Kiriakides v. United Artists Communications, Inc., 23993
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
| Citation | 440 S.E.2d 364,312 S.C. 271 |
| Docket Number | No. 23993,23993 |
| Parties | Alex KIRIAKIDES, Jr. and John Kiriakides, Appellants, v. UNITED ARTISTS COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Respondent. . Heard |
| Decision Date | 03 November 1993 |
Page 364
v.
UNITED ARTISTS COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Respondent.
Decided Jan. 17, 1994.
Page 365
[312 S.C. 272] Edward M. Woodward, Jr. and Mark A. King, Jr., Woodward, Leventis, Unger, Daves, Herndon, and Cothran, Columbia, for appellants.
[312 S.C. 273] V. Clarke Price and James H. Cassidy, Love, Thornton, Arnold, and Thomason, Greenville, for respondent.
HARWELL, Chief Justice.
Alex and John Kiriakides (Landlord) contend that the trial judge erred in refusing to terminate the remainder of United Artists Communications' (United Artists) lease after United Artists failed to pay a rent increase. We disagree and affirm.
I. Facts
On January 15, 1976, Fairlane Litchfield Company Inc. entered into an agreement to lease a theater from Landlord until 1996. The lease was later amended to extend the term to 2016. Fairlane Litchfield assigned the lease to United Artists on May 15, 1987. In February 1988, Landlord discovered that United Artists had failed to pay a $365 per month rent increase 1 that took effect January 1, 1988 according to the terms of the lease. In May or June of that year, Landlord sent a letter to the local theater and to United Artists' office in New Jersey, the return address of all rent payments, rather than the New York address listed on the lease. Raymond Sohmer, the Administrative Assistant for United Artists, testified that he never received this letter in the New York office. United Artists continued to timely pay the amount due prior to the increase.
On February 9, 1989, Landlord sent a letter to United Artists stating that if payment of the past due rent was not made within ten days, Landlord was going to "regretfully exercise our rights under the lease." The letter was received in the New Jersey office on February 16 and in the New York office on February 17. United Artists tried to contact Landlord concerning the exact amount of rent due. Thereafter, Landlord's lawyer informed United Artists of the amount of past rent owed. United Artists immediately sent Landlord the past due amount.
On March 3, 1989, the same day that United Artists mailed [312 S.C. 274] the check for the past due amount, Landlord commenced this action for ejection by service of Summons and Complaint at United Artists' New Jersey office. United Artists answered, claiming that Landlord failed to serve notice of default as required by the terms of the lease and that termination of the lease would be inequitable. At trial, Landlord moved for a directed verdict claiming that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the whole of the evidence was that the notice requirement had been met. The trial judge denied the motion and the jury rendered a verdict for United Artists. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the trial judge erred in failing to direct a verdict in Landlord's favor because proper notice was given to United Artists as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals remanded for a determination whether forfeiture of the lease would be inequitable, 307 S.C. 72, 413 S.E.2d 850.
On remand, the trial judge denied the forfeiture of the lease and ejectment of United Artists, ruling that upon payment of any past due installment of rent, United Artists shall resume possession of the premises. Landlord appealed.
II. Discussion
Landlord argues that because both the lease 2 and S.C.Code § 27-37-10 (1991) provide
Page 366
for termination of the lease if the tenant fails to pay rent when due, the trial judge erred in applying equitable principles to deny the forfeiture of United Artists' lease. We disagree.Section 27-37-10 provides:
[312 S.C. 275] [t]he tenant may be ejected upon application of the landlord or his agent when (a) such tenant fails or refuses to pay the rent when due or when demanded, (b) the term of tenancy or occupancy has ended or (c) the terms or conditions of the lease have been violated.
According to Landlord, section 27-37-10 and the terms of the lease would permit forfeiture no matter how trivial, inadvertent, non-prejudicial, or technical the breach.
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