Kinsley v. City of Chicago

• Decision Date: 28 March 1888
• Citation: 16 N.E. 260,124 Ill. 359
• Parties: KINSLEY v. CITY OF CHICAGO.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

124 Ill. 359

16 N.E. 260

KINSLEY

v.CITY OF CHICAGO.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 28, 1888.

Appeal from appellate court, First district.

Action against Jesse Kinsley by the city of Chicago for a penalty for keeping a meat market without a license, in violation of the ordinances of such city. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

C. B. Samson and Barnum Rubens & Ames, for appellant.

Frederick S. Winsten and John W. Green, for appellee.

SHELDON, C. J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of affirmance, by the appellate court of the first district, of a judgment of the criminal court of Cook county for a penalty for keeping a meat market in the city of Chicago, and selling meats, without a license, in violation of sections 1575, 1579 of the Revised Ordinances of said city as amended by the ordinances of July 10, 1882, and February 26, 1883.

The only question presented by the record in this case is as to the validity of the aforenamed sections in imposing a license fee of $15 per annum upon vendors of meats. The city's claim of authority for the requirement of the license is under the following trants of powers of the general incorporation act under which the city of Chicago is organized:

‘ Fiftieth. To regulate the sale of meats, poultry, fish, cheese, lard, vegetables, and all other provisions, and to provide for a place and manner of selling the same.’

‘ Seventy-Eighth. To do all acts, make all regulations, which may be necessary or expedient for the promotion of health, or the suppression of disease.’

Although there is not here given, in express terms, the power to license, it is insisted, on behalf of the city, that, as the power to regulate is expressly given, that power includes the power to license. This precise point was os adjudged by this court in Packing Co. v. City of Chicago, 88 Ill. 221, where it was held that the eighty-first clause of section 62 of the general incorporation act, giving cities and villages the power to direct the location of and regulate the management and construction of packing houses, etc., confers the power to license such establishments, as one of the means of regulating the same. It is admitted by appellant's counsel that, if that decision be adhered to, the judgment here must be affirmed, and a reconsideration is asked of the doctrine announced in that case. It is said that in examining the terms used in conferring the various powers, as enumerated in the general incorporation act, we find, in many instances, the words ‘to regulate’ stand alone, not coupled with either of the words ‘to license,’ or ‘to tax;’ that in other instances the words ‘to license’ or ‘to tax,’ or both, are added to the words ‘to regulate;’ whereon it is argued that the legislature did not intend that the power to regulate should carry with it, and include, ipso facto, the power to license; that, the power here containing merely the words ‘to regulate,’ reading it in the light of the whole act, and applying the canons of interpretation applicable to municipalcharters, the omission of the words ‘to license’ is tantamount to an express denial of a power to license. We think this a too technical construction to be applied. After an attentive consideration of the ingenious...