Kirby v. Edgewood Independent School Dist., No. 3-87-190-CV

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Writing for the Court: Before SHANNON; SHANNON; GAMMAGE
• Citation: 761 S.W.2d 859
• Parties: 52 Ed. Law Rep. 379 William KIRBY, et al., Appellants, v. EDGEWOOD INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Appellees.
• Docket Number: No. 3-87-190-CV
• Decision Date: 14 December 1988

Page 859

761 S.W.2d 859 52 Ed. Law Rep. 379 William KIRBY, et al., Appellants,
v.
EDGEWOOD INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Appellees. No. 3-87-190-CV. Court of Appeals of Texas,
Austin. Dec. 14, 1988.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 4, 1989.

Page 860

Jim Turner, Timothy L. Hall, Hughes & Luce, Austin, for Eanes Independent School Dist., et al.

Robert E. Luna, Earl Luna, Mary Milford, Dallas, for Andrews Independent School Dist., et al.

Robert F. Brown, Hutchinson, Price, Boyle & Brooks, Dallas, James W. Deatherage, Power, Deatherage, Sharp & Blankenship, Irving, for Irving Independent School Dist.

Jim Mattox, Atty. Gen., Kevin T. O'Hanlon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, for William N. Kirby, Texas Com'r of Educ., Texas State Bd. of Educ., William Clements, Governor of Texas, Robert Bullock, Comptroller of Texas, Jim Mattox, Atty. Gen. of Texas.

Albert H. Kauffman, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, San Antonio, for Edgewood Independent School Dist., et al.

David R. Richards, Richards, Wiseman & Durst, Richard E. Gray, III, Gray & Becker, Austin, for Alvarado Independent School Dist., et al.

Before SHANNON, C.J., and GAMMAGE and ABOUSSIE, JJ.

SHANNON, Chief Justice.

Appellee school districts, parents, and students filed suit in the district court of Travis County seeking a declaration that the Texas school financing system, Tex.Educ.Code § 16.001, et seq., is in violation of the Texas Constitution. ¹ After a bench trial, the district court rendered judgment to that effect. This Court will reverse the judgment and here render judgment that appellees take nothing.

By its judgment the district court declared the funding scheme in violation of Tex. Const. art. I, § 3 (equal rights), § 19 (due course of law) ² and art. VII, § 1 (efficient school system). The district court concluded that education is a "fundamental right"; that wealth is a "suspect classification" in the school finance context; that the existing funding scheme is unconstitutionally "inefficient"; and that the Texas Constitution demands "fiscal neutrality" in public school funding, i.e., the level of expenditures per pupil in any district may not vary according to the property wealth of that district. Finally, the district court enjoined the relevant state officials from enforcing the challenged statutes but

Page 861

"stayed" the injunction until September 1, 1989.

The district court filed many findings of fact, a distillation of which follows. There are 1,061 school districts in Texas with about three million students in attendance. Under the existing school finance system, the state and the school districts share the cost of school operations but not the cost of facilities, which is borne entirely by the districts. Of total education costs, the State provides approximately forty-two percent, the school districts approximately fifty percent (derived from local property taxes), with the remainder coming from various sources, including federal funds. Because taxable property wealth varies from district to district, school districts' abilities to generate revenues vary and, as one would expect, there are disparities in the level of expenditures per student between the wealthy and the less wealthy school districts. Wealthier school districts are able to provide their students better physical facilities, more extensive curriculum, larger libraries and better trained teachers than are the less wealthy districts.

The local school district tax rates also vary widely from district to district. The less wealthy districts frequently must set a higher than average tax rate to achieve the necessary revenue to meet minimum educational standards.

The State, through its Foundation School Program, offsets to a degree the inability of the less wealthy school districts to generate revenues. The purpose of the program is to insure that each district has the necessary funds to provide each of its students at least a basic education. Under the program, the amount of state aid received by any given district is "equalized" according to a complex formula, so that low property wealth districts generally receive substantially more state aid than do the high property wealth districts.

