Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust
| Decision Date | 05 April 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-1496.,No. 04-1628.,No. 04-1495.,No. 04-1660.,No. 04-2162.,No. 04-2687.,No. 04-1608.,No. 04-1651.,No. 04-1650.,No. 04-1661.,04-1495.,04-1496.,04-1608.,04-1628.,04-1650.,04-1651.,04-1660.,04-1661.,04-2162.,04-2687. |
| Citation | 403 F.3d 478 |
| Parties | Carl KIRCHER and Robert Brockway, individually and on behalf of a class, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. PUTNAM FUNDS TRUST and PUTNAM INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, LLC, et al., Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
George A. Zelcs, Eugene Y. Barash, Robert L. King, Korein Tillery, Chicago, IL, John J. Stoia, Jr., Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach, San Diego, CA, Francis J. Balint, Jr., Bonnett, Fairbourn, Friedman & Balint, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Rebecca R. Jackson, Bryan Cave, Jon A. Santangelo, Stinson, Morrison & Hecker, St. Louis, MO, Matthew R. Kipp, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, Chicago, IL, Gordon R. Broom, Regina L. Wells, Burroughs, Hepler, Broom, MacDonald & Hebrank, Edwardsville, IL, Steven B. Feirson, Dechert, Price & Rhoads, Philadelphia, PA, Mark A. Perry (argued), Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Washington, DC, for Defendants-Appellants.
Before EASTERBROOK, RIPPLE, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.
Complaints filed in the circuit court of Madison County, Illinois, charge several mutual funds with setting prices in a way that arbitrageurs can exploit. The funds removed the suits to federal court and asked the district judges to dismiss them under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA). Instead the federal judges remanded each suit. Last year we held that these remands are appealable. See Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 373 F.3d 847 (7th Cir.2004). Now we must decide whether SLUSA blocks litigation in state court. (Plaintiffs have asked us to overrule our decision about appellate jurisdiction, but their arguments are unpersuasive.)
Mutual funds must set prices at which they sell and redeem their own shares once a day, and must do so at the net asset value of the funds' holdings. (All of the defendants, which operate in interstate and international commerce, are regulated under the Investment Company Act of 1940; we call them "mutual funds" for convenience.) Each defendant sets that price at 4 p.m. Eastern time, shortly after the New York Stock Exchange closes. Orders placed before the close of business that day are executed at this price.
When the funds hold assets that trade in competitive markets, they must value the assets at their market price. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(41)(B)(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-4(a). Defendants implement this requirement by valuing securities at the closing price of the principal exchange or market in which the securities are traded. For domestic securities this yields a current price; for securities of foreign issuers, however, it may produce a price that is as much as 15 hours old. (European markets close 5 or 6 hours ahead of New York; Asian markets close 12 to 15 hours before New York.)
Many securities trade on multiple markets or over the counter. Stock of a Japanese firm that closes in Tokyo at >10,000 might trade in Frankfurt at > 75.22 (equivalent to >10,500) between the close in Tokyo and the close in New York — but the mutual fund nonetheless would value each share at >10,000, because that was its most recent price in the issuer's home market. If foreign stocks move predominantly up during this interval (or if one foreign security moves substantially higher), the mutual fund as a whole would carry a 4 p.m. price below what would be justified by the latest available information, and an arbitrageur could purchase shares before 4 p.m. with a plan to sell the next day at a profit. Likewise arbitrageurs could gain if the foreign stock falls after the close in its home market, and the arbitrageur knows that the U.S. mutual fund will be overpriced at 4 p.m. relative to the price it is likely to have the next trading day when new information from abroad finally is reflected in the fund's valuation. See Richard L. Levine, Yvonne Cristovici & Richard A. Jacobsen, Mutual Fund Market Timing, Federal Lawyer 28 (Jan.2005).
A short-swing-trading strategy would not be attractive unless the foreign securities' prices had moved enough to cover the transactions costs of matched purchases and sales of the mutual fund shares, but for no-load funds that have substantial investments in foreign markets this condition sometimes is satisfied. Arbitrageurs then make profits with slight risk to themselves, diverting gains from the mutual funds' long-term investors while imposing higher administrative costs on the funds (whose operating expenses rise with each purchase and redemption). Plaintiffs contend that the mutual funds acted recklessly in failing to block arbitrageurs from reaping these profits. Available means might include levying fees on short-swing transactions, adopting to a front-end-load charge, reducing the number of trades any investor can execute (or deferring each trade by one day), and valuing the securities of foreign issuers at the most current price in any competitive market (organized or over the counter), and not just the closing price on the issuers' home stock exchanges. Some mutual funds have begun to take steps to curtail arbitrage, while disclosing residual vulnerabilities more prominently, but the litigation targets those funds that have not done so (or targets the period before a given fund acted).
SLUSA added to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 parallel provisions curtailing certain class actions under state law. As in last year's jurisdictional opinion, we limit attention to § 16 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77p, because the additions to the 1934 Act are functionally identical. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb. As amended by SLUSA, § 77p(b) reads:
No covered class action based upon the statutory or common law of any State or subdivision thereof may be maintained in any State or Federal court by any private party alleging —
(1) an untrue statement or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security; or
(2) that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.
Investments in mutual funds are "covered securities," see § 77p(f)(3), and all of these suits are "covered class actions," see § 77p(f)(2), because plaintiffs seek to represent more than 50 investors and each action is direct rather than derivative. Section 77p(d) contains a number of additional exceptions, but plaintiffs do not contend that any of them applies to these actions. Thus everything turns on subsection (b), which forecloses a suit based on state law in which a private class alleges "(1) an untrue statement or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security; or (2) that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security."
That familiar language comes from Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, which is based on § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Rule 10b-5 reads:
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Every court of appeals to encounter SLUSA has held that its language has the same scope as its antecedent in Rule 10b-5. Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 395 F.3d 25, 34-36 (2d Cir.2005); Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir.2005); Green v. Ameritrade, Inc., 279 F.3d 590, 596-97 (8th Cir.2002); Falkowski v. Imation Corp., 309 F.3d 1123, 1131 (9th Cir.2002), amended, 320 F.3d 905 (2003); Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 292 F.3d 1334, 1342-43 (11th Cir.2002). We agree with this conclusion. SLUSA is designed to prevent plaintiffs from migrating to state court in order to evade rules for federal securities litigation in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. See Spielman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 332 F.3d 116, 122-24 (2d Cir.2003) (). SLUSA can do its job only if subsection (b) covers those claims that engage Rule 10b-5 () if presented directly under federal law; this is why SLUSA borrows the Rule's language. Unfortunately, however, the other circuits do not agree among themselves (or with the SEC) what Rule 10b-5 itself means. The phrase "in connection with the purchase or sale" of a security is the sticking point.
The Supreme Court held in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975), that investors who neither purchase nor sell securities may not collect damages in private litigation under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, even if failure to purchase or sell was the result of fraud. Assuming that SLUSA's "in connection with" language means "able to pursue a private right of action after Blue Chip Stamps...
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