Kinney v. Schlussel
Decision Date | 13 October 1925 |
Citation | 116 Or. 376,239 P. 818 |
Parties | KINNEY v. SCHLUSSEL ET AL. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Multnomah County; J. U. Campbell, Judge.
Suit by Robert C. Kinney against Birdie F. Schlussel and another. From a decree for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
Chriss A. Bell, of Portland, for appellant.
Veazie & Veazie, of Portland, for respondents.
This was a suit in equity, to compel the specific performance of an alleged contract for the sale of land. The complaint alleges that defendants entered into a contract with plaintiff whereby defendants agreed to sell and convey in fee simple, and he agreed to purchase, certain real property in Clatsop county, Or. This allegation was denied by the answer. Two writings are attached as exhibits to the complaint, which the complaint alleges and the answer admits were signed by plaintiff and defendants on April 23, 1923. Omitting the attestation clause, these papers, the signatures to the first of which are sealed, read as follows:
The first of these writings is in the form of a contract; the second contains instructions which were given to the bank directing the disposal to be made of the first paper. Whether the first writing was, in fact, a concluded contract, and went into immediate effect, depends upon the intention of the parties, as the fact itself is put in issue by the pleadings. On their face, these two writings show that they relate to the same transaction, and therefore they must be taken and read together, and be so construed that each may have the effect intended by the parties.
While it is ordinarily true that the manual traduction of a written contract is not required, yet the parties may themselves agree that a writing, which if completely executed would be a valid and enforceable contract, shall not be delivered as a contract until the happening of a certain event, or that, if such event does not happen, there shall be no delivery of it. If there was such an agreement in this case, then there could be no contract until delivery, for no other intention could reasonably be imputed to the parties. There is no evidence of the intention of the parties to be found in this record except that contained in the writings themselves, and so we must look to them alone to determine the intention of the parties.
An examination of these two instruments discloses that, by the provisions of the first, second, and fifth paragraphs of the first writing, the defendants agreed to sell and the plaintiff to purchase the premises in controversy for $5,500, of which $1,500 was to be paid upon the delivery of the contract and balance later at stated intervals, and that the defendants agreed to furnish an abstract of title, and that the abstract so furnished should show a good title. If there had been nothing else contained in the contract except the provisions just referred to, and if it was executed by the parties with intent that it should go into immediate effect as a contract, it would, of course, be a concluded contract, and either party, upon his performance, would be entitled to require the other party to perform.
Now, before referring to any other provisions of the contract, let us assume that the contract contained only the terms just referred to, and that the contract was executed by both parties, and that they intended it to go into immediate effect, and that, upon the performance by one, or offer to perform, he would be entitled to compel the other to perform, and apply this legal result to the facts appearing in this case.
The first payment of $1,500, together with the three copies of the first writing, were deposited and placed in the bank in accordance with the terms of the understanding between the parties. Defendants furnished an abstract, and this abstract failed to show that defendants had a good and merchantable title in the premises, and for that reason, the plaintiff did not approve the title and did not notify the bank of his approval, and it further appears that defendants cannot cure the alleged defect in the title. Let us further assume that defendants' failure to furnish the abstract was a breach of the contract upon their part. Now, under those circumstances, what was plaintiff's remedy so far as his right to sue to compel specific performance is concerned? That question is answered in the only way it can possibly be answered by the former decisions of this and other courts. If the title was unsatisfactory to plaintiff, he had an election to do either of two things. He could either perform the contract and take a conveyance relying on the covenants in the deed as security against any defects in the title, or he could refuse to perform the contract and receive from the bank the money he had placed there. ...
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Meyer v. Kesterson
...may agree that a written and signed agreement shall not be "delivered" until the happening of a certain event, Kinney v. Schlussel, et al, 116 Or. 376, 381, 387, 239 P. 818 (1925), Williamson's retention of physical custody of the signed document, without more, does not render the contract ......
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Raasch v. Goulet, 5522.
...been given.’ Clark v. Rosario, Mining & Milling Co., 176 Fed. 180, 189, 99 C. C. A. 534, 543.” To the same effect, see Kinney v. Schlussel, 116 Or. 376, 239 P. 818. The same rule is laid down in 36 Cyc. 747-750. “As a general rule, if plaintiff fails to make out a case for specific performa......
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Raasch v. Goulet
... ... Clark v. Rossario, Min. & Mill. Co. 99 C.C.A. 534, 543, 176 ... F. 180, 189." ... To the ... same effect see Kinney v. Schlussel, 116 Or. 376, ... 239 P. 818 ... The ... same rule is laid down in 36 Cyc. pp. 747 to 750 ... ...
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