Klaneski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

Docket Number3:22-cv-1456 (VAB)
Decision Date30 June 2023
PartiesROSA LEE KLANESKI, as Assignee of Farmington Auto Park, LLC, as Assignee of Dimaisha Jurado, Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

RULING AND ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

VICTOR A. BOLDEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Rosa Lee Klaneski (Plaintiff) has sued State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (Defendant or “State Farm”), alleging that State Farm provided incorrect guidance to Dimaisha Jurado regarding the safety of Ms. Jurado's car after an accident and later failed to pay the full amount owed under Ms. Jurado's policy. See Compl., ECF No. 1. Ms. Jurado later assigned her rights under the policy to Farmington Auto Park LLC, which in turn assigned these rights to Ms. Klaneski. See id. at 3. Ms. Klaneski now asserts claims under the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”), the federal mail and wire fraud statutes, the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (“CUIPA”), the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (“CUTPA”) state insurance regulations, and state common law. See id. at 4-10.

State Farm has filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 11 (“Mot.”).

For the following reasons, State Farm's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

Ms Klaneski's claims under federal law are DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim.

Because the federal claims are dismissed and the Court does not have diversity jurisdiction over this action, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Ms. Klaneski's state law claims. These claims are DISMISSED without prejudice to refiling in state court.

If Ms Klaneski believes that the jurisdictional defects identified in this Ruling and Order can be cured, she must seek leave to file an Amended Complaint by August 4, 2023, or this action will be dismissed with prejudice.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual Allegations

On September 24, 2021, a passing car allegedly struck Ms. Jurado's parked car. Compl. at 2. A few weeks later, on October 14, 2021, Ms. Jurado allegedly drove the car, a Nissan Altima, to the local Nissan dealership in order to determine if it was repairable. Id. While at the dealership, Ms. Jurado allegedly called her insurer, State Farm, and informed them of the damage. Id. A State Farm employee allegedly told Ms. Jurado that, because the airbags had not deployed, it was safe to continue driving the vehicle. Id. The employee allegedly told Ms. Jurado to keep driving the car and that a claims adjuster would visit her to conduct an appraisal at a later date. Id.

Later that day, while Ms. Jurado was driving, the Nissan Altima allegedly began to overheat. Id. According to the Complaint, the September 24 collision had not only significantly damaged the interior, but also cracked the radiator. Id. This crack allegedly led to a catastrophic loss of antifreeze, which resulted in engine failure that left the vehicle inoperable. Id.

After this breakdown, Farmington Auto Park allegedly towed the car to its shop, where it remained until a State Farm appraiser allegedly visited on October 22, 2021. Id. After conducting a review, State Farm allegedly informed Ms. Jurado that it would pay $8,200 to repair the exterior of the vehicle. Id. at 3. The insurer, however, allegedly asserted that the cost of replacing the engine was not covered by its policy because the October 14 engine failure was not related to the September 24 collision. Id.

Farmington Auto Park allegedly repaired the Nissan Altima and rented a vehicle to Ms. Jurado at a total cost of $23,812.30. Id. State Farm allegedly made two payments totaling $10,156.42, which allegedly left an outstanding balance of $13,655.88. Id.

B. Procedural History

On November 14, 2022, Ms. Klaneski filed her Complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. Compl.

On January 19, 2023, State Farm filed its motion to dismiss Ms. Klaneski's Complaint. Mot.; Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 11-1 (Mem.).

On February 6, 2023, Ms. Klaneski filed her opposition to State Farm's motion to dismiss. Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 14 (“Opp'n”).

On February 10, 2023, the parties filed their Rule 26(f) report. Rule 26(f) Report, ECF No. 15.

On February 13, 2023, the Court issued a scheduling order. Scheduling Order, ECF No. 16.

On February 21, 2023, State Farm filed a reply in support of its motion to dismiss. Def.'s Reply to Pl.'s Obj. to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 17 (“Reply”).

On April 21, 2023, the Court granted State Farm's motion to stay discovery pending the resolution of State Farm's motion to dismiss. Order, ECF No. 22.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Rule 12(b)(1)

A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims. Id.

“When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the court must take all facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff.” Sweet v. Sheahan, 235 F.3d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Johnson, 461 F.3d 164, 171 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Sweet, 235 F.3d at 83). The Court may also, however, resolve disputed jurisdictional fact issues “by referring to evidence outside of the pleadings, such as affidavits, and if necessary, hold an evidentiary hearing.” Karlen ex rel. J.K. v. Westport Bd. of Educ., 638 F.Supp.2d 293, 298 (D. Conn. 2009) (citing Zappia Middle E. Constr. Co. v. Emirate of Abu Dhabi, 215 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir. 2000)).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). Any claim that fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” will be dismissed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In reviewing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), a court applies a “plausibility standard” guided by [t]wo working principles.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

First, [t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)). Second, “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, the complaint must contain “factual amplification . . . to render a claim plausible.” Arista Records LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 589 F.3d 542, 546 (2d Cir. 2009)).

When reviewing a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court takes all factual allegations in the complaint as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The court also views the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and draws all inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Cohen v. S.A.C. Trading Corp., 711 F.3d 353, 359 (2d Cir. 2013); see also York v. Ass'n of the Bar of N.Y.C., 286 F.3d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 2002) (“On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting the complaint's allegations as true.”).

A court considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) generally limits its review “to the facts as asserted within the four corners of the complaint, the documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and any documents incorporated in the complaint by reference.” McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007). A court may also consider “matters of which judicial notice may be taken” and “documents either in plaintiffs' possession or of which plaintiffs had knowledge and relied on in bringing suit.” Brass v. Am. Film Techs., Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 1993); Patrowicz v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 359 F.Supp.2d 140, 144 (D. Conn. 2005).

III. DISCUSSION

The federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 700 (2d Cir. 2000) (“It is axiomatic that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may not decide cases over which they lack subject matter jurisdiction.”). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). “Unlike failure of personal jurisdiction, failure of subject matter jurisdiction is not waivable and may be raised at any time by a party or by the court sua sponte. If subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, the action must be dismissed.” Lussier, 211 F.3d at 700-01 (citing Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986)).

In her Complaint, Ms. Klaneski asserts that the Court has federal question jurisdiction over this action. See Compl. at 2. State Farm, however, argues in its motion to dismiss that the federal statutes under which Ms. Klaneski...

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