By several points of error, appellants challenge the district court's overall conclusion that the State's school funding scheme is in violation of Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. Article I, § 3 provides in pertinent part:

All free men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights....

More specifically, appellants attack the district court's application of the "strict scrutiny" standard in evaluating the school finance system because, appellants assert, education is not a "fundamental right" and wealth is not a "suspect classification."

In an equal protection or equal rights analysis, the appellate court, of necessity, must begin by recognizing the applicable standard of judicial review. ³ If the questioned statute infringes upon a "fundamental right" or creates an inherently "suspect classification," the statute will be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. Such scrutiny requires the state to establish a compelling interest in its enactment. To discharge such a burden the state must demonstrate that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and compelling, and that its use of the classification is necessary to the accomplishment of its purpose. Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Stamos, 695 S.W.2d 556 (Tex.1985); Hernandez v. Houston Independent School District, 558 S.W.2d 121 (Tex.Civ.App.1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). ⁴

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On the other hand, if the statute does not collide with a fundamental right or create a suspect classification, the statute is accorded a presumption of constitutionality. The presumption may not be disturbed unless the enactment rests upon grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of a legitimate state objective. Whitworth v. Bynum, 699 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex.1985).

In support of the district court's conclusion that education is a fundamental right for purposes of equal protection analysis, appellees advance the premises that (1) education is vitally important and (2) education is specifically referred to in the Constitution of Texas, particularly Tex. Const. art. VII, § 1. No one, of course, disputes appellees' premise that education is important and that public education has long commanded a central role in the affairs of this State. Importance of a state service and its role in state affairs, however, is not controlling in ascertaining whether fundamental constitutional rights are involved. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30-31, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1295, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973).

Appellees' second premise is grounded upon a statement in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, supra, to the effect that for purposes of federal equal protection analysis one should determine "whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." Because public education is mentioned in the Texas Constitution, appellees insist that the right to an education is a fundamental right. More specifically, appellees rely upon Tex. Const. art. VII, § 1 which provides:

§ 1. Support and maintenance of system of public free schools.

Sec. 1. A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools.

Appellees' argument, embraced by the district court, ignores the difference between the Constitution of the United States and that of Texas. Unlike the United States Constitution, which is a document delegating limited authority and power, the Texas Constitution addresses a great number of subjects, the large majority of which are not fundamental rights. Indeed, the Texas Constitution contains many provisions that are usually the subject for legislation. For example, the Constitution provides for the establishment of county poor houses and farms, art. XVI, § 8; defines usury, art. XVI, § 11; provides for local option elections, art. XVI, § 20; provides for mechanic liens, art. XVI, § 37, and for water storage facilities, art. III, § 49-d. Yet, no one would seriously propose that one has a fundamental right, for example, to a water storage facility or a mechanics lien although the provision for each finds its place in the Texas Constitution. This Court, of course, does not suggest that these provisions are on an equal footing with those provisions which concern education, but the placement in the Constitution of such legislative-type provisions points up the weakness in appellees' argument, i.e., that because a subject is contained in the Texas Constitution it must be a fundamental right.

Appellees point out, however, that the Texas Constitution not only refers to education, but also states that education is "essential to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people." Because the Texas Constitution states that education is "essential" to the basic liberties, appellees argue education must be a fundamental right. Without a system of education, appellees reason, the people would not be able to meaningfully exercise liberties such as freedom of speech and the right to vote. ⁵

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Appellees' analysis has been termed the "nexus" theory in legal writings.

The Supreme Court of the United States concluded that education is not a fundamental right even though its provision by the state may be necessary for its citizens to exercise meaningfully their basic liberties. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, supra. The Court reasoned that the "nexus" analysis lacked logical limitation; for example, that there is no fundamental right to food and shelter although the existence of each is essential for the exercise of recognized fundamental rights....