Kinney v. Cloutier

Decision Date01 June 1965
Docket NumberNo. 73,73
Citation211 A.2d 246,125 Vt. 109
PartiesWalter N. KINNEY v. Rolland L. CLOUTIER.
CourtVermont Supreme Court

Wick, Dinse & Allen, Burlington, for plaintiff.

Conley & Foote, Middlebury, for defendant.

Before HOLDEN, C. J., and SHANGRAW, BARNEY, SMITH and KEYSER, JJ.

SHANGRAW, Justice.

In this action the plaintiff seeks to recover for property damage and personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by him as a result of an automobile accident which took place in Vergennes, Vermont, on December 25, 1961.

The case was tried by jury during the May Term, 1963, of the Addison County Court resulting in a verdict of $98.00 in favor of the plaintiff. After verdict, and before judgment was entered thereon, plaintiff moved that the verdict be set aside, and that a new trial on the issue of damages alone be granted, or in the alternative, a new trial on all the issues. These motions were denied. The plaintiff has appealed.

The declaration follows the ventional pattern by alleging that plaintiff's automobile, while proceeding southerly on U. S. Route No. 7 in Vergennes, came in contact with that operated by the defendant which was then proceeding northerly on this highway. Following allegations of negligence on the part of the defendant, plaintiff claims that his automobile was extensively damaged; that he was required to expend money for automobile repairs; that he was injured; that he suffered pain, and continues so to do; that he was required to spend money for medical treatment and examination; and that he lost time and wages from his employment.

Specifically, the plaintiff by his brief assigns the following was errors on the part of the trial court: (1) refusal to allow the jury to consider a repair estimate as evidence of damage to his automobile; (2) refusal by the court to allow plaintiff to testify to, or allow in evidence the medical bills received by him; (3) failure to charge and submit to the jury the issue of pain and suffering; and (4) failure to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial.

The two automobiles collided, and by reason of the force of the impact each car was damaged to a considerable extent. The fender, door, and back panel of plaintiff's car was damaged. The front end, door, grill, steering wheel, and the motor of the defendant's automobile was also damaged. Following the accident, and before plaintiff's automobile was repaired, it was driven from Vergennes to Connecticut where plaintiff resided.

During the trial plaintiff was permitted to testify, without objection, that he had received a statement from Strong Alignment Service, of Connecticut, which garage does body work and also aligns front ends of cars, estimating the cost of repairing his automobile at $505.66. This statement of the estimated cost of repairs was admitted in evidence without objection. No evidence was offered as to the reasonable market value of the vehicle immediately before the accident, and its reasonable market value immediately afterward.

At no time did the defendant move to strike the foregoing evidence. At the close of all the evidence the defendant, in moving for a directed verdict, among other grounds, urged that the measure of damage in such cases is the 'difference between its value before the injury and immediately thereafter.' In its charge to the jury the foregoing item of claimed damage was excluded from consideration by the jurors. Plaintiff excepted to this exclusion.

As stated in Purington v. Newton, 114 Vt. 490, 494, 49 A.2d 98, 100, 'The usual measure of damages in such a case is the difference between the market value of the automobile immediately before the accident and its market value immediately afterward. 5 Am.Jur. Automobiles, § 746; collins v. Fogg, 110 Vt. 465, 8 A.2d 684; Lyman v. James, 87 Vt. 486, 490, 89 A. 932; Chase v. Hoosac Tunnel & W. R. Co., 85 Vt. 60, 63, 81 A. 236. In determining the difference between the value of the automobile before and after the accident, or its depreciations as the result of the injury, evidence is admissible as to the reasonable cost of repairs made necessary thereby, and as to the value of the automobile as repaired.' See cases cited.

On the issue of property damage, the plaintiff relies exclusively on the evidence as to the estimated cost of repairs. However, no evidence was offered that such repairs were made necessary by reason of the accident, or that the estimated cost was reasonable. Furthermore, there was no evidence that the...

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9 cases
  • Melo v. Allstate Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Vermont
    • May 26, 2011
    ...rendered. Leitinger, 2007 WI 84, ¶ 24, 736 N.W.2d at 7; see e.g., Smedberg, 2007 VT 99, ¶ 3, 940 A.2d at 676; Kinney v. Cloutier, 125 Vt. 109, 211 A.2d 246, 249 (1965). Next, the Leitinger court examined the collateral source rule, which, as a rule of damages, “denies a tortfeasor credit fo......
  • State v. Buckley
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • May 27, 2016
    ...upon each point indicated by the evidence, material to a decision of the case, whether requested or not.” Kinney v. Cloutier, 125 Vt. 109, 112, 211 A.2d 246, 249 (1965). At the same time, however, “where it is claimed the court has failed to instruct on one or more essential points or issue......
  • Pizzagalli Const. Co., Inc. v. Vermont Dept. of Taxes
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • June 4, 1974
    ...question, it is not a matter for review. Heaton Hospital, Inc. v. Emrick et al., 128 Vt. 405, 264 A.2d 806 (1970); Kinney v. Cloutier, 125 Vt. 109, 211 A.2d 246 (1965). Appellants's request, informally set forth in their brief, for leave to present additional evidence before the Commissione......
  • Heaton Hospital, Inc. v. Emrick
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • April 7, 1970
    ...be brought to this Court upon which it is made to appear that the trial court had no fair opportunity to pass judgment. Kinney v. Cloutier, 125 Vt. 109, 112, 211 A.2d 246. Defendant's claim of self-incrimination is without substance or In addition, the defendant claims that 12 V.S.A. sectio......
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