Kiraly v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince George's Cnty., Civil Action No. DKC 11-2845
| Decision Date | 30 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. DKC 11-2845 |
| Parties | MARIA KIRALY v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this employment discrimination action is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Board of Education of Prince George's County ("the Board"). (ECF No. 7).1 The issues are fully briefed and the court now rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, no hearing being deemed necessary. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted.
Plaintiff Maria Kiraly commenced this action on October 4, 2011, by filing a complaint against the Board, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Prior to any response, she amended her complaint, adding as a defendant theAmerican Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Local 2250 ("Local 2250"), and further asserting claims for hostile work environment, retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (ECF No. 3).2
According to the amended complaint, "Plaintiff is a seventy[-]one year old, Caucasian female, born in Hungary[,] who suffers [from] a disability," namely, Irritable Bowel Syndrome ("IBS"). (Id. at ¶ 5). She has been employed by the Board as a bus driver for more than twenty-eight years and is a member of Local 2250, "the collective bargaining agent that represents approximately 5,500 support employees who work for [the Board]." (Id. at ¶ 7). The complaint recites, in conclusory fashion, that one or both defendants are "trying to force older white employees out of their jobs." (Id. at ¶ 21).3 As support forthis conclusion, she asserts that unidentified persons, at unspecified times, have made "comments . . . about her seniority and the need for her to retire" and called into question "her ability to drive the buses safely due to her age." (Id. at ¶ 9). On other occasions, Plaintiff has been "yelled at and given misinformation," allegedly for the purpose of "mak[ing] it appear that because of her age she [is] incompetent and not capable of doing her job or learning to use the newer equipment," despite the fact that she has "successfully completed training." (Id. at ¶ 20).
Plaintiff cites the assignment and management of bus routes as evidence of race and age discrimination. Apparently, a collective bargaining agreement sets forth a process by which the Board's bus drivers bid on preferred routes. Route assignments are based, at least in part, on seniority. Despite her long tenure with the Board, Plaintiff was "pulled off scheduled runs that she bid for and received and [] assigned to work on [buses] that were older and not safe." (Id. at ¶ 10). At some point, she was altogether "denied the ability to bid on runs . . . while younger people of a different race were given the more senior runs that Plaintiff was qualified to bid on and should have received." (Id. at ¶ 23). According to Plaintiff,"[t]his affected [her] ability to earn income and benefits that she is entitled to receive under the collective bargaining agreement." (Id. at ¶ 24).
On two occasions, Plaintiff was "threatened . . . with termination." (Id. at ¶ 17). From November 2008 to February 2009, she was "placed on leave without pay and forced to use her annual and sick leave," apparently in relation to an incident in which she was "accused of attempting to run over another employee who actually ran in front of [her] bus while [she] was driving." (Id. at ¶ 14).4 On April 6, 2011, she was "accused of threatening another driver and taken off her run and forced to work in a different location and in another capacity to maintain her employment." (Id. at ¶ 17). With regard to this second incident, Plaintiff alleges that "[t]he Defendant could not reasonably believe that the Plaintiff was capable of placing the accuser in danger or fear for his safety," and that theaccusation was merely "pretext for continued harassment and retaliation." (Id. at ¶ 19).
According to Plaintiff, the cumulative effect of this "harassment" caused her to "have an attack" of IBS. (Id. at ¶ 30). When she informed the Board of her condition, she was "harassed and retaliated against . . . [and] subjected [] to psychological testing to determine her eligibility for continued employment." (Id. at ¶ 26). After a subsequent "attack," Plaintiff was accused of "pull[ing] a stunt," "yelled at for changing her soiled garments," and "told that she was old and that her health was in question." (Id. at ¶ 31). Plaintiff was required to obtain medical clearance before returning to work. When she presented her employer with a doctor's note declaring her fit, however, she was "told that she could not return[.]" (Id. at ¶ 33). While it is unclear whether Plaintiff did eventually return to her duties as a bus driver, there appears to be no dispute that her employment has not been terminated.
On February 3, 2012, the Board filed the pending motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 7). Plaintiff opposed that motion on March 16 (ECF No. 13) and the Board filed reply papers on April 2 (ECF No. 16).
The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of the complaint. Presley v. City ofCharlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006). A plaintiff's complaint need only satisfy the standard of Rule 8(a), which requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). "Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a 'showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n. 3 (2007). That showing must consist of more than "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" or "naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
At this stage, the court must consider all well-pleaded allegations in a complaint as true, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994), and construe all factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co. , 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Mylan Labs, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)). The court need not, however, accept unsupported legal allegations. Revene v. Charles Cnty. Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989). Nor must it agree with legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979); Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186,193 (4th Cir. 2009). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged, but it has not 'show[n] . . . that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). Thus, "[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.
The Board contends that Plaintiff's amended complaint "is merely a jumble of accusations that fails to provide even general allegations about who took certain actions and when they supposedly took these actions." (ECF No. 7-1, at 4 (emphasis in original)). Absent such, it argues that it is "not on notice as to who might be creating respondeat superior liability," or when the conduct in question occurred, and therefore "cannot defend itself." (Id.). Thus, according to the Board, "Plaintiff's [c]omplaint is deficient and does not set out the requisite facts to show that her claims are plausible under the Iqbal and Twombly standards." (Id.). In opposing the motion, Plaintiff merely asserts that "the [c]omplaint gives fair notice of the nature and basis of the claim[s]," and suggests that "[i]f necessary, [she] is prepared to give details about eachsupervisor named in the allegations in the complaint." (ECF No. 13 ¶ 7).
Significantly more detail than that set forth in the amended complaint is clearly necessary. Absent a narrative providing some description of the specific conduct at issue, when it occurred, and the identity of the relevant actors, Plaintiff cannot allege plausible claims for relief. See, e.g., United Black Firefighters, 604 F.2d at 847 (); Casey v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, Civ. No. RDB-11-0787, 2012 WL 502886, at *6 (D.Md. Feb. 14, 2012) (); Cureton v. Cianbro Corp., Civ. No. JFM-06-2303, 2006 WL 3537407, at *2 (D.Md. Nov. 22, 2006) (). While it is true, as the Board argues, that the amended complaint does not satisfy the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Iqbal and Twombly, a brief analysis of the specific claims Plaintiff purports to raise is instructive.
The first and second counts of the amended complaint purport to raise disparate treatment claims under Title VII and the ADEA.5 To plead a disparate treatment claim, the plaintiff must allege with sufficient particularity that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) her job performance was satisfactory, (3) she suffered an adverse...
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