Kingbrook, Inc. v. Pupurs

• Decision Date: 18 October 2002
• Docket Number: No. 92162.,92162.
• Citation: Kingbrook, Inc. v. Pupurs, 779 N.E.2d 867, 202 Ill.2d 24, 269 Ill.Dec. 13 (Ill. 2002)
• Parties: KINGBROOK, INC., Appellant, v. John A. PUPURS et al., Appellees.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

779 N.E.2d 867

202 Ill.2d 24

269 Ill.Dec. 13

KINGBROOK, INC., Appellant, v. John A. PUPURS et al., Appellees.

No. 92162.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

October 18, 2002.

Robert C. Pottinger, Tyler A. Moore, of Barrick, Switzer, Long, Balsley & Van Eviera, Rockford, for appellant.

Holmstrom & Kennedy, P.C., Rockford (Kim M. Casey, of counsel), for appellees John A. Pupurs and Rockford Manufacturing, Inc.

Gary W. Leydig, of Worker, Sitko & Hoffman, L.L.C., Chicago, Robert G. Black, Naperville, for appellee R&D Thiel, Inc.

Justice FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

The subject of this appeal is appellate jurisdiction. The circuit court of Boone County entered summary judgment against plaintiff Kingbrook, Inc. (Kingbrook), and denied Kingbrook's motion to reconsider. Kingbrook appealed, but the appellate court found that Kingbrook's motion to reconsider was ineffective to toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. Accordingly, the appellate court found the notice of appeal to be untimely and dismissed Kingbrook's appeal. The question before us is: In a nonjury case, what degree of detail must be included in a motion to reconsider for such a motion to qualify as a "post-judgment motion" within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure (see 735 ILCS 5/2-1203 (West 1998)) and the rules of this court (see 155 Ill.2d R. 303(a)), such that the motion will toll the time for filing a notice of appeal until its disposition?

BACKGROUND

Kingbrook sued John A. Pupurs and Rockford Manufacturing, Inc. (Rockford), based on a theory of unjust enrichment, and sued R&D Thiel, Inc. (Thiel), for unjust enrichment and breach of contract. Although the issues before this court are solely procedural, we briefly note that according to the allegations of the complaint, Kingbrook is a commercial real estate agent which showed a specific property to Thiel. Thiel placed multiple offers on the property, but never completed a purchase from the original seller. Instead, the property was sold to Rockford, a corporation of which Pupurs is the sole shareholder. Rockford then sold the property to Thiel for $500,000 more than Rockford had paid the original seller. Kingbrook, characterizing Rockford's profit as a commission, sued Rockford, Pupurs and Thiel on the above-noted theories.

Rockford, Pupurs and Thiel (collectively, defendants) moved to dismiss Kingbrook's complaint for failure to state a claim, and the circuit court granted that motion. However, this judgment was reversed on appeal and the cause was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. Kingbrook, Inc. v. Pupurs, Nos. 2-98-1120, 2-98-0550 cons. (2001) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

It is at this time that the proceedings pertinent to this appeal began. On remand, defendants moved for summary judgment. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants on January 21, 2000. On February 17, 2000, Kingbrook filed a document titled "Motion For Reconsideration." The body of that document read, in its entirety, as follows:

"N[ow comes] the plaintiff, K[ingbrook, Inc.], an Illinois corporation, by and through its attorneys, Barrick, S[witzer], L[ong], B[alsley] & V[an Evera], and hereby moves the Court to reconsider its decision granting severing [sic] judgment in favor of the Defendants."

No additional materials in support of or opposition to the motion were filed by any party or requested by the circuit court. Kingbrook noticed up the motion within the time allowed by the circuit court rules, and the circuit court denied the motion on April 28, 2000.

On May 30, 2000, Kingbrook filed a notice of appeal. In the appellate court, defendants moved to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction, arguing that Kingbrook's notice of appeal was late because the motion to reconsider was not a proper post-judgment motion. The appellate court agreed with defendants and dismissed the appeal. No. 2-00-0611 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We granted Kingbrook leave to appeal. 155 Ill.2d R. 315(a).

