Kingsley v. Gilman

• Decision Date: 01 January 1867
• Citation: 12 Minn. 425
• Parties: DWIGHT L. KINGSLEY v. MOSES B. GILMAN and others.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 425

12 Minn. 425

DWIGHT L. KINGSLEY

v. MOSES B. GILMAN and others.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Appeal by defendant Gilman from an order of the district court, Hennepin county, striking out part of an answer.

Lampreys, for appellant.

J. B. Gilfillan, for respondent.

McMILLAN, J.

This is an appeal from an order of the district court striking out a portion of the defendant's answer. The portion of the answer stricken out is as follows: "The said defendant denies each and every statement and averment, and every part of the same, in said amended complaint contained, as therein stated or otherwise, save as hereinafter stated, admitted, or qualified." The grounds of the motion to strike out this portion of the answer were as follows: That "the same is so indefinite and uncertain that the precise nature of the defence is not apparent, and that the same does not contain a denial of each nor of any allegation in the complaint, nor of any knowledge or information thereof sufficient to form a belief."

The respondent interposes the objection that this is not an order involving the merits of the action, or some part thereof but merely a question of practice resting in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable.

This portion of the answer purports to be a denial of all the allegations in the complaint not expressly admitted. The remaining part of the answer admits but a few of the material allegations of the complaint. If the portion of the answer in the form of a general denial is good, it puts at issue all the remaining allegations of the complaint material to the plaintiff's right to recover, and not only compels the plaintiff to prove the issues on his part, but permits the defendant to disprove them; if it is stricken out, the defendant is deprived of his right to disprove the allegations, and they are taken as admitted against him. The order striking out, therefore, goes to the merits of the action, and is appealable. Starbuck v. Dunklee, 10 Minn. 173, (Gil. 136.)

Upon the merits of the motion we think it should not have been granted.

The statute provides that the answer shall contain (1) a denial of each allegation of the complaint controverted by the defendant, or of any knowledge or information thereof sufficient to form a belief. Gen. St. p. 460, § 79. The statute prescribes no particular form of denial, nor does it make any distinction between general and specific duties.

The sufficiency of a general denial, where it puts in issue the substance of the allegations to which it is addressed, cannot now be questioned. This form of denial has been in general use by the profession since the adoption of the Code, and has been repeatedly recognized and sustained by this court. Bond v. Corbet, 2 Minn. 248, (Gil. 209;) Caldwell v. Bruggerman, 4 Minn. 270, (Gil. 190;) Starbuck v. Dunklee, 10 Minn. 173, (Gil. 136;) Montour v. Purdy, 11 Minn. 401, (Gil. 278.)

The certainty required in pleading is that the allegation must be so certain and explicit as to exclude ambiguity, and make the meaning of the averments clearly intelligible. Gould, Pl. c. 4, § 24, p. 180.

Any language in an answer, therefore, which clearly indicates the allegations which the pleader intends to controvert, and denies with certainty the substance of such allegations, is sufficient.

If a complaint alleges a fact which is qualified by a particular intention, or by its connection with other facts alleged in the pleading, there is no reason why the simple fact may not be admitted, and the qualifying facts or circumstances be denied; nor do we see any reason why, in case of an allegation embracing a fact and a qualifying intention, a general denial of the allegation, except as afterwards admitted, followed with an express admission of the simple fact, is not sufficient to put in issue the intention alleged, and is not sufficiently definite and certain. If the legal effect of express statements or admissions is to qualify or deny any of the allegations in the complaint, it is no objection to the answer that such effect is not expressly stated in the answer. The answer in this case purports to deny each and every allegation in the complaint, except as afterwards stated, admitted, or qualified in the answer. If there is no ambiguity in what is afterwards stated, admitted, or qualified in the subsequent portion of the answer, the pleading is sufficiently certain. The statements and admissions in the answer are express and unambiguous, and there can be no reasonable doubt as to what the pleader intended to state and admit.

We are therefore of opinion that the answer is sufficiently definite and certain as to the portions of the complaint which the pleader intended to controvert.

The question then remains whether the denial in the answer is sufficient in form to put in issue the portions of the complaint which it purports to deny. The language of a general denial, considered in reference to the allegation it purports to deny, may be such as to be a denial in form only, and not in substance. An instance of this kind is found in the case of Dean v. Leonard, 9 Minn. 190, (Gil. 176,) or it may be uncertain, as in Starbuck v. Dunklee, 10 Minn. 168 (Gil. 136.) But the case under consideration differs from these. The defendant in this case "denies each and every statement and averment, and every part of the same, in said amended complaint as therein stated or otherwise." This, we think, is a denial, in form and substance, of the allegations controverted. It would be unreasonable to suppose that the pleader intended to deny a portion of a sentence composing an allegation in the complaint, and the only reasonable construction,...