Klamath and Modoc Tribes v. Maison

Citation338 F.2d 620
Decision Date02 November 1964
Docket NumberNo. 19231.,19231.
PartiesKLAMATH AND MODOC TRIBES and Yahooskin Band of Snake Indians et al., Appellants, v. H. G. MAISON, Individually and as Superintendent, Department of State Police, State of Oregon, et al., Appellees, and United States of America, Intervenor-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Cleveland C. Cory, Rockwood, Davies, Biggs, Strayer & Stoel, Portland, Or., for appellants.

Robert Y. Thornton, Atty. Gen. of Oregon, Salem, Or., Roy C. Atchison, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Or., Portland, Or., for appellees.

Ramsey Clark, Asst. Atty. Gen. of U. S., Roger P. Marquis, S. Billingsley Hill, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Sidney I. Lezak, Acting U. S. Atty., Portland, Or., amici curiæ: United States.

John W. Cragun, Charles A. Hobbs, Washington, D. C., Richard A. Baenen, Lloyd G. Andrews, Shawano, Wis., Donald C. Gormley, Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker, Washington, D. C., amici curiæ: Menominee Enterprises, Inc.

Donald C. Gormley, Claron C. Spencer, Washington, D. C., for amici curiæ: Withdrawing members of Klamath Tribe et al.

Before CHAMBERS, MERRILL and KOELSCH, Circuit Judges.

MERRILL, Circuit Judge.

Appellees are officers of the State of Oregon, charged with enforcement of Oregon game laws. They have asserted the right and duty to enforce hunting and trapping regulations and statutes of Oregon against appellants' members within an area which, under the Treaty of 1864, 16 Stat. 707, between the United States and appellants, formed a part of appellants' reservation. Appellants have brought this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1958) seeking a declaration of their right to hunt and trap in this area, free from Oregon regulation and control.

In 1956 the District Court for the District of Oregon held that such was their right despite the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1958) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1958) (which gave jurisdiction to the State of Oregon over criminal offenses and civil actions to which Indians are parties).1 Since that date the Klamath Termination Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 564-564w, has become effective, and the question presented by this case is whether that act and the manner in which it has been carried out have resulted in a loss of appellants' rights within the area in question. Aggrieved by the decision of the District Court, appellants have taken this appeal.

The purpose of the Termination Act is set forth in § 564. It is to provide for "the termination of Federal supervision over the trust and restricted property of the Klamath Tribe of Indians consisting of the Klamath and Modoc Tribes and the Yahooskin Band of Snake Indians, and of the individual members thereof, for the disposition of federally owned property acquired or withdrawn for the administration of the affairs of said Indians, and for a termination of Federal services furnished such Indians because of their status as Indians."

By § 564d(2) each member of the tribe is given an opportunity "to elect to withdraw from the tribe and have his interest in tribal property converted into money and paid to him," or to remain in the tribe and participate in a tribal management plan prepared pursuant to the Act.

Section 564d(3) provides for the sale of so much of the tribal lands as is necessary to convert into money the shares of the withdrawing members.

Section 564d(5) provides for the management, through a trustee, of the remaining tribal property for the benefit of those electing to remain in the tribe.

Section 564w provides for a taking by the United States of all tribal lands within the Klamath Indian Forest which had not been sold by April 1, 1961.

Section 564q(a) reads as follows:

"Upon removal of Federal restrictions on the property of the tribe and individual members thereof, the Secretary shall publish in the Federal Register a proclamation declaring that the Federal trust relationship to the affairs of the tribe and its members has terminated. Thereafter individual members of the tribe shall not be entitled to any of the services performed by the United States for Indians because of their status as Indians and, except as otherwise provided in sections 564-564w of this title, all statutes of the United States which affect Indians because of their status as Indians shall no longer be applicable to the members of the tribe, and the laws of the several States shall apply to the tribe and its members in the same manner as they apply to other citizens or persons within their jurisdiction."

Upon election held under the Act, 1660 members elected to withdraw from the tribe and 473 elected to remain. Thereafter a proportionate part of the original tribal property, equal to the number of remaining members as compared to the entire membership, was transferred by the United States to the United States National Bank of Portland, Oregon, as trustee for the remaining tribe. Of the remaining land area held for sale the greater portion was taken by the United States and now forms a part of the Winema National Forest and the Klamath Forest National Wildlife Refuge.

Upon this appeal the issue is whether the remaining members of the tribe have a right to hunt and trap, free from state regulation and control, upon the forest lands taken by the United States pursuant to § 564w. The holding of the District Court was that by virtue of the Termination Act this right was lost. We agree.

The same issue was presented in State v. Sanapaw (1963) 21 Wis.2d 377, 124 N.W.2d 41, cert. denied (1964) 377 U.S. 991, 84 S.Ct. 1911, 12 L.Ed.2d 1044. That case dealt with the Act terminating the Menominee Tribe2 upon substantially the same terms as those of the Act before us. There the Court referred to House Concurrent Resolution 108, 83d Congress, 1st Session, pursuant to which the Menominee Termination Act was drafted and introduced. That resolution recited the policy of Congress "as rapidly as possible, to make the Indians within the territorial limits of...

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13 cases
  • U.S. v. Adair
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • January 24, 1984
    ...Kimball I, 493 F.2d at 566; Klamath & Modoc Tribes v. Maison, 139 F.Supp. 634, 637 (D.Or.1956), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 338 F.2d 620 (9th Cir.1964). As this court noted in Kimball The specific treaty provision reserving the Klamaths' exclusive right to fish could prompt the argument t......
  • St. Cloud v. US, 87-3023.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota
    • December 1, 1988
    ...373, 389, 96 S.Ct. 2102, 48 L.Ed.2d 710 (1976) (terminated Indians subject to "the full sweep of state laws"); Klamath & Modoc Tribes v. Maison, 338 F.2d 620 (9th Cir.1964). The Court in Catawba Indian thus concluded that a state statute of limitations applied to the tribe's claim and reman......
  • Dillon v. State of Mont.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Montana
    • May 3, 1978
    ...to them "in the same manner as they apply to other citizens . . .."'" 509 F.2d at 19, quoting Klamath and Modoc Tribes v. Maison, 338 F.2d 620, 622 (9th Cir. 1964). The Court found that exclusive federal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act arose not from the defendant's racial status as......
  • Kimball v. Callahan
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • January 26, 1979
    ...Inc. v. Department of Game, supra (Puyallup III), which they read as sustaining this court's decision in Klamath and Modoc Tribes v. Maison, 338 F.2d 620 (9 Cir. 1964), limiting the exercise of treaty hunting, fishing, and trapping rights to unsold lands on the reservation. 9 We do not find......
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