Klaus v. Vill. of Tijeras

• Decision Date: 08 November 2021
• Docket Number: Civ. 20-1105 JFR/KK
• Parties: DIANE KLAUS, Plaintiff, v. VILLAGE OF TIJERAS, JAKE BRUTON, DON JOHNSON, FELIX GARCIA and MAXINE WILSON, in their individual and official capacities, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico

DIANE KLAUS, Plaintiff, v. VILLAGE OF TIJERAS, JAKE BRUTON, DON JOHNSON, FELIX GARCIA and MAXINE WILSON, in their individual and official capacities, Defendants.

Civ. No. 20-1105 JFR/KK

United States District Court, D. New Mexico

November 8, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER^[1]

JOHN F. ROBBENHAAR United States Magistrate Judge

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against Implied Contract Claims and Declaratory Relief (“Motion”), filed July 1 2021. Doc. 83. The Court, having considered counsel's arguments, the record, and the relevant law, FINDS that the motion is not well taken and is DENIED.

I. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Village of Tijeras (“Village”) hired Plaintiff as a Deputy Clerk in October of 2011. Doc. 1-1 at 2, ¶ 10. Plaintiff successfully completed her probationary period in May of 2012. Id. Plaintiff was a regular, full time hourly employee. Id. at ¶ 11. From the date Plaintiff was hired until January 3, 2020, Gloria Chavez was the Mayor of the Village and was Plaintiff's direct supervisor. Id. at ¶ 12. After January 3, 2020 Defendant Jake Bruton, a former Village Council member, became the Mayor of the Village. Id. at ¶ 13. Plaintiff alleges that beginning in 2017, Defendants Bruton, Johnson, Garcia and Wilson were vocal critics and opponents of Mayor Chavez and Plaintiff and initiated a concerted effort to terminate Plaintiff's employment in retaliation for, inter alia, her association and affiliation with Mayor Chavez. Id. at 4, ¶¶ 24-25. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants continued their efforts until she was terminated on the recommendation of newly elected Mayor Bruton. Id. at ¶ 26.

On March 10, 2020, Village Clerk/Treasurer Michael Wismer, in concurrence with Mayor Bruton, notified Plaintiff that they were recommending termination of her employment effective the date of the letter. Doc. 102-1 (Exh. 1). The letter identified Plaintiff as a salaried employee and stated that “as a salaried employee under the Village's personnel ordinance # 157 Section 19 [you] are entitled to all the rights and benefits of hourly employees, except that you are terminable at will, with or without cause. It is pursuant to that section that I recommend your termination as a salaried employee.”^[2] Id. at 1. The letter went on to say that “in view of your long-time employment with the Village I also performed a review of your performance to assess whether or not there is cause for terminating you. That review indicates that if you are now protected by the Village personnel ordinance, meaning you can only be terminated for cause, there clearly is cause.” Id. at 2. The lion's share of the letter then addressed Plaintiff's role in what was characterized as illegal PERA reimbursements without the Council's authorization. Id. at 2-3. The letter also noted other reimbursement issues and that documentation confirmed a “continued pattern of behavior leading to disorganization, poor record-keeping, [and] poor communications both internally and with the public.” Id. at 3. The letter notified Plaintiff of her right to a hearing to determine whether the decision to terminate her was affirmed, reversed or modified. Id. at 4.

On March 17, 2020, Plaintiff, through her counsel of record, Duff Westbrook, notified Mayor Bruton and Mr. Wismer that Plaintiff would exercise her right to a pre-termination hearing before the Village Council as provided for in the Village Personnel Ordinance No. 157 (“Ordinance”). Doc. 102-2 (Exh. 2).

