Kirkland v. City of Maryville, Tennessee
| Decision Date | 05 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-5569 |
| Citation | 54 F.4th 901 |
| Parties | Shaina M. KIRKLAND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF MARYVILLE, TENNESSEE, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
ARGUED: Heather Moore Collins, COLLINS & HUNTER PLLC, Brentwood, Tennessee, for Appellant. Courtney E. Read, WATSON, ROACH, BATSON & LAUDERBACK, P.L.C., Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Heather Moore Collins, Caroline Drinnon, COLLINS & HUNTER PLLC, Brentwood, Tennessee, for Appellant. Courtney E. Read, Reid A. Spaulding, WATSON, ROACH, BATSON & LAUDERBACK, P.L.C., Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee.
Before: GUY, THAPAR, and READLER, Circuit Judges.
Shaina Kirkland served as a patrol officer with the City of Maryville's police department. While in that role, Kirkland periodically used her Facebook account to criticize the county sheriff. Kirkland's supervisors became concerned that her posts would undermine the Department's relationship with their sister law enforcement agency. So they asked her to stop. They also reprimanded her for other behavioral issues.
Matters came to a head following a Facebook post by Kirkland claiming the sheriff had excluded her from a training event because she was female and opposed his reelection. At that point, the City fired Kirkland. Kirkland responded by suing the City, alleging retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, Title VII, and the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The district court granted summary judgment in the City's favor. We now affirm.
Maryville is a city located in Blount County, Tennessee. Over her career in law enforcement, Shaina Kirkland worked for both the City and the County. She began that career as a corrections officer in the Blount County Sheriff's Office. She left the position following an undisclosed "incident" and an unsuccessful appeal to Sheriff James Berrong.
Kirkland then joined the Maryville Police Department as a patrol officer. Her early tenure there, however, proved uneven. For example, she received "verbal counseling and remedial training" for an improper warrant application. And she was twice reprimanded when citizens complained about her "rude and unprofessional" behavior during traffic stops.
The Department eventually made Kirkland a field training officer. In this role, she would have new officers accompany her for training purposes while on patrol. This service too was not without incident. In one instance, Kirkland griped to a trainee that she had been passed over for traffic unit assignments in favor of male officers. (Kirkland, however, lacked a Tennessee motorcycle endorsement, which was needed to work in the traffic unit, resulting in her repeated rejections for the position.) She also criticized the shoes officers must wear as well as the field training program for new officers. Upon learning of these exchanges, Captain Sharon Moore, Kirkland's superior officer, undertook an investigation. At the investigation's close, Moore issued Kirkland a written reprimand for her "negativity toward th[e] department" and suspended her from her training duties.
Other incidents involving Kirkland emanated from her apparent resentment for Sheriff Berrong, who she was familiar with from her tenure at the Blount County Sheriff's Office. A number of years into her service with the City, Kirkland made two Facebook posts criticizing Berrong, who was running for re-election. One belittled his public speaking abilities; the other referred to his supporters as "brainwashed minions." A concerned citizen complained about the posts, questioning whether an officer who publicly criticizes a sheriff and his deputies could work effectively alongside them. Kirkland's superiors found her conduct inappropriate and issued a reprimand. Kirkland was allowed to post "supporting views" of political candidates but was cautioned against posting "negative comments," as the Department must "maintain working relationships with other agencies and departments to provide services to the public."
Months later, Kirkland attended a Sheriff's Office event to satisfy an annual training requirement. At the training, Kirkland participated in a "high stress" exercise during which she drove an SUV in a simulated gunfight. Despite being a simulation, the exercise veered into treacherous territory when Kirkland nearly ran over a Sheriff's deputy. Complicating matters, Kirkland later refused to shake a Sheriff's Office investigator's hand.
