Klaus v. Vill. of Tijeras
| Decision Date | 24 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 20-1105 JFR/KK |
| Citation | 604 F.Supp.3d 1151 |
| Parties | Diane KLAUS, Plaintiff, v. VILLAGE OF TIJERAS, Jake Bruton, Don Johnson, Felix Garcia and Maxine Wilson, in their individual and official capacities, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
Duff H. Westbrook, Sanders & Westbrook, PC, Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiff.
Daniel Ross Rubin, Jessica R. Terrazas, Eugene I. Zamora, Nicholas A. Govea, Tony F. Ortiz, Ortiz & Zamora, Attorneys at Law, LLC, Santa Fe, NM, for Defendants.
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants’ Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against Implied Contract ("Defendants’ Motion"), filed November 12, 2021. Doc. 133. On February 1, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Response. Doc. 165. On February 15, 2022, Defendants filed a Reply. Doc. 173. This matter is also before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Whether Plaintiff Is Barred From Litigating the Issues of Just Cause and Lack of Progressive Discipline by the Doctrine of Issue Preclusion ("Plaintiff's Motion"), filed November 12, 2021. Doc. 131. On December 22, 2021, Defendants filed a Response. Doc. 156. On March 10, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Reply. Doc. 179. The Court, having considered counsel's arguments, the record, and the relevant law, FINDS that Defendants’ Motion is not well taken and is DENIED and that Plaintiff's Motion is well taken and is GRANTED .
The Village of Tijeras ("Village") hired Plaintiff as a Deputy Clerk in October of 2011. Doc. 1-1 at 2, ¶ 10. Plaintiff successfully completed her probationary period in May of 2012. Id. Plaintiff was classified as a regular, full time hourly employee. Id. at ¶ 11. From the date Plaintiff was hired until January 3, 2020, Gloria Chavez was the Mayor of the Village and was Plaintiff's direct supervisor. Id. at ¶ 12. After January 3, 2020, Defendant Jake Bruton, a former Village Council member, became the Mayor of the Village. Id. at ¶ 13.
Plaintiff alleges that beginning in 2017, Defendants Bruton, Johnson, Garcia and Wilson were vocal critics and opponents of Mayor Chavez and Plaintiff and initiated a concerted effort to terminate Plaintiff's employment in retaliation for, inter alia , her association and affiliation with Mayor Chavez. Id. at 4, ¶¶ 24-25. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants continued their efforts until she was terminated on April 15, 2020, on the recommendation of newly elected Mayor Bruton. Id. at ¶ 26. On June 24, 2019, Defendants voted to change Plaintiff's Deputy Clerk position from an hourly position to a salaried position and gave Plaintiff a significant raise. Id. at 10, ¶ 70. When the Village terminated Plaintiff's employment in 2020, Defendants claimed Plaintiff's change to a salaried employee transformed her from a regular, full time, non-probationary employee who was entitled to the rights and protections afforded by the Village's Personnel Ordinance ("Ordinance") and who could only be terminated for cause, into an at-will employee who could be fired at any time, with or without cause.2 Id. at 10-11, ¶ 71. Plaintiff disagrees.
On September 21, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Breach of Implied Contract of Employment, Retaliatory Discharge in Violation of Whistleblower Protection Act, Violation of Contract Clause Rights, and Violation of First Amendment Right of Political Association ("Complaint") against the Defendants. Doc. 1-1. Defendants removed the case to this Court on October 27, 2020, based on original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331. Doc. 1 at 1-2.
A motion for summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Jones v. Kodak Med. Assistance Plan , 169 F.3d 1287, 1291 (10th Cir. 1999) ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of [the record] ... which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Catrett , 106 S. Ct. at 2552 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 144 F.3d 664, 670-71 (10th Cir. 1998). Once the movant meets this burden, the non-moving party is required to put in the record facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Adamson v. Multi Cmty. Diversified Servs., Inc. , 514 F.3d 1136, 1145 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted); Bird v. W. Valley City , 832 F.3d 1188, 1199 (10th Cir. 2016). Only material factual disputes preclude the entry of summary judgment. Atl. Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita , 226 F.3d 1138, 1148 (10th Cir. 2000).
The trial judge is not to weigh the evidence to determine the truth of the matter, but instead must ask "whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented." Anderson, 106 S. Ct. at 2512. "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 2510. To carry its initial burden, the moving party need not negate the nonmoving party's claim. See Allen v. Muskogee, Okla. , 119 F.3d 837, 840 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. Smith v. Allen , 522 U.S. 1148, 118 S.Ct. 1165, 140 L.Ed.2d 176 (1998). " ‘Instead, the movant only bears the initial burden of ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.’ " Id. (quoting Catrett , 106 S. Ct. at 2552 ). Once the moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ " Catrett , 106 S. Ct. at 2552 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ). A plaintiff cannot rely upon conclusory allegations or contentions of counsel to defeat summary judgment but rather must produce some specific factual support of its claim. See Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers, Inc. v. Losavio , 847 F.2d 642, 649 (10th Cir. 1988) ; Fritzsche v. Albuquerque Mun. Sch. Dist. , 194 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1206 (D.N.M. 2002). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ " Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (citation omitted). Upon a motion for summary judgment, a court "must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and allow the nonmovant the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence." Kaus v. Standard Ins. Co. , 985 F. Supp. 1277, 1281 (D. Kan. 1997). If there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute, then a court must next determine whether the movant is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Wood , 81 F.3d 988, 990 (10th Cir. 1996).
On October 18, 2011, Plaintiff was hired by the Village as a part-time Deputy Clerk. Doc. 126 at 2, ¶ 1. On December 26, 2011, Plaintiff became a full-time Deputy Clerk. Id. Plaintiff served as Acting Clerk from August 25, 2012 to March 2015, from March 20, 2016 to April 17, 2018, and from November 19, 2018 to July 28, 2019. Id. As Acting Clerk, Plaintiff was responsible for, among other things, supervising all employees and recommending disciplinary action of employees to the Mayor under Section 3 of the Ordinance. Id. Plaintiff's duties as Acting or Deputy Clerk also included drafting minutes for Village Council meetings.3 Doc. 156 at 9, ¶ 1.
On March 17, 2014, the Village adopted the Ordinance which was in effect during the period of time Plaintiff was employed by the Village. Doc. 133 at 3, ¶ 1. The Ordinance governed Village personnel rights and procedures at the time the Village terminated Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 2.
Section 16 of the Ordinance, entitled "Disciplinary Policy," provides procedures for contemplated termination of employees by the Village.4 Id. at ¶ 3. Section 16 of the Ordinance vests the Mayor with authority to terminate an employee, with approval by the governing body if the employee requests a hearing before the governing body after notice of termination by the Mayor.5 Id. at ¶ 4.
Section 17 of the Ordinance, titled "Appeal of Probations and Dismissals," includes, inter alia , procedures that allow an employee to request a hearing before the Village Council if notified of termination, procedures for the termination hearing, and requirements that the Village Council issue a final decision in the form of findings and conclusions. Doc. 133 at 3, ¶ 6. Section 17.C.6 provides that "[n]o subpoenas shall be issued to compel testimony in person." Doc. 83-2 at 27. Section 17.G.6 provides that as part of its decision, the Governing Body may uphold, set aside or modify the recommended action. Doc. 131 at 4, ¶ 11, Doc. 83-2. It also provides that the Governing Body may "consider any evidence of appellant's mitigation of evidence," and "make other appropriate recommendations or orders." Id. Nothing in the Ordinance authorizes the Village Council to award damages.6 Id. Plaintiff was not permitted to...
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