On April 6, 2020, the Village Council held a meeting via teleconference and addressed what the Village Council should do with the recommendation by Mr. Wismer and concurred in by Mayor Bruton that Plaintiff be terminated. Doc. 112-1 at 2. Plaintiff was represented by counsel. Id. The Village called three witnesses - Michael Wismer, Mayor Bruton, and Finance Director Larry Seebinger. Id. at 3. They each provided direct testimony and were cross examined by Plaintiff's counsel. Id. at 5-14. Plaintiff was the sole witness as to her appeal and she was directly examined by her counsel about each of the grounds for termination as outlined in the March 10, 2020, letter recommending termination. Id. at 14-23. Plaintiff was cross examined by Mayor Bruton. Id. at 23-26. Plaintiff also answered a handful of questions that were solicited at large from Council members. Id. at 26-27. After hearing from the parties, the Village Council participated in a closed meeting to discuss the personnel matter. Id. at 28. When the meeting came back on the record, a motion was made and seconded to approve Mayor Bruton's recommended dismissal of Plaintiff. Id. at 29.

The Village Council subsequently issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and emailed a copy to Plaintiff's counsel on May 11, 2020. Doc. 83-4 at 1, ¶ 9; Doc. 83-5 (Exh. 3A). The Village Council provided the basis for their decision to terminate Plaintiff and advised her that her termination was effective as of April 15, 2020. Id.

On September 21, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Breach of Implied Contract of Employment, Retaliatory Discharge in Violation of Whistleblower Protection Act, Violation of Contract Clause Rights, and Violation of First Amendment Right of Political Association (“Complaint”) against the Defendants. Doc. 1-1. Defendants removed the case to this Court on October 27, 2020, based on original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331. Doc. 1 at 1-2.

Defendants filed the partial summary judgment motion presently before the Court on July 1, 2021. Defendants seeks summary judgment on Counts I-III of Plaintiff's Complaint based on Plaintiff's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies as required in the Village's Ordinance. Plaintiff filed a Response on August 16, 2021. Doc. 102. Defendants filed a Reply on September 3, 2021. Doc. 112.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Summary Judgment

A motion for summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986); Jones v. Kodak Med. Assistance Plan, 169 F.3d 1287, 1291 (10^th Cir. 1999); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of [the record] ... which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Catrett, 106 S.Ct. at 2552 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670-71 (10^thCir. 1998). Once the movant meets this burden, the non-moving party is required to put in the record facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). “A fact is ‘material' if, under the governing law, it could have an effect on the outcome of the lawsuit. A dispute over a material fact is ‘genuine' if a rational jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party on the evidence presented.” Adamson v. Multi Cmty. Diversified Servs., Inc., 514 F.3d 1136, 1145 (10^th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted); Bird v. W.Valley City, 832 F.3d 1188, 1199 (10^th Cir. 2016). Only material factual disputes preclude the entry of summary judgment. Atl. Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1148 (10^th Cir. 2000).

The trial judge is not to weigh the evidence to determine the truth of the matter, but instead must ask “whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented.” Anderson, 106 S.Ct. at 2512. “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 2510. To carry its initial burden, the moving party need not negate the nonmoving party's claim. See Allen v. Muskogee, Okla., 119 F.3d 837, 840 (10^th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. Smith v. Allen, 522 U.S. 1148 (1998). “‘Instead, the movant only bears the initial burden of ‘showing'-that is, pointing out to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.'” Id. (quoting Catrett). Once the moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'” Catrett, 106 S.Ct. at 2552 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). A plaintiff cannot rely upon conclusory allegations or contentions of counsel to defeat summary judgment but rather must produce some specific factual support of its claim. See Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers, Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 649 (10^th Cir. 1988); Fritzcshe v. Albuquerque Mun. Sch. Dist., 194 F.Supp.2d 1194, 1206 (D.N.M. 2002). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.'” Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986) (citation omitted). Upon a motion for summary judgment, a court “must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and allow the nonmovant the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” Kaus v. Standard Ins. Co., 985 F.Supp. 1277, 1281 (D. Kan. 1997). If there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute, then a court must next determine whether the movant is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d 988, 990 (10^th Cir. 1996).

B. ...