Kingman Park Civic Ass'n v. Williams, 04-CV-954.

• Decision Date: 10 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. 04-CV-954.,04-CV-954.
• Citation: 924 A.2d 979
• Parties: KINGMAN PARK CIVIC ASSOCIATION, et al., Appellants, v. Anthony A. WILLIAMS, et al., Appellees.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

924 A.2d 979

KINGMAN PARK CIVIC ASSOCIATION, et al., Appellants, v. Anthony A. WILLIAMS, et al., Appellees.

No. 04-CV-954.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued November 15, 2005.

Decided May 10, 2007.

Frazer Walton, Washington, DC, with whom Steven W. Teppler, was on the brief, for appellants.

John R. Hoellen, Assistant General Counsel for the Council of the District of Columbia, with whom Charlotte Brookins-Hudson, General Counsel for the Council of the District of Columbia, were on the brief, for appellants.

Stacy L. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Robert J. Spagnoletti, Attorney General, at the time the brief was filed, and Edward E. Schwab, Deputy Attorney General, at the time the brief was filed, were on the brief, for appellees.

Before REID, GLICKMAN, and KRAMER, Associate Judges.

KRAMER, Associate Judge:

The appellants appeal from the trial court's order granting a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment on their Complaint that the Ward Redistricting Amendment Act of 2001 ("Redistricting Act"), codified at D.C.Code § 1-1041.03 (2001), which reconfigured the eight election wards in the District of Columbia, violates the redistricting standards set forth in the District of Columbia Election Act, D.C.Code § 1-1011.01 (2001) ("D.C. Election Act"). We affirm the trial court's order.

I.

Appellants, the Chevy Chase Civic Association and the Kingman Park Civic Association (hereinafter referred to as the "Associations"),¹ filed suit in the Superior Court against the District of Columbia, the Mayor in his official capacity and the individual members of the Council of the District of Columbia in their official capacities (hereinafter referred to collectively as the "District of Columbia") after their communities were split between Wards 3 and 4 and Wards 6 and 7, respectively, by the redistricting process. The Council passed the Redistricting Act on June 19, 2001, setting out the new Ward boundaries, and it became effective on October 2, 2001. The redistricting process was in response to the 2000 federal decennial census, which revealed that the District of Columbia had undergone a significant demographic shift since the previous electoral wards were established.² Several plans were proposed and considered before the final redistricting scheme was enacted.

Before bringing their suit in the Superior Court, the Associations had filed a similar case in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging the validity of the Redistricting Act based on violations of § 2 of the federal Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, and, in addition, asserting D.C. Election Act claims. Concluding that the Associations had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under § 2 of the federal Voting Rights Act, the District Court dismissed the suit pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and declined to exercise pendant jurisdiction over the Associations' D.C. Election Act claims. Kingman Park Civic Ass'n v. Williams, No. 01-2675(GK), 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 15254 (D.D.C.2002).

The Associations appealed that ruling, and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, although rejecting the District Court's conclusion that the Associations had failed to state a claim, affirmed the District Court's judgment of dismissal on the alternative ground that the Mayor and Council were entitled to summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Kingman Park Civic Ass'n v. Williams, 358 U.S.App.D.C. 295, 348 F.3d 1033 (2003). (Kingman II). In reaching that judgment, the Circuit looked to the three predicate conditions set forth by the Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986), that are necessary to make out a prima facie case of vote dilution under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act:

1. That the minority group in question is "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district";

2. That the minority group is "politically cohesive"; and

3. That the "majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate."

Kingman II, supra, at 358 U.S.App.D.C. at 303-04, 348 F.3d at 1041-42.

The Circuit Court noted that the Associations had "not alleged that African American voters in Ward Six or Ward Three are politically cohesive or that Ward Six or Ward Three is characterized by racially polarized voting," nor had the Associations "submitted affidavits or any other evidence supporting such a conclusion." Kingman II, supra, at 358 U.S.App.D.C. at 304-05, 348 F.3d at 1042-43. Having determined that the District was entitled to summary judgment on the sole federal claim properly before the court, the Circuit Court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the pendent D.C. Election Act claims.

