Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States
| Decision Date | 22 November 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-5910L,No. 01-59125L,No. 01-591L,01-591L,01-5910L,01-59125L |
| Parties | KLAMATH IRRIGATION DISTRICT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant, PACIFIC COAST FEDERATION OF FISHERMEN'S ASSOCIATIONS, Defendant-Intervenor. |
| Court | U.S. Claims Court |
Takings/contract case; Motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction - RCFC
12(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1500; "Assignee";
Members of associations were not assignees
for purposes of section 1500; Tohono
O'odham; Same operative facts - concept
examined; Comparison to jurisprudence
under Rules 13, 15 and 20 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure; Four tests -
elements enumerated; Issues of fact and law;
Role of res judicata; Substantially the same
evidence; Logical relationship; Claims in
district court did not involve substantially
the same operative facts as takings claim, but
did have substantially the same operative
facts as contract claim; Section 1500
applicable, in part.
OPINIONNancie G. Marzulla and Roger J. Marzulla, Marzulla Law, LLC, Washington, DC, for plaintiffs.
Kristine Sears Tardiff, Environmental and Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, Concord, New Hampshire, with whom was Assistant Attorney General Ignacia S. Moreno, for defendant.
Todd D. True, Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund, Seattle, WA, for Defendant-Intervenor.
Section 1500 of Title 28 of the United States Code bars litigation in this court of the same dispute pending in another court. Passed shortly after the Civil War, and long outliving itsoriginal purpose, this gatekeeper provision has oft been described as an "anachronism"1 and a "trap for the unwary."2 Yet, in recent years, it has experienced a risorgimento, triggered by the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Tohono O'odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. 1723 (2011), and perpetuated by the United States' litigating positions. Defendant, at times, seems to discover this jurisdictional issue exceedingly late in the game, often after considerable time and resources have been expended. Such is the case with defendant's motion to dismiss under RCFC 12(b)(1) - filed more than a decade after the original complaint, after discovery was completed, and several merits decisions and a final judgment were rendered by this court, as well as after an appeal, a referral of questions by the Federal Circuit to the Oregon Supreme Court, a decision by that state court, and a remand by the Federal Circuit. See Klamath Irr. Dist. v. United States, 635 F.3d 505 (Fed. Cir. 2011).3 Now, for the first time, defendant argues that, under section 1500, adistrict court case filed in 2001 (and dismissed that same year) obliges this court to dismiss the complaint. For the reasons that follow, the court GRANTS, in part, and DENIES, in part, defendant's motion.
The Klamath River Basin is home to the Klamath Project - one of the first irrigation projects constructed under the Reclamation Act of 1902 (the Reclamation Act).4 Under authority of this Act, the Bureau of Reclamation (Bureau) entered into water rights contracts with individual landowners and irrigation districts. In 1957, the states of California and Oregon entered into the Klamath River Basin Compact (Klamath Compact), which was ratified by the United States Congress, and allegedly governs the property rights related to the water from the Klamath Basin.
Prior to 2001, Klamath Basin landowners received all the water they needed under a combination of contracts with the United States and the Klamath Compact. But, in the spring of 2001, several federal agencies produced studies indicating that water levels in the Basin were so low as to threaten the health and survival of three species in violation of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 87 Stat. 884, 16 U.S.C. § 1531, et seq. On April 6, 2001, responding to these concerns, the Bureau issued a revised Operation Plan (the 2001 Plan) for the Klamath Project that terminated the delivery of irrigation water to many individuals and irrigation districts for the year 2001.
On April 9, 2001, Steven Lewis Kandra, David Cacka, the Klamath Irrigation District (KID), the Tulelake Irrigation District (TID), and the Klamath Water Users Association (KWUA), hereinafter collectively the "Kandra plaintiffs," filed suit against the United States, Gale Norton (Secretary of the Interior), and Don Evans (Secretary of Commerce) in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon.5 In their complaint, the Kandra plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and a preliminary injunction preventing the Bureau from implementing the2001 Plan.6 They alleged that in adopting the 2001 Plan, the defendant had breached existing contracts and violated reclamation law, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 852, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., the ESA, and other federal laws. Notably, the complaint averred that the Kandra plaintiffs were "not waiv[ing] any rights to seek damages in the Court of Federal Claims against the United States for any conduct of the federal defendants." The complaint's "general allegations" segment included seventeen paragraphs of factual background, tracing the history of water rights and irrigation in the Klamath Project from the Reclamation Act of 1902 through the 2001 Plan.
On April 30, 2001, the district court denied the Kandra plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Kandra v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (D. Or. 2001). On October 15, 2001, the Kandra plaintiffs filed a document entitled "Notice of Dismissal" that docketed by the district court as a "Motion to Dismiss." On November 27, 2001, the district court granted the motion to dismiss and entered judgment dismissing the action.
Meanwhile, on October 11, 2001, fourteen water, drainage, and irrigation districts, and thirteen agricultural landowners in Oregon and California (the "Klamath plaintiffs") filed this suit against the United States.7 The original complaint made two takings claims: (i) that the United States took the water rights of plaintiffs without paying just compensation as required by the Fifth Amendment; and (ii) that the United States impaired plaintiffs' water rights, thereby violating the Klamath Compact, without paying just compensation as required by the Fifth Amendment. On March 24, 2003, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint which added a third claim, to wit, that "beginning on or about April 10, 2001, and continuing through the remainder of water year 2001, defendant breached [various contracts between the Bureau and the plaintiffs] by failing and refusing to deliver to plaintiffs . . . the quantities of water required by their written contracts." The basic factual allegations in the original and amended complaints are identical.
In two separate summary judgment opinions, this court dismissed plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment takings claims, their claims under the Klamath Compact and their breach of contract claims. See Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504 (2005) (takings decision); Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 677 (2007) (contract decision). Relying, in part, on the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit vacated the judgment of this court and remanded the case to the court for further proceedings. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 635 F.3d 505, 507 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
On August 22, 2011, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under RCFC 12(b)(1), claiming that this court lacked jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1500. The defendant-intervenor in this case, Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's Associations, joined in support of this motion. Original briefing on this motion was completed in October, 2011, but on December 5, 2011, proceedings were stayed pending the resolution of a similar motion in Petro-Hunt v. United States, No. 00-512. After that decision was published, the parties submitted supplemental briefing on the motion to dismiss and oral argument was conducted.
Deciding a motion to dismiss "starts with the complaint, which must be well-pleaded in that it must state the necessary elements of the plaintiff's claim, independent of any defense that may be interposed." Holley v. United States, 124 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-55 (2007). In particular, the plaintiff must establish that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over its claims. Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Plaintiffs assert federal subject-matter jurisdiction in this court under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491. That provision grants this court "jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). It is well-established that takings actions and breach of contract actions are both covered by this grant of jurisdiction. See Keene Corp., 508 U.S. at 205; Bywaters v. United States, 670 F.3d 1221, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Defendant, however, claims that jurisdiction is lacking here because of 28 U.S.C. § 1500.
Section 1500 of Title 28 provides:
The United States Court of Federal Claims shall not have jurisdiction of any claim for or in respect to which the plaintiff or his assignee has pending in any other court any suit or process against the United States or any person who, at the time when the cause of action alleged in such suit or process arose, was, in respect thereto, acting or professing to act, directly or indirectly under the authority of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1500. "[T]he words of the statute are plain," the Supreme Court stated nearly ninety years ago, "with nothing in the...
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