Kinter v. Commonwealth Trust Co.

• Decision Date: 25 May 1922
• Docket Number: 10
• Parties: Kinter, Appellant, v. Commonwealth Trust Co., Exr., et al
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

118 A. 392

274 Pa. 436

Kinter, Appellant, v. Commonwealth Trust Co., Exr., et al

No. 10

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

May 25, 1922

Argued April 19, 1922

Appeal, No. 10, May T., 1922, by plaintiff, from decree of C.P. Dauphin Co., No. 684, Equity Docket, dismissing bill in equity, in case of J. Carroll Kinter v. Commonwealth Trust Co., Executor of William T. Hildrup, Jr., deceased, D.E Tracy and William P. Starkey, and St. Stephen's Protestant Episcopal Church of Harrisburg, Pa., Florence Nightingale Hildrup, and Commonwealth Trust Co., Trustee. Affirmed.

Demurrer to bill in equity to set aside sale of corporate stock, and for accounting. Before HARGEST, P.J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Bill dismissed. Plaintiff appealed.

Error assigned, inter alia, was decree, quoting it.

The decree is affirmed and the appeal is dismissed at the costs of appellant.

J. W Swartz, of Swartz, Swartz & Swartz, with him Beidleman & Hull, for appellant. -- Plaintiff is not guilty of laches in bringing his suit: Todd's App., 24 Pa. 429; Altoona, etc., R.C. v. R.R., 203 Pa. 102; Phila. Trust, etc. Ins. Co. v. Coal, etc., Co., 139 Pa. 534; Hamilton v. Hamilton, 18 Pa. 20; Corbett's Est., 10 Pa. Dist. R. 59; Sutton v. Morgan, 158 Pa. 204; Wilson v. Brown, 269 Pa. 225; Hilliard v. Wood Carving Co., 173 Pa. 1; Montgomery Bros. v. Montgomery, 269 Pa. 332; Hammond v. Hopkins, 143 U.S. 224; Bennett v. McMillin, 179 Pa. 146; Townsend v. Vanderwerker, 160 U.S. 171; Dalzell v. Lewis, 252 Pa. 283.

Owen J. Roberts and Charles L. Bailey, Jr., with them William S. Snyder and Charles H. Bergner, for appellees. -- Bill shows plaintiff is debarred of any relief by his gross laches: Scranton Gas & Water Co. v. Iron & Coal Co., 167 Pa. 136; Taylor v. Coggins, 244 Pa. 228; Smith v. Blachley, 198 Pa. 173; Leaming v. Wise, 73 Pa. 173; Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 140; Landsdale v. Smith, 106 U.S. 391; Hardt v. Heidweyer, 152 U.S. 547; Nerve Food Co. v. Robertson, 199 Pa. 486; Hammond v. Hopkins, 143 U.S. 224.

Before FRAZER, WALLING, SIMPSON, KEPHART, SADLER and SCHAFFER, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE WALLING:

This action in equity is to set aside a sale of corporate stock, on the ground of fraud, and for an accounting. The Harrisburg Pipe and Pipe Bending Company is a manufacturing corporation located at Harrisburg, in which the plaintiff, J. Carroll Kinter, became a stockholder in 1908, to the extent of twenty shares of common stock of the par value of $50 a share. It was then and for seven years thereafter a going concern but paid no dividends on such stock and became badly involved. From prior to 1914, to 1920 the defendant D.E. Tracy, was president, the defendant William T. Hildrup, Jr., was secretary, treasurer and general manager, and the defendant William P. Starkey, was general superintendent, of the company; they were also directors and large stockholders. In February, 1915, its agent in London secured a large war contract, and the effect of plaintiff's averment is, inter alia, that on receipt of this contract, with prospects of additional like contracts, the three corporate officers above named conspired to keep from the other stockholders knowledge of this important business while they secured options on as much as possible of the outstanding common stock. To that end Hildrup sent a circular letter to the stockholders containing certain false and misleading statements, and also a blank agreement for a one-year option upon the stock, at par value, which, induced by the false statements, plaintiff executed and returned to Hildrup, for his twenty shares of stock. Hildrup having elected to take the stock under the option, it was formally transferred to him on December 22, 1915. Plaintiff further avers that his stock was in fact bought for the joint interest of Hildrup, Tracy and Starkey, who received thereon as dividends, from May 16, 1916, to December, 1918, sums amounting in all to $9,500. Hildrup died in May, 1920, and on March 3, 1921, this bill was filed jointly against his executor, and Tracy and Starkey, praying for a decree ordering the return to plaintiff of his stock and the $9,500 received as dividends thereon, less the $1,000 paid him for the stock, averring ignorance, until October, 1920, of the fraud practiced upon him. Defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's bill interposing laches, inter alia, as a defense, was sustained by the court below and a final decree entered dismissing the bill; from which plaintiff brought this appeal.

