Kirkland v. United States
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Writing for the Court | Coleman & White, Edgefield, S. C., Buzhardt & Baggett, McCormick, S. C., for plaintiff |
| Citation | Kirkland v. United States, 241 F.Supp. 198 (D. S.C. 1965) |
| Decision Date | 06 May 1965 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 4527. |
| Parties | Bliss KIRKLAND, Plaintiff, v. The UNITED STATES of America, Defendant. |
Coleman & White, Edgefield, S. C., Buzhardt & Baggett, McCormick, S. C., for plaintiff.
John C. Williams, U. S. Atty., Albert Q. Taylor, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Greenville, S. C., for defendant.
This is an action by the plaintiff against the defendant for damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act for loss of property and personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff on or about August 13, 1963, as a result of a collision between plaintiff's 1956 Ford Pickup truck, which he was driving, and a United States Army vehicle engaged in maneuver operations and being operated by United States Army personnel of the defendant. The plaintiff alleges that his damages and injuries were caused by the negligent acts of a United States Army soldier while acting in the discharge of his duties as such.
The above case was tried by me without a jury.
After the plaintiff in this case completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant moved for an involuntary dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff had shown no right to relief (Rule 41(b), Rules of Civil Procedure), which motion was granted.
In compliance with Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, I find the facts specially and state my conclusions of law thereon, in the above cause, as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiff is a citizen of the State of South Carolina, and resides in the Greenwood Division in the Western District of South Carolina.
2. On or about August 13, 1963, at or about seven o'clock a. m., plaintiff was operating his 1956 Ford Pickup truck in a westerly direction on South Carolina State Highway Number 23. At the same time a soldier of the United States Army, involved in Swift Strike III maneuvers, was operating a truck belonging to the United States in a convoy, as agent, servant and employee of the defendant, acting within the scope of his duties and employment, in a northerly direction on South Carolina State Highway Number 39, which intersects with Highway Number 23, in Saluda County, the road on which the plaintiff was proceeding and which is known as a through highway. Highway Number 39, upon which the trucks of the army convoy were being operated was a secondary highway. There is a stop-sign some distance from the intersection on Highway 39, the highway on which the army convoy of trucks was traveling.
3. As plaintiff was driving along highway Number 23 at a rate of speed of about twenty-five or thirty miles an hour, approaching the intersection with highway Number 39, a soldier of the United States Army was standing in the middle of the intersection, facing the plaintiff, and when plaintiff was about one hundred yards from the intersection the soldier held up his hand as a signal to the plaintiff to stop, and then dropped it to his side, and turned his head toward the convoy and motioned the trucks in the convoy to proceed to cross the intersection.
4. The plaintiff failed to heed the stop signal given by the soldier of the United States Army but continued on toward the intersection without stopping or reducing his speed until he collided with the leading truck in the convoy, and suffered damages to his truck and personal injuries by reason of the collision.
5. Plaintiff testified that he did not see the soldier giving the stop signal to him or the army trucks approaching and entering the intersection.
6. Plaintiff was guilty of negligence in failing to see the soldier giving him the signal to stop, which he saw or should have seen, in time to have avoided the collision; in failing to heed the stop signal given him by the soldier of the United States Army; in failing to maintain a proper lookout for the defendant's vehicle or other vehicles traveling upon the highway; in failing to apply his brakes when he knew, or should have known, that his vehicle was about to strike the defendant's vehicle; in failing to exercise that degree of care and caution which an ordinary or prudent...
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Vaughan v. Southern Bakeries Company
...reasonably conclude that the mandate of the STOP sign would be obeyed. As Judge Wyche recently pointed out in Kirkland v. United States, 241 F.Supp. 198, 200 (W.D.S.C.1965): A motorist on a preferred highway is entitled to assume that a vehicle approaching on a secondary highway will stop f......