question of the sufficiency of the title to the act gives us little difficulty. It is entitled "An act to add an...
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