Kirchner v. Chattanooga Choo Choo

Citation10 F.3d 737
Decision Date30 November 1993
Docket NumberNo. 92-6346,92-6346
PartiesArt KIRCHNER and Edie Kirchner, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHATTANOOGA CHOO CHOO, a Hawaiian Limited Partnership, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)

Jack S. Dawson (Kelly A. George and James A. Scimeca, with him on the briefs), Miller, Dollarhide, Dawson & Shaw, Oklahoma City, OK, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Lana Cohlmia, Culp, Heath & Sushnik, Oklahoma City, OK, for defendant-appellee.

Before LOGAN and MOORE, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, District Judge. *

JOHN P. MOORE, Circuit Judge.

Art Kirchner fell on ice outside his apartment and sued his landlord, Chattanooga Choo Choo, for damages. At trial, the jury decided against Mr. Kirchner on his common law claim but for him on his claim under the Oklahoma Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, Okla.Stat. tit. 41, Secs. 101-136 (1991) (the Act). The court subsequently granted defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the statutory claim. Mr. Kirchner appeals arguing the Oklahoma statute alters the common law by increasing the duty a landlord owes tenants and provides a tort remedy for personal injuries caused by a landlord's breach of that statutory duty. We disagree and affirm the district court's decision.

In January 1991, Mr. Kirchner slipped and fell on ice hidden beneath a puddle of water on the sidewalk in front of his apartment. He filed a personal injury suit against Chattanooga Choo Choo asserting violations of the common law and the Act. In his statutory claim, plaintiff contended the Act imposes on landlords a higher duty than the common law to keep common areas in a safe condition. Chattanooga Choo Choo breached this duty, thus entitling Mr. Kirchner to damages for his personal injuries. After the jury found Chattanooga Choo Choo liable under the Act but not the common law, Chattanooga filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The motion alleged the Act does not provide a tort remedy for personal injuries. The district court granted the motion.

We review de novo a district court's determination of state law. Mountain Fuel Supply v. Reliance Ins. Co., 933 F.2d 882, 889 (10th Cir.1991) (citation omitted). The Act, except as otherwise provided, "applies to, regulates and determines rights, obligations and remedies under a rental agreement ... for a dwelling unit located within this state." Okla.Stat. tit. 41, Sec. 103(A). Pursuant to the Act, a landlord of a dwelling, other than a single-family residence, must "keep all common areas of his building, grounds, facilities and appurtenances in a clean, safe and sanitary condition." Okla.Stat. tit. 41, Sec. 118(A)(1). If a landlord breaches this duty and thus "materially" affects health or safety, the tenant, after notifying the landlord and receiving no cure, may terminate the lease or, where the breach implicates health, may make inexpensive repairs and deduct their cost from the rent. Okla.Stat. tit. 41, Sec. 121(A)-(B).

The Oklahoma Supreme Court has never reached the issue of whether the Act provides a damage remedy for violations resulting in personal injury. However, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals recently answered this question in a case resembling Mr. Kirchner's. In Weatherall v. Yorktown Homeowners Ass'n, 852 P.2d 815 (Okla.Ct.App.1993), the tenant fell on ice and snow outside her apartment and sued the companies that owned and managed the building for personal injuries. The tenant claimed the Act's mandate requiring landlords to keep common areas in "a clean, safe and sanitary condition" altered the common law by imposing a higher duty of care. Id. at 816 (citing Okla.Stat. tit. 41, Sec. 118(A)(1)). The appellate court disagreed reasoning the common law remains effective unless a statute explicitly changes it. Id. (citing Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218 (Okla.1992)). According to Weatherall, nothing in section 118(A)(1) indicates "safe" condition requires more than satisfying the common law duty. Therefore, the court upheld a summary judgment order in favor of one of the defendants. We find the reasoning of Weatherall persuasive.

We reach the same conclusion under the district court's reasoning as well. The Oklahoma legislature promulgated the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act to regulate the contractual rights of residential landlords and tenants. See Okla.Stat. tit. 41, Sec. 103(A). It does not alter the common law regarding personal injury and, therefore, does not expand a landlord's duties.

Also, the Act does not specifically create an action for damages for personal injuries. The legislature modeled Oklahoma's law on the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, Secs. 1.101-6.104, 7B U.L.A. 432 (1974), but did not include a provision existing in the uniform act which explicitly provides for damages. Sec. 4.101(b) (amended 1974) (Supp.1993). Where a legislature models an act on...

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3 cases
  • City of Hugo v. State ex rel. Public Employees Relations Bd.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Oklahoma
    • December 6, 1994
    ...such discretion is not found within the language of the Oklahoma Act, these decisions are not persuasive.28 Kirchner v. Chattanooga Choo Choo, 10 F.3d 737, 738-39 (10th Cir.1993); Crane Co. v. Richardson Constr. Co., 312 F.2d 269-70 (5th Cir.1963). See also, Bank of America v. Webster, 439 ......
  • Essex Ins. Co. v. Vincent
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)
    • April 19, 1995
    ...de novo. See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 1221, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991); Kirchner v. Chattanooga Choo Choo, 10 F.3d 737, 738 (10th Cir.1993). A court interprets an insurance contract using traditional principles of contractual interpretation. See Buell ......
  • Helmer v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)
    • July 12, 2016
    ...in the original, a strong presumption exists that the legislature intended to omit that provision.” Kirchner v. Chattanooga Choo Choo , 10 F.3d 737, 738–39 (10th Cir. 1993).6 Thus, the inclusion of a product's useful safe life in the Model Act weighs against reading the requirement into § 1......

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