After the event, Sheriff Berrong wrote to Tony Crisp, the Maryville Police Chief. Berrong informed Crisp that Kirkland was barred from attending future Sheriff's Office training events due to her "blatant disrespect for our training instructors and deputies" and her "unsafe" conduct. Crisp asked Captain Moore to investigate. Moore documented Kirkland's "childish" behavior at the event as well as her history of disciplinary issues, including her Facebook posts mocking Berrong. Moore recommended that Kirkland be suspended without pay for three days. Crisp agreed. City Manager Greg McClain ultimately upheld the recommendation due to "the disrespectful manner in which [Kirkland] conducted [her]self."
Before Kirkland's suspension began, she complained to McClain regarding purported sex discrimination within the Department. According to Kirkland, her superiors had discriminated against her "for being a female when it comes to special assignments [i.e., the Traffic Unit] and days off." Later that week, Kirkland submitted the same accusations to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
Six months passed. At that point, Kirkland filed a "grievance" with Chief Crisp. In addition to repeating her claims of sex discrimination, Kirkland also complained about her continued ban from Sheriff's Office training events. Crisp denied the grievance as factually unsupported, adding that he had "addressed most of these complaints previously when [Kirkland] appealed [her] 3 day suspension." Nonetheless, Crisp did ask (albeit to no avail) Sheriff Berrong to allow Kirkland to attend future training sessions.
Things soon came to a head. Despite her earlier instructions to refrain from negative social media commentary, Kirkland shared on Facebook an unflattering article about Sheriff Berrong. The article's title read: "Sheriff's connections to private contractor are cozy, but lawyer says not illegal." Kirkland added her own comment: "Just like I'm sure it's not illegal to ban a female officer from training for not voting for you either." After learning about the post, Chief Crisp recommended to Assistant City Manager Roger Campbell that Kirkland be terminated because her post violated Department orders requiring officers to maintain good relations with the public and other law enforcement agencies. Following a disciplinary appeal hearing, McClain upheld the recommendation. Kirkland was terminated.
Kirkland sued the City. Relevant here are her claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VII, and the Tennessee Human Rights Act. Cf. Paige v. Coyner , 614 F.3d 273, 283–84 (6th Cir. 2010) (). She alleged that her termination violated the First Amendment and that her suspension without pay and her termination were unlawful retaliation for complaints of sex discrimination, in violation of Title VII and the THRA. The district court granted summary judgment to the City on those claims. This appeal followed.
To prevail under her First Amendment retaliation theory, Kirkland must show that: (1) she engaged in constitutionally protected speech, (2) she suffered an adverse action likely to chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in protected speech, and (3) the protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse action. Wood v. Eubanks , 25 F.4th 414, 428 (6th Cir. 2022). The district court granted summary judgment to the City on that claim, concluding that the City did not violate the First Amendment by firing Kirkland for her May 2019 Facebook post. Kirkland contests that decision on appeal, emphasizing that the City failed to show "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact" or that it was "entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In assessing the propriety of Kirkland's challenge, we review the district court's decision de novo, viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to her and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor. Fisher v. Nissan N. Am., Inc. , 951 F.3d 409, 416 (6th Cir. 2020).
We begin by asking whether Kirkland engaged in constitutionally protected speech. A government employee enjoys the right to speak on matters of public concern. Lane v. Franks , 573 U.S. 228, 235–36, 134 S.Ct. 2369, 189 L.Ed.2d 312 (2014). That right, however, must be balanced against the need to ensure "efficient provision of public services," as government entities "need a significant degree of control over their employees’ words and actions." Garcetti v. Ceballos , 547 U.S. 410, 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006). In other words, while "public employees do not forfeit all their First Amendment rights simply because they are employed by the state or a municipality," they necessarily "accept certain limitations on [their] freedom." Handy-Clay v. City of Memphis , 695 F.3d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).
Under our settled legal framework, Kirkland's speech was constitutionally protected if: (1) she was speaking as a private citizen and not pursuant to official duties, (2) her speech was on a matter of public concern, and (3) her speech interest outweighs the City's interest in "promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." Id. at 540 (cleaned up). As the parties do not contest whether the statements at issue were made in Kirkland's capacity as a private citizen, we turn to whether her speech addressed a...
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