The decree must be affirmed on the ground of laches and it is unnecessary to consider other questions. He who would rescind a contract by reason of fraud must act promptly (Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U.S. 55, 62; Wood v. Wood, 263 Pa. 521, 526; Hilliard et al. v. Wood Carving Co., 173 Pa. 1; Dunn v. Columbia Nat. Bank, 204 Pa. 53; Muehlhof v. Boltz, 215 Pa. 125; Automobile Finance Co. v. Rosenheim, 73 Pa.Super. 546), and when the facts are not disputed the question of an unreasonable delay is one of law: Leaming et al. v. Wise et al., 73 Pa. 173; Morgan v. McKee, 77 Pa. 228; Spiegelberg v. Karr, 24 Pa.Super. 339; Scale Co. v. Wood-Ward 29 Pa.Super. 142; Acetylene Co. v. Smith, 10 Pa.Super. 61. A contract induced by fraud is valid unless the party defrauded elects to rescind it within a reasonable time: Howard, Receiver, v. Turner, 155 Pa. 349, 357. In the instant case, for nearly six years after plaintiff gave the option and five years after he transferred the stock, he remained silent and inert. Meantime the situation of the parties had entirely changed by the death of Hildrup, who transacted the business with plaintiff and was conversant with all the facts. As to this, the trial court pertinently says: "The death of Hildrup materially changed the conditions so far as Tracy and Starkey are concerned. The dealings between the plaintiff and the defendants were all through Hildrup. He would necessarily be a most important witness. His mouth is sealed by death. He is not here either to defend himself, or the others, against the charges of fraud. His evidence is denied to the defendants because of the delay of the plaintiff in bringing his bill. The condition of the defendants has become so changed that it cannot be restored and it is extremely doubtful whether they could produce evidence necessary to a fair presentation of the case on their part." Equity will not lend its aid to one who has slept upon his rights until the original transaction is obscured by lapse of years and death of parties: see Dalzell v. Lewis, 252 Pa. 283; Taylor v. Coggins, 244 Pa. 229; Whitney v. Fox, 166 U.S. 637; Naylor v. Foreman Blades Lumber Co., 230 F. 658; Selden's Exr. v. Kennedy, 104 Va. 826; s.c. 52 S.E. 635; Ripple v. Kuehne, 100 Md. 672, s.c. A. 464. Or as cogently stated by Lord Campbell, in Bright v. Legerton, 2 D.F. & J. p. 617, "A court of equity will not allow a dormant claim to be set up when the means of resisting it, if unfounded, have perished": and see Inlew v. Christy, 187 Pa. 186.

But plaintiff avers he did not discover the fraud until October, 1920. This general averment is insufficient he is not only chargeable with what he knew but also with what he could have discovered by reasonable diligence. "Nothing can call a court of chancery into activity but conscience, good faith and reasonable diligence": RICE, P.J., in Goggins v. Risley, 13 Pa.Super. 316. "It is an inherent doctrine of equity jurisprudence that nothing less than conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence can call courts of equity into activity, and that they will not grant aid to a litigant who has negligently slept on his rights and suffered his demand to become stale where injustice would be done by granting the relief asked. It is therefore a general rule that laches or staleness of demand constitutes a defense to the enforcement of the right or demand so neglected. . . . The doctrine is based in part on the injustice that might result from the enforcement of long neglected rights, and the difficulty, if not the impossibility of ascertaining the truth of the matters in controversy and doing justice between the parties, and in part on grounds of public policy, its aim being the discouragement, for the peace and repose of society, of stale and antiquated demands": 21 C.J. 212, 214. Such has ever been the English rule. In Smith v. Clay (3Bro. C.C. 639, n.), Lord Camden said (1767): "A court of equity, which is never active in relief in matters...