Kinney v. State

• Decision Date: 28 November 1989
• Docket Number: No. 13687,13687
• Citation: 566 A.2d 670,213 Conn. 54
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Joan A. KINNEY v. STATE of Connecticut.

Page 670

566 A.2d 670

213 Conn. 54

Joan A. KINNEY v.STATE of Connecticut.

No. 13687.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 3, 1989.

Decided Nov. 28, 1989.

Brewster Blackall, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, were Clarine Nardi Riddle, Atty. Gen., and Carl J. Schuman, former Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant(state).

Roger J. Frechette, with whom was Matthew E. Frechette, New Haven, for appellee(plaintiff).

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, CALLAHAN, GLASS, COVELLO, HULL and SANTANIELLO, JJ.

PETERS, Chief Justice.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the legislature intended judges of the Superior Court to come within the jurisdictional confines of the Workers' Compensation Act,General Statutes § 31-275 et seq.¹Following the death of her husband, the Honorable Frank J. Kinney, Jr., the plaintiff, Joan A. Kinney, filed a workers' compensation claim against the state alleging that the decedent's fatal heart condition was causally related to work-induced stress.Ruling that the decedent was an "employee" for the purposes of workers' compensation as defined by General Statutes § 31-275(5) and that his death arose out of and in the course of his employment, the commissioner for the third district awarded the plaintiff the maximum allowable spousal survivorship benefits under General Statutes § 31-306(b).In response to the defendant's appeal, pursuant to General Statutes § 31-301, the compensation review division, on its own motion, invoked the procedure authorized by General Statutes § 31-324, ² to reserve to the Appellate Court the threshold jurisdictional issue of whether a Superior Court judge is an employee as defined by § 31-275(5).We transferred this reservation to ourselves pursuant to Practice Book§ 4023.³We answer no.

The plaintiff sought workers' compensation benefits on the theory that the chronic stress connected with her husband's employment with the defendant contributed to his death.After the defendant contested her claim pursuant to General Statutes § 31-297(b), the commissioner conducted a formal hearing as provided in General Statutes § 31-298.⁴As a result of that hearing, the commissioner made the following findings of fact, which are not contested in this appeal.The decedent was first appointed to the state bench in 1972.At the time of his death, he had undertaken various administrative assignments in addition to his judicial responsibilities for the adjudication of criminal cases.The decedent was serving as the presiding criminal and administrative judge for the judicial district of New Haven, the chief administrative judge of the criminal division for the entire state and also as the chairman of the Commission to Study Alternate Sentences.The defendant at all times controlled, supervised and regulated the decedent's administrative duties.The decedent, by accepting and performing judicial and administrative duties in return for fair compensation, had entered into an employment relationship with the defendant.The unusual work pressures ⁵ associated with the decedent's excessive administrative workload resulted in chronic stress that contributed to the development of coronary artery disease and exacerbated his preexisting myocardial atherosclerosis.⁶The myocardial infarction that resulted in his death was precipitated in part by the chronic stress associated with his prodigious judicial duties.⁷

On the basis of these findings of fact, the commissioner concluded that the decedent's employment relationship with the defendant constituted a contract of employment for the purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act;General Statutes § 31-275(5); and that the decedent's death arose out of and in the course of his employment.Accordingly, the commissioner awarded the plaintiff the maximum allowable spousal survivorship benefits under § 31-306(b)(2).⁸

In its appeal to the compensation review division, the defendant challenged the validity of the commissioner's determination that the instant case falls within the jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation Act.The defendant maintained then, as it does now, that a judge of the Superior Court is not an employee for the purposes of workers' compensation, and does not have an employer-employee relationship with the defendant.The review division decided to seek guidance on these questions of law, and propounded the reservation that is presently before us.

