Kirchgessner v. Wilentz
| Decision Date | 28 April 1995 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 94-5973 (AJL). |
| Citation | 884 F. Supp. 901 |
| Parties | Robert KIRCHGESSNER, Jr., et al., Plaintiffs, v. Robert N. WILENTZ, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
David I. Fox, Craig S. Gumpel, Fox and Fox, Newark, NJ, for plaintiff Probation Ass'n of New Jersey.
A.J. Fusco, Jr., P.A., Passaic, NJ, for Kirchgessner plaintiffs.
Deborah T. Poritz, Atty. Gen., Robert H. Stoloff, Asst. Atty. Gen., Christian Arnold, Deputy Atty. Gen., Benjamin Clarke, Asst. Atty. Gen., Trenton, NJ, for defendants.
This is a consolidated action consisting of an action brought by seven named probation officers including one Robert Kirchgessner, Jr.1 (the "Kirchgessner Plaintiffs"), as members of a putative class of all present and future probation officers employed by the State of New Jersey, see Kirchgessner Plaintiffs' Verified Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand (the "Kirchgessner Complaint"), and Exhibits A through C, and an action brought by the Probation Association of New Jersey ("PANJ"), the employee representative for some 1500 probation employees throughout New Jersey. See PANJ's Verified Complaint, Civil Action Number 94-6375 (AJL) (the "PANJ Complaint"), and Exhibits A through D. The Kirchgessner Plaintiffs and PANJ (collectively, the "Plaintiffs") commenced their actions against the seven justices (the "Chief Justice" and the "Associate Justices" or the "Defendants") of the Supreme Court of the State of New Jersey (the "New Jersey Supreme Court"), in their official capacities, seeking by way of injunctive relief to enjoin the policy of the New Jersey Supreme Court prohibiting probation officer membership in police organizations. Jurisdiction is alleged pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 29 U.S.C. § 102. Kirchgessner Complaint, ¶¶ 2-3; PANJ Complaint, ¶ 4.
On 15 December 1994, the Kirchgessner Plaintiffs made an application for an accelerated return date and a preliminary injunction (the "Preliminary Injunction Application"). See transcript of Preliminary Injunction Application, dated 15 December 1994 (the "Preliminary Injunction Application Tr."). Counsel for the Defendants was given notice of the Preliminary Injunction Application on 14 December 1994. Id. at 3.
In light of the limited opportunity counsel for the Defendants had to present opposition and because the Kirchgessner Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the New Jersey Supreme Court concerning an opinion issued more than five months earlier on 8 July 1994 (the "8 July 1994 Opinion"), attached as Exhibit A to the Kirchgessner Complaint and Exhibit C to the PANJ Complaint, the Preliminary Injunction Application was denied on 15 December 1994. Preliminary Injunction Application Tr. at 3-5. The Kirchgessner Plaintiffs were instructed to proceed with their motion for injunctive relief pursuant to Rule 12 N, Appendix N of the General Rules Governing the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. Id. at 4-6.
On 3 January 1995, PANJ filed an order to show cause (the "Order to Show Cause"), seeking a declaratory judgment, preliminary and permanent injunction against the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices in connection with the 8 July 1994 Opinion. A letter was forwarded to counsel for PANJ, with copies to counsel for the Kirchgessner Plaintiffs and counsel for the Defendants, dated 4 January 1995 (the "4 January 1995 Letter") stating:
As explained on 15 December 1994 to counsel in the Kirchgessner matter, based upon the chronology of the events related to these cases, as well as the timing of the applications for injunctive relief, ... there is no reason to proceed in an emergent manner. The relief sought requires deliberate action and the Defendants should have a fair and adequate opportunity to respond to a request for injunctive relief, as sought in each of these matters.
4 January 1995 Letter at 2. Additionally, the 4 January 1995 Letter advised that it was the court's inclination to consolidate the matters and have the Kirchgessner Plaintiffs and PANJ jointly brief the injunctive relief issue to avoid a duplication of effort. Id.
At a status conference, dated 12 January 1995, the action commenced by PANJ, was consolidated with the matter filed by the Kirchgessner Plaintiffs. See Order of Consolidation, dated and filed 12 January 1995. Thereafter, a return date and hearing were scheduled for 17 April 1995 (the "17 April Hearing"). See transcript of the 17 April Hearing, dated 17 April 1995 (the "17 April Hearing Tr.").
Currently before the court is the Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices, from enforcing a policy, as articulated in the 8 July 1994 Opinion; this policy prohibits probation officer membership in law enforcement organizations. Also before the court is the cross-motion by the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices to dismiss for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 12(b)(6)").2
For the reasons set forth below, the motion by Plaintiffs for a preliminary injunction is denied. The cross-motion by the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices to dismiss is granted as to the Plaintiffs' Federal causes of action; supplemental jurisdiction is not exercised concerning the Plaintiffs' state law causes of action.
In October and November 1993, PANJ passed a referendum to affiliate itself with the Policeman Benevolent Association of New Jersey (the "State PBA"). PANJ Complaint, ¶ 28. In September of 1994, the State PBA agreed to become affiliated with the PANJ, if such affiliation was not prohibited by law. Id., ¶ 30. Additionally, many of the Plaintiffs were, at that time, members of the Fraternal Order of Police (the "FOP"). Kirchgessner Complaint, ¶¶ 9-14; PANJ Complaint, ¶ 32.
On 3 March 1994, in response to a request made by the Chief Probation Officers' Association, the New Jersey Supreme Court announced it would review its longstanding policy prohibiting probation officer membership in law enforcement organizations, namely the State PBA and the FOP. See Letter from the New Jersey Supreme Court, dated 3 March 1994 (the "3 March 1994 Letter"), attached as Exhibit A to the PANJ Complaint at 1. The New Jersey Supreme Court appointed retired Superior Court Judge Paul R. Huot, as a special master (the "Special Master"), to develop a factual record to aid in its review of this matter. Id.
In the 3 March 1994 Letter, the New Jersey Supreme Court explained: Id. at 1-2. Additionally, the 3 March 1994 Letter stated: "The Supreme Court of New Jersey wishes to make clear that it recognizes the probation officers' constitutional right to have representatives of their own choosing in connection with collective negotiations." Id. at 2.
On 28 March 1994, the Special Master issued his report (the "Report of the Special Master"), attached as Exhibit B to the Kirchgessner Complaint and the PANJ Complaint, concerning probation officer membership in law enforcement organizations and the proposed affiliation of PANJ with the State PBA. According to the Special Master, there were five questions submitted by the New Jersey Supreme Court for which it sought a factual record and recommended findings of fact. Report of the Special Master at 2. These questions were:
The Report of the Special Master explained:
This report does not and the assignment of the Special Master was not intended to make findings concerning the question of whether a probation officer was a "law enforcement officer", nor the question of the propriety or right of any "union" to be a representative for collective bargaining purposes of probation officers nor the question of the right of probation officers to join any particular union.
Id. (emphasis in original).
With regard to the impact of membership in police organizations on the probation function, the Special Master determined that the testimony he heard and the evidence submitted "were not such that a true factual determination can be made." Id. at 3. According to the Special Master: "While a far more detailed and intense study would be required to come to a fully sustainable conclusion based upon empirical data rather than opinions, it would appear that membership in the State PBA or the FOP will not affect the functions of probation." Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
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