ANALYSIS

Before this court there is but one central issue. The parties agree that the filing of a timely notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. R.W. Dunteman Co. v. C/G Enterprises, Inc., 181 Ill.2d 153, 159, 229 Ill.Dec. 533, 692 N.E.2d 306 (1998). The parties also agree that the notice of appeal was timely if and only if Kingbrook's motion to reconsider tolled the 30-day filing period.¹ The sole question is whether Kingbrook's motion did toll the filing period. The parties' arguments may be briefly summarized as follows. Kingbrook contends that neither the Code of Civil Procedure nor the rules of this court demand any specificity in post-judgment motions in cases decided without a jury, whereas the Code does explicitly require specificity in post-judgment motions in cases decided by a jury. Thus, Kingbrook argues, the motion filed in this case was sufficient because it was timely filed, was in proper form, and requested the appropriate type of relief. Defendants respond that a bare motion with no specifics, such as the motion in this case, cannot serve the purpose of a proper post-judgment motion and is nothing more than a subterfuge to delay the time for filing the notice of appeal. Such chicanery, defendants argue, should not be countenanced. Some detail, some argument, they contend, must be presented for a post-judgment motion to toll the time for filing the notice of appeal.

The pertinent portions of the Code and our rules read as follows. Our Rule 303(a)(1) governs when a notice of appeal must be filed in civil cases. It states that

"Except as provided in paragraph (b) below, the notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment appealed from, or, if a timely post-trial motion directed against the judgment is filed, whether in a jury or a nonjury case, within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the last pending post-judgment motion." 155 Ill.2d R. 303(a)(1).

Section 2-1203(a) of the Code, which governs post-judgment motions in cases decided without a jury, provides that

"In all cases tried without a jury, any party may, within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or within any further time the court may allow within the 30 days or any extensions thereof, file a motion for a rehearing, or a retrial, or modification of the judgment or to vacate the judgment or for other relief." 735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West 1998).

Kingbrook also calls our attention to section 2-1202 of the Code, which governs post-trial motions in cases decided by a jury. Section 2-1202(b) provides in part:

"Relief desired after trial in jury cases, heretofore sought by reserved motions for directed verdict or motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, in arrest of judgment or for new trial, must be sought in a single post-trial motion. * * * The post-trial motion must contain the points relied upon, particularly specifying the grounds in support thereof, and must state the relief desired, as for example, the entry of a judgment, the granting of a new trial or other appropriate relief." 735 ILCS 5/2-1202(b) (West 1998).

Our primary job in interpreting statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill.2d 493, 503-04, 247 Ill.Dec. 473, 732 N.E.2d 528 (2000). The plain language of a statute provides the most reliable indicator of legislative intent, and "`[w]e must not depart from the plain language of [a statute] by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the express legislative intent.'" Zimmerman v. Village of Skokie, 183 Ill.2d 30, 56, 231 Ill.Dec. 914, 697 N.E.2d 699 (1998), quoting Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill.2d 378, 389, 216 Ill.Dec. 550, 665 N.E.2d 808 (1996). Moreover, if the meaning is not unmistakable from the face of the statute, our civil appeals rules are to be interpreted liberally, in order that lawsuits may be decided on the merits. Parks v. McWhorter, 106 Ill.2d 181, 185, 88 Ill.Dec. 9, 478 N.E.2d 324 (1985); 735 ILCS 5/1-106 (West 1998).

Each side claims support for its position in previous decisions of this court. Defendants, rely on Beck v. Stepp, 144 Ill.2d 232, 162 Ill.Dec. 10, 579 N.E.2d 824 (1991), and Andersen v. Resource Economics Corp., 133 Ill.2d 342, 140 Ill.Dec. 390, 549 N.E.2d 1262 (1990), both of which involved the same basic question as the case at bar: whether a particular document constituted a post-judgment motion within the meaning of section 2-1203(a) of the Code. Defendants note that in those cases, this court explicitly stated that specificity is required in post-judgment motions. See Beck, 144 Ill.2d at 241, 162 Ill.Dec. 10, 579 N.E.2d 824; Andersen, 133 Ill.2d at 347, 140 Ill.Dec. 390, 549 N.E.2d 1262. They suggest that this precedent is conclusive.²

Kingbrook contends that Beck and Andersen are not controlling. Kingbrook argues that in both cases the court had already concluded that the documents in question were not post-judgment motions for other reasons than the lack of specificity and thus that the mention of specificity was dictum. Moreover, Kingbrook notes that when mentioning the specificity requirement, Beck merely cited Andersen, and the only authority cited in Andersen was Brown v. Decatur Memorial Hospital, 83 Ill.2d 344, 47 Ill.Dec. 332, 415 N.E.2d 337 (1980). Kingbrook contends that this chain of precedent casts doubt on the validity of the statements in Beck and Andersen, because Brown involved a post-judgment motion after a jury verdict. As Kingbrook points out, sections 2-1202 and 2-1203 of the Code differ, in that, the former—which governs post-judgment motions after a jury verdict—explicitly requires specificity and the latter does not. See Berg v. Allied Security, Inc., Chicago, 297 Ill.App.3d 891, 894-97, 232 Ill.Dec. 27, 697 N.E.2d 769 (1998),vacated &...