Kizer v. Dorchester County Vocational Educ. Bd. of Trustees

• Decision Date: 16 December 1985
• Docket Number: No. 22467,22467
• Citation: 287 S.C. 545,340 S.E.2d 144
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: , 30 Ed. Law Rep. 959 Wallace E. KIZER, Appellant, v. DORCHESTER COUNTY VOCATIONAL EDUCATION BOARD OF TRUSTEES, Respondent. . Heard

Page 144

340 S.E.2d 144

287 S.C. 545, 30 Ed. Law Rep. 959

Wallace E. KIZER, Appellant, v. DORCHESTER COUNTY VOCATIONAL EDUCATION BOARD OF TRUSTEES, Respondent.

No. 22467.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard Dec. 16, 1985.

Decided Feb. 6, 1986.

Richard Mark Gergel and Timothy R. Fincher, of Gergel & Burnette, Columbia, for appellant.

Bruce E. Davis, of Camden, and James B. Richardson, Jr., of Ham & Richardson, Columbia, for respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Wallace E. Kizer was dismissed as Director of the Dorchester County Career School by the Dorchester County Vocational Education Board of Trustees. The Circuit Court affirmed the Board's action, and this appeal followed. We affirm, adopting the Circuit Court order as modified.

For five years (1978-1983), appellant was employed as Director of the Dorchester County Career School. His entire tenure as Director of the School was engulfed in controversy. At the end of the 1981-82 school year, the Board of Trustees gave every employee of the school, including the Director, written notice of its troubled concern about the growing friction and discord among the faculty and staff. The problems continued. On May 19, 1983, the Board of Trustees sent a letter to appellant, notifying him of a hearing to determine whether termination would be appropriate due to his alleged "manifest unfitness for employment."

The matter was heard by the Board on June 10 and 11, 1983. The seventeen hours of hearing revealed an environment characterized by continuing conflict and turmoil between the Director and the school faculty and staff. This situation (admitted by appellant) was largely the product of appellant's calloused insensitivity to basic human concerns and inexcusably abrasive and juvenile behavior in dealing with colleagues. By letter of June 22, 1983, the Board of Trustees advised Mr. Kizer of its decision to terminate his employment. This appeal followed.

South Carolina law specifically vests in the board of trustees the power and duty to "[e]mploy and discharge teachers". Section 59-19-90(2) of the 1976 Code of Laws of South Carolina provides in pertinent part "The board of trustees shall ... [e]mploy teachers--and discharge them when good and sufficient reasons for so doing present themselves". The standard applicable to judicial review of the school board decision is limited to a determination of whether the decision is supported by "substantial evidence". The Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of school authorities, in view of the powers, functions and discretion which must necessarily be vested in such authorities if they are to execute the duties imposed upon them. Laws v. Richland County School Dist. No. 1, 270 S.C. 492, 243 S.E.2d 192 (1978). "Substantial evidence" is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the Board reached or must have reached in order to justify its action. Laws, supra, 243 S.E.2d at 192.

Mr. Kizer does not challenge the decision of the Board to dismiss him on the merits. Instead, his appeal hinges entirely on alleged due process violations. The evidence of immature and grossly unprofessional acts of mismanagement and misbehavior is so overwhelming that it is obvious from even a brief review of the evidence why appellant bases his appeal on procedure, rather than on the merits. He claims the Board's action was in contravention of its policy relating to the Director's employment, and alleges disqualifying bias on the part of the chairperson of the Board, Mrs. Claudia Hart.

Although the existence of the Board's termination policy is disputed, it is unnecessary to reach this issue. Assuming the policy exists, there has been no violation of it. The policy provided in pertinent part as follows:

If a majority of the Board finds the services of the Director to be unsatisfactory, he shall be notified in writing and given an opportunity to correct the conditions. If the conditions are not corrected, he shall be given notice in writing at least two (2) months prior to the expiration of his contract and his services shall not be retained.

This reflects an obvious intent to incorporate and follow the lead of Section 59-25-440 of the Teacher Employment and Dismissal Act (see Code of Laws of South Carolina 1976) calling for written notice of any reason that may lead to dismissal or non-renewal and an opportunity to correct the problem. Interpretation is properly aided by consideration of statutory provisions which have direct reference to the field of education. Absent contractual language to the contrary it may be assumed that when words or phrases utilized in a teaching contract incorporate terms given specific meaning by statute, it was intended to give the statutory meaning to the contractual terms. Stow Teachers Association v. Stow Board of Education, 2 Ohio App.3d 82, 440 N.E.2d 827 (1981). Hence the language of the policy is to be construed in para materia with South Carolina's Teachers Employment Dismissal Act. In Adams v. Clarendon County School Dist. No. 2, 270 S.C. 266, 241 S.E.2d 897 (1978), the Supreme Court stated when one is dismissed for "evident unfitness for teaching", the requirements of Section 59-25-440 do not apply and all that is required is "prior notice and an opportunity to be heard." 241 S.E.2d at 900 & 901; therefore, the policy would have no applicability here.

Furthermore, public policy does not allow recognition of appellant's claim. In the landmark decision of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954), the United States Supreme Court said the following about the role and importance of public education:

Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his enviornment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. 347 U.S. at 493, 74 S.Ct. at 691.

High quality education for the students must be the ultimate goal of every school system. In recognition of "the public's legitimate interest in quality education, the South Carolina General Assembly has authorized the immediate dismissal from teaching "at any time" of one guilty of conduct manifesting "an evident unfitness for teaching" with no obligation to give written notice of the problem or opportunity to correct. To remove from the school one whose conduct manifests an evident unfitness for teaching, all that is required is "prior notice and opportunity for hearing." See Section 59-25-430, Code of Laws of South Carolina as interpreted by Adams. Therefore, the officially enunciated public policy of this State is to provide for immediate removal of those whose conduct manifests evident unfitness. Such conduct is undeniably and abundantly present in this case. To construe a school board policy statement as an integral part of a contractual agreement precluding the immediate removal "at any time" as authorized by State law, of one who, among other things, (1) reprimands teachers in the presence of other teachers and students referring to them as "stupid", (2) hides an employee's keys knowing the employee is looking for them, (3) foolishly and irresponsibly obstructs the provision of emergency medical service for a pregnant student suffering a miscarriage and when told the child had miscarried into the commode reacts with the callous expression of "that's one more we won't have to pay for", (4) describes himself as "one tough son-of-a-bitch"--tough to work for", (5) calls a teacher a "son-of-a-bitch" causing the teacher to push him against the wall and threaten to "tear his head off", (6) addresses another teacher with intemperate language causing her to respond by telling the Director of the School that "you get on my ass, I'll charge you $.50 to get off", and the like resulting in a school environment filled with turmoil, tension, conflict, fear and an absence of trust and respect for the Director threatening the very existence of the school, would certainly be an agreement at war with the interests of society.

It would be an agreement against public policy--illegal and void. A school board simply does not have the authority to enter into an agreement which interferes with their duty to the public. See 17 Am.Jr.2d Contracts § 179; ...