While their federal claims were pending appeal before the Circuit, the Associations brought the instant suit in the Superior Court alleging that the District's Redistricting Act violated the D.C. Election Act. The District of Columbia filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion,³ finding: (1) the wards under the Redistricting Act were sufficiently "compact and contiguous" because "a resident can reasonably access all portions of the election district[s] . . . without leaving the district," (2) "[t]here is no absolute requirement that census tracts not be split," (3) the Associations could not sustain their claim that minority votes were diluted because they did "not show[] [that the District of Columbia was] motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose," and (4) there was "no authority for the proposition that failing to fall within [the Council's Subcommittee on Labor, Voting Right and Redistricting]'s target range [which was less than the statutory dictate of 10%] results in violation of the statute." The trial court also held that the Associations were not collaterally estopped by the federal proceedings from bringing their claims in the Superior Court because the District Court had only addressed the federal Voting Rights Act and not the Election Act claims.

II.

The Associations now argue that the trial court erred in granting the District's motion by rejecting their various claims: first, that the boundaries of the District of Columbia's eight electoral wards established under the Redistricting Act are not sufficiently compact or contiguous and do not respect natural boundaries as required by the D.C. Election Act, D.C.Code § 1-1011.01 (2001); second, that the Redistricting Act violates the Election Act by splitting two census tracts, in violation of § 1-1011.01(e) of the Act; and third, that the Redistricting Act divides the African-American population between wards in a fashion that has the purpose and effect of diluting minority votes, in violation of § 1-1011.01(g) of the Act.⁴

"We review a `dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo,'" Washkoviak v. Student Loan Marketing Ass'n (Sallie Mae), 900 A.2d 168, 177 (D.C.2006) (quoting Oparaugo v. Watts, 884 A.2d 63, 75 (D.C.2005)), and will affirm a dismissal only if "`it is beyond doubt that the plaintiff[s] can prove no set of facts in support of [their] claim which would entitle [them] to relief.'" Oparaugo, supra, 884 A.2d at 75 (quoting Atraqchi v. GUMC Unified Billing Servs., 788 A.2d 559, 562 (D.C. 2002)). Likewise, we also review the grant of summary judgment de novo Tobin v. John Grotta Co., 886 A.2d 87, 89 (D.C. 2005) (citing Joyner v. Sibley Mem'l Hosp., 826 A.2d 362, 368 (D.C.2003)), to ensure that "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Allen v. Yates, 870 A.2d 39, 44 (D.C.2005) (quoting Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c)).

The Election Act establishes requirements that the Council must fulfill in creating electoral wards.⁵ Pertinent here are its requirements that the wards be divided "into 8 compact and contiguous election wards, each of which shall be approximately equal in population size," D.C.Code § 1-1011.01(c); that the population deviation range of the wards not be greater than 10% and not be greater than 5% from the average ward population of 71,507, except where necessary to promote "a rational public policy, including ... respect for the political geography of the District, the natural geography of the District, neighborhood cohesiveness, or the development of compact and contiguous districts," D.C.Code § 1-1011.01(f) (emphasis added); that the boundaries of the wards "shall conform to the greatest extent possible with the boundaries of the census tracts that are established by the United States Bureau of the Census," D.C.Code § 1-1011.01(e); and that the redistricting plan not have "the purpose and effect of diluting the voting strength of minority citizens," D.C.Code § 1-1011.01(g). In reviewing the trial court's order, we must determine whether the districts, as redrawn, violated the dictates of the Election Act.

We review interpretation of a statute de novo. Robert Siegel, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 892 A.2d 387, 393 (D.C. 2006) (citing Richardson v. Easterling, 878 A.2d 1212, 1216 (D.C.2005)). In doing so, we "look to the plain meaning of [the] statute first, construing words according to their ordinary meaning." Mesa v. United States, 875 A.2d 79, 89 (D.C.2005) (quoting Boyle v. Giral, 820 A.2d 561, 568 (D.C. 2003)); see Crescent Props. v. Inabinet, 897 A.2d 782, 786 (D.C.2006) (quoting Peoples Drug Stores, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 753 (D.C.1983)). Those words "are to be read in the light of the statute taken as a whole, and are to be given a sensible construction and...