Kinlaw v. State of California
Decision Date | 30 August 1991 |
Docket Number | No. S014349,S014349 |
Citation | 814 P.2d 1308,285 Cal.Rptr. 66,54 Cal.3d 326 |
Court | California Supreme Court |
Parties | , 814 P.2d 1308 Frances KINLAW et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. STATE of California, Kenneth Kizer as Director of the Department of Health Services, etc., et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
Stephen D. Schear, Stephen E. Ronfeldt, Armando M. Menocal III, Lois Salisbury, Laura Schulkind and Kirk McInnis, San Francisco, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Catherine I. Hanson, Astrid G. Meghrigian, Alice P. Mead, Alan K. Marks, County Counsel, San Bernardino, Paul F. Mordy, Deputy County Counsel, De Witt W. Clinton, County Counsel, Los Angeles, Robert M. Fesler, Asst. County Counsel, Frank J. DaVanzo, Deputy County Counsel, Weissburg & Aronson, Mark S. Windisch, Carl Weissburg and Howard W. Cohen as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiffs and appellants.
John K. Van de Kamp and Daniel E. Lungren, Attys. Gen., N. Eugene Hill, Asst. Atty. Gen., Richard M. Frank, Asher Rubin and Carol Hunter, Deputy Attys. Gen., Sacramento, for defendants and respondents.
Plaintiffs, medically indigent adults and taxpayers, seek to enforce section 6 of article XIIIB (hereafter, section 6) of the California Constitution through an action for declaratory and injunctive relief. They invoked the jurisdiction of the superior court as taxpayers pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 526a and as persons affected by the alleged failure of the state to comply with section 6. The superior court granted summary judgment for defendants State of California and Director of the Department of Health Services, after concluding that plaintiffs lacked standing to prosecute the action. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that plaintiffs have standing and that the action is not barred by the availability of administrative remedies.
We reverse. The administrative procedures established by the Legislature, which are available only to local agencies and school districts directly affected by a state mandate, are the exclusive means by which the state's obligations under section 6 are to be determined and enforced. Plaintiffs therefore lack standing.
Section 6, adopted on November 6, 1979, as part of an initiative measure imposing spending limits on state and local government, also imposes on the state an obligation to reimburse local agencies for the cost of most programs and services which they must provide pursuant to a state mandate if the local agencies were not under a preexisting duty to fund the activity. It provides:
A complementary provision, section 3 of article XIIIB, provides for a shift from the state to the local agency of a portion of the spending or "appropriation" limit of the state when responsibility for funding an activity is shifted to a local agency:
"The appropriations limit for any fiscal year ... shall be adjusted as follows: [p] (a) In the event that the financial responsibility of providing services is transferred, in whole or in part, ... from one entity of government to another, then for the year in which such transfer becomes effective the appropriations limit of the transferee entity shall be increased by such reasonable amount as the said entities shall mutually agree and the appropriations limit of the transferor entity shall be decreased by the same amount."
The underlying issue in this action is whether the state is obligated to reimburse the County of Alameda, and shift to Alameda County a concomitant portion of the state's spending limit, for the cost of providing health care services to medically indigent adults who prior to 1983 had been included in the state Medi-Cal program. Assembly Bill No. 799 (1981-1982 Reg.Sess.) (AB 799) (Stats.1982, ch. 328, p. 1568) removed medically indigent adults from Medi-Cal effective January 1, 1983. At the time section 6 was adopted, the state was funding Medi-Cal coverage for these persons without requiring any county financial contribution.
Plaintiffs initiated this action in the Alameda County Superior Court. They sought relief on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated medically indigent adult residents of Alameda County. The only named defendants were the State of California, the Director of the Department of Health Services, and the County of Alameda.
In the complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, plaintiffs sought an injunction compelling the state to restore Medi-Cal eligibility to medically indigent adults or to reimburse the County of Alameda for the cost of providing health care to those persons. They also prayed for a declaration that the transfer of responsibility from the state-financed Medi-Cal program to the counties without adequate reimbursement violated the California Constitution. 1
At the time plaintiffs initiated their action neither Alameda County, nor any other county or local agency, had filed a reimbursement claim with the Commission on State Mandates (Commission). 2
Whether viewed as an action seeking restoration of Medi-Cal benefits, one to compel state reimbursement of county costs, or one for declaratory relief, therefore, the action required a determination that the enactment of AB 799 created a state mandate within the contemplation of section 6. Only upon resolution of that issue favorably to plaintiffs would the state have an obligation to reimburse the county for its increased expense and shift a portion of its appropriation limit, or to reinstate Medi-Cal benefits for plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent.
The gravamen of the action is, therefore, enforcement of section 6. 3
In 1984, almost five years after the adoption of article XIIIB, the Legislature enacted comprehensive administrative procedures for resolution of claims arising out of section 6. (§ 17500.) The Legislature did so because the absence of a uniform procedure had resulted in inconsistent rulings on the existence of state mandates, unnecessary litigation, reimbursement delays, and, apparently, resultant uncertainties in accommodating reimbursement requirements in the budgetary process. The necessity for the legislation was explained in section 17500:
"(Italics added.)
In part 7 of division 4 of title 2 of the Government Code, "State-Mandated Local Costs," which commences with section 17500, the Legislature created the Commission (§ 17525), to adjudicate disputes over the existence of a state-mandated program (§§ 17551, 17557) and to adopt procedures for submission and adjudication of reimbursement claims (§ 17553). The five-member Commission includes the Controller, the Treasurer, the Director of Finance, the Director of the Office of Planning and Research, and a public member experienced in public finance. (§ 17525.)
The legislation establishes a test-claim procedure to expeditiously resolve disputes affecting multiple agencies (§ 17554), 4 establishes the method of payment of claims (§§ 17558, 17561), and creates reporting procedures which enable the Legislature to budget adequate funds to meet the expense of state mandates (§§ 17562, 17600, 17612, subd. (a).)
Pursuant to procedures which the Commission was authorized to establish (§ 17553), local agencies 5 and school districts 6 are to file claims for reimbursement of state-mandated costs with the Commission (§§ 17551, 17560), and reimbursement is to be provided only through this statutory procedure. (§§ 17550, 17552.)
The first reimbursement claim filed which alleges that a state mandate has been created under a statute or executive order is treated as a "test claim." (§ 17521.) A public hearing must be held promptly on any test claim. At the hearing on a test claim or on any other reimbursement claim, evidence may be presented not only by the claimant, but also by the Department of Finance and any other department or agency potentially affected by the claim. (§ 17553.) Any interested organization or individual may participate in the hearing. (§ 17555.)
A local agency filing a test claim need not first expend sums to comply with the alleged state mandate, but may base its claim on estimated costs. (§ 17555.) The Commission must determine both whether a state mandate exists and, if so, the amount to be reimbursed to local agencies and school districts, adopting "parameters and guidelines" for...
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