Kirkpatrick v. Dist. Ct.
| Decision Date | 11 April 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 37593.,37593. |
| Citation | 118 Nev. 233,43 P.3d 998 |
| Parties | Bruce KIRKPATRICK, Petitioner, v. The EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT of the State of Nevada, In and For the COUNTY OF CLARK, and the Honorable Robert E. Gaston, District Judge, Family Court Division, Respondents, and Sierradawn Kirkpatrick Crow, Real Party in Interest. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
Gayle F. Nathan, Las Vegas, for Petitioner.
Bruce I. Shapiro, Henderson; Rebecca L. Burton, Las Vegas, for Real Party in Interest.
BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.
In this case we are asked to determine the constitutionality of NRS 122.025, which permits a minor under the age of sixteen to marry with the consent of one parent and the district court's authorization. Under that statute, the district court permitted petitioner's fifteen-year-old daughter to marry a forty-eight-year-old man. Although the daughter's mother had provided consent, petitioner had no knowledge that his daughter was planning to and ultimately did undergo a marriage in Nevada. Because petitioner, who had an on-going personal and custodial relationship with his daughter, was provided neither notice nor an opportunity to be heard before his daughter was given judicial permission to marry, NRS 122.025 was unconstitutionally applied in this instance. Additionally, the district court manifestly abused its discretion when it failed to identify any extraordinary circumstances warranting the marriage and failed to expressly consider the daughter's best interests. Accordingly, we grant this petition for extraordinary relief.
Fifteen-year-old SierraDawn Kirkpatrick Crow ("Sierra") is the daughter of Karen Karay and petitioner Bruce Kirkpatrick. In 1990, Karay and Kirkpatrick were divorced in California. As part of the divorce decree, Karay and Kirkpatrick were awarded joint legal and physical custody of Sierra. In 1992, Karay and Sierra moved from California to New Mexico. After the divorce, Kirkpatrick maintained a relationship with his daughter through telephone conversations, and visits with her in New Mexico and California. Sierra spent the 2000 Christmas holiday with Kirkpatrick in California. The record suggests that Kirkpatrick may have had physical custody of Sierra in California during the late 1990s.
In late December 2000, shortly after Sierra turned fifteen years old, she informed her mother that she desired to marry her guitar teacher, forty-eight-year-old Sauren Crow. Under New Mexico law, a minor under the age of sixteen is not permitted to marry unless the marriage legitimizes a child born out of wedlock or the minor is pregnant.1 Because Sierra was not pregnant and had no children, she could not marry Crow in New Mexico. In Nevada, however, a minor under the age of sixteen may marry if he or she has the consent of one parent and the district court's authorization.2 Thus, Sierra, her mother and Crow traveled to Las Vegas so that Sierra could take advantage of Nevada's marriage consent law and seek judicial permission to marry Crow.
On December 29, 2000, Karay filed a petition with the Clark County district court to obtain judicial authorization for Sierra's marriage. With the petition, Karay filed a conclusory affidavit consenting to the marriage, in which she simply stated that Sierra and Crow were "right for each other," that they had "very real life plans," and that "their talents [would] be most effectively utilized by [the] marriage."3 Without conducting a hearing or interviewing Karay, Sierra or Crow, the district court summarily found that good cause existed under Nevada law for the marriage, and ordered that a marriage license be issued to Sierra and Crow. On January 3, 2001, Sierra and Crow were married in Las Vegas.
When Kirkpatrick first learned of Sierra's marriage, he sought an ex parte temporary restraining order in the New Mexico district court. That court granted the temporary restraining order, and awarded Kirkpatrick immediate legal and physical custody of Sierra. Four days later, however, the court rescinded its order because it found that Sierra's marriage was valid under Nevada law, and that Sierra was emancipated as a result of the marriage.4
Kirkpatrick then moved the Clark County district court to vacate its earlier order authorizing Sierra's marriage. Kirkpatrick also sought to have the marriage annulled. Following a hearing, during which Kirkpatrick was present and Sierra and Crow were physically absent, but were represented by counsel, the district court entered an order denying Kirkpatrick's motion, concluding that the marriage complied with Nevada law and determining that Kirkpatrick lacked standing to challenge the marriage's validity.