We must decide in this case whether the legislature intended the Workers' Compensation Act to confer jurisdiction upon the commissioner to award benefits to the plaintiff.Even though the plaintiff has presented a factual record that warrants sympathetic consideration of her claims, her entitlement to relief cannot transcend the jurisdictional limits of the statute under which she seeks recovery.Once an issue of subject matter jurisdiction is raised, ⁹the court must dispose of this legal question as a threshold matter.Concerned Citizens of Sterling v. Sterling, 204 Conn. 551, 556-57, 529 A.2d 666(1987);Cahill v. Board of Education, 198 Conn. 229, 238, 502 A.2d 410(1985)." ' "[W]henever a court discovers that it has no jurisdiction, it is bound to dismiss the case, without regard to previous rulings." 'Chzrislonk v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 101 Conn. 356, 358, 125 A. 874(1924)."Cahill v. Board of Education, supra;Pet v. Department of Health Services, 207 Conn. 346, 351, 542 A.2d 672(1988).The applicability of these principles is no less compelling in the instant case where the limited and statutory jurisdiction at issue is the legislative will as expressed in the Workers' Compensation Act.Although the Workers' Compensation Act"should be broadly construed to accomplish its humanitarian purpose";Adzima v. UAC/Norden Division, 177 Conn. 107, 117, 411 A.2d 924(1979);Perille v. Raybestos-Manhattan-Europe, Inc., 196 Conn. 529, 541, 494 A.2d 555(1985); its remedial purpose cannot transcend its statutorily defined jurisdictional boundaries.Castro v. Viera, 207 Conn. 420, 435, 541 A.2d 1216(1988);Perille v. Raybestos-Manhattan-Europe, Inc., supra, 196 Conn. at 541-42, 494 A.2d 555;Jester v. Thompson, 99 Conn. 236, 238, 121 A. 470(1923)."The act is not triggered by a claimant until he brings himself within its statutory ambit."Castro v. Viera, supra, 207 Conn. at 433, 541 A.2d 1216.

The plaintiff would have us resolve the jurisdictional issue in this case by deferring to the commissioner's findings of fact.This we cannot do.We recognize that the commissioner found that the decedent's judicial duties amounted to a contractual relationship with the defendant such that he was an "employee" for purposes of workers' compensation as defined by § 31-275(5).While it is correct that "[b]ecause only employees are entitled to compensation under the act ... coverage must arise from a contract of employment, either express or implied";Blancato v. Feldspar Corporation, 203 Conn. 34, 38, 522 A.2d 1235(1987);Sibley v. State, 89 Conn. 682, 686-87, 96 A. 161(1915); our jurisdictional inquiry is not limited to the commissioner's factual finding of the decedent's contract of employment with the defendant.The elements of subject matter jurisdiction are "dependent upon both law and fact."(Emphasis added.)Castro v. Viera, supra, 207 Conn. at 433, 541 A.2d 1216.Although the plaintiff correctly asserts that the power and duty of determining facts rests on the commissioner as the trier of facts;Fair v. People's Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535, 539, 542 A.2d 1118(1988); the conclusions drawn by the commissioner cannot stand when they result from an incorrect application of the law.Id.;Adzima v. UAC/Norden Division, supra, 177 Conn. at 118, 411 A.2d 924.

The commissioner exercises jurisdiction only " 'under the precise circumstances and in the manner particularly prescribed by the enabling legislation.'Heiser v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 150 Conn. 563, 565, 192 A.2d 44(1963)."Castro v. Viera, supra, 207 Conn. at 427-28, 541 A.2d 1216.¹⁰The parties cannot confer jurisdiction upon the commissioner by agreement, waiver or conduct.Id., at 430, 541 A.2d 1216;Jester v. Thompson, supra, 99 Conn. at 238, 121 A. 470.The plaintiff may invoke the remedy provided under the Workers' Compensation Act only if her decedent, as a matter of law, satisfies the requisite jurisdictional standard of "employee" as defined by the legislature in § 31-275(5).¹¹The legal question before us, therefore, is whether the legislature intended to include judges of the Superior Court within § 31-275(5).

We begin our examination of the scope of § 31-275(5) by recourse to the accepted rules of statutory construction.We look first to the text of § 31-275(5) itself.Because § 31-275(5) consists of a functional definition with expressly delineated exceptions, for purposes of clarity, we will focus first on the operative meaning before integrating the exceptions into our analysis.Section 31-275(5) defines "employee" in relevant part as "any person who has entered into or works under any contract of service or apprenticeship with an employer...."This language, on its face, expresses no clear legislative intent as to whether a member of the judiciary is a covered "employee."In ascertaining legislative intent, however, the legislature is presumed to know the history of a statute as judicially construed.Nichols v. Warren, 209 Conn. 191, 202 n. 8, 550 A.2d 309(1988);Peck v. Jacquemin, 196 Conn. 53, 71, 491 A.2d 1043(1985).Our decisions concerning the eligibility of individuals working in the public sector for workers' compensation benefits have long distinguished between public officers and public employees, and have held that public officers not expressly included within the definition provided by § 31-275(5) are not "employees" for the purposes of the act.McDonald v. New Haven, 94 Conn. 403, 417-18, 109 A. 176(1920);Sibley v. State, supra, 89 Conn. at 685, 96 A....