Thereafter, Kirkpatrick filed this petition seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to vacate its order authorizing Sierra's marriage, and to annul the marriage.
Propriety of writ relief
A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.5 But we will not issue a writ of mandamus to control a trial court's discretionary action unless the court has manifestly abused its discretion.6 Additionally, a writ of mandamus is not available if the petitioner has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.7 Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and it is within the discretion of this court to determine if a petition will be considered.8 Here, Kirkpatrick's petition is appropriate because he has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.
The district court concluded that Kirkpatrick lacked standing to challenge Sierra's marriage. Indeed, NRS 125.320(1) states that a marriage is voidable only on the insistence of one of the parties to the marriage. Here, however, the question of standing goes to whether Kirkpatrick is entitled to have us decide the merits of his petition—whether he was denied his right to due process under the circumstances and whether the district court failed to follow legal requirements in granting Sierra permission to marry.
To establish standing, Kirkpatrick must show that he has suffered an injury in fact, that there is a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and that it is likely that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.9 Here, Kirkpatrick complains of the loss of his parent-child relationship without the benefit of due process. There is a causal connection between this injury and Nevada's marriage consent statute as applied in this case, and a ruling in Kirkpatrick's favor by this court will remedy the injury. Accordingly, we conclude that Kirkpatrick has standing to challenge the validity of Nevada's marriage consent statute.
Constitutional challenges to the marriage consent statute
As mentioned, NRS 122.025 permits a minor less than sixteen years old to marry if the minor has the consent of one parent and authorization from the district court.10 In his petition, Kirkpatrick asserts that, because the consent of only one parent was required, he was deprived of his fundamental right to the parent-child relationship without a compelling reason.11 In effect, Sierra's marriage places her beyond his parental control and releases him, without opportunity to be heard, from his obligations as her father. He may no longer enforce parental rules and restrictions upon her, as he no longer has parental rights and responsibilities for her care, custody, control and support. Likewise, Sierra may no longer look to him for her care and support. Additionally, Kirkpatrick maintains that his procedural due process rights were infringed upon because he was not provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard and to object to his daughter's marriage before the court authorized it. Thus, Kirkpatrick raises both substantive and procedural due process challenges to Nevada's marriage consent statute.12
Substantive due process
The Federal and Nevada Constitutions provide that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.13 Essentially, "the State owes to each individual that process which, in light of the values of a free society, can be characterized as due."14 Substantive due process ensures that state action is not random and unpredictable; it restricts the government's ability to interfere with a person's life, liberty, or property.15
A liberty interest is deemed fundamental, and thus protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, if it is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."16 The United States Supreme Court has recognized certain family privacy rights as fundamental rights,17 and has decisively declared that a parent has a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of his or her child.18 "It is cardinal with [the Supreme Court] that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."19
A fundamental parental interest in the integrity of the family unit is not automatic, however.20 Biology alone does not create a fundamental liberty interest in the parent-child relationship; the parental relationship must show a greater connection with the child.21 "[T]he demonstration of commitment to the child through the assumption of personal, financial, or custodial responsibility may give the natural parent a stake in the relationship with the child rising to the level of a liberty interest."22 Thus, divorce does not change the nature of the right.23 Because Kirkpatrick has consistently demonstrated paternal commitment to Sierra, through custody and visitation, he has a fundamental liberty interest in the parent-child relationship. The existence of this liberty interest does not end our analysis, however.
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Kirkpatrick v. Dist. Ct.
...circumstances, I cannot understand how the majority can uphold the district court's marriage authorization. LEAVITT and BECKER, JJ., concur. 1.Kirkpatrick v. Dist. Ct., 118 Nev. ___, 43 P.3d 998 2. An exhibit to the petition for rehearing is an application for a marriage license in New Mexi......
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Vallery v. State, 36586.
...ch. 607, § 9, at 2253. 8. NRS 200.508. 9. Smith v. State, 112 Nev. 1269, 1276, 927 P.2d 14, 18 (1996). 10. See Kirkpatrick v. Dist. Ct., 118 Nev. ___, ___, 43 P.3d 998, ___ (2002) (citing McKay v. Bd. of Supervisors, 102 Nev. 644, 648, 730 P.2d 438, 441 (1986) and Charlie Brown Constr. Co. ......