Klavans v. Klavans, 235

Citation275 Md. 423,341 A.2d 411
Decision Date03 July 1975
Docket NumberNo. 235,235
PartiesLee KLAVANS v. Lorraine KLAVANS.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Maryland

Lawrence S. Greenwald, Baltimore (Donald N. Rothman and Gordon, Feinblatt, Rothman, Hoffberger & Hollander, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Karl H. Goodman and Lee Gordon, Baltimore (Gordon & Goodman, P. A., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE and O'DONNELL, JJ.

LEVINE, Judge.

This case commenced in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, where appellant, Lee Klavans (the husband), sought to impress a lien and impose a constructive trust upon certain funds concerning which he and appellee, Lorraine Klavans (the wife), had become engaged in a dispute. 1 The chancellor (Cicone, J.) granted the relief, but his decision was overturned on appeal by the Court of Special Appeals in Klavans v. Klavans, 23 Md.App. 144, 326 A.2d 26 (1974). We granted certiorari to consider important questions pertaining to the presumption of gift doctrine as applied to the husband-wife relationship.

The facts giving rise to this dispute are so thoroughly summarized in the opinion written by Judge Thompson for the Court of Special Appeals that, for the most part, we need merely quote them here.

'In 1966, Lee Klavans and Lorraine Klavans, his wife, were residents of Baltimore City. In order that their (three) children might attend what they considered to be better schools, they decided to acquire a home in Baltimore County. After looking at several existing houses they decided to purchase (the necessary land) and to construct a house thereon. The deed for one lot was acquired on March 6, 1967 and for an adjoining lot on September 22, 1967, both being titled to the parties as tenants by the entireties. The first lot cost $10,500 which was paid out of their savings. The second lot cost $10,000 and was purchased with funds borrowed from Mercury Cab Company, Inc. This note was signed by both Mr. & Mrs. Klavans. Eventually the parties entered into a contract in the amount of $69,000 for the construction of a home on the two lots. Extras brought the total cost of the dwelling to $89,800. Of that amount, $50,000 was obtained by a mortgage executed by both parties; $10,000 was borrowed from Mr. Klavans' stepfather, secured by a note dated May 9, 1969 executed by both parties. As to the balance, $14,800 was derived from savings from Mr. Klavans' earnings and $15,000 from the proceeds of a loan from The Yellow Cab Company ((the Yellow Cab note)). The loan was evidenced by a note executed by Mr. Klavans alone and dated July 1, 1968.

'The parties were married in 1950 and continued living together until sixteen months after they moved into their home in 1969. It appears that Mrs. Klavans did not work at any time after her marriage and had no funds of her own. Mr. Klavans, an attorney, was involved in the taxicab business and the parties lived exclusively on his earnings. They were divorced in January of 1972. While the divorce proceedings were pending their house was sold and approximately.$19,000 was placed in escrow to await the outcome of the current litigation.

'In this litigation, . . . Mr. Klavans (sought) to recover one-half of $29,800 which is the amount he contributed over and above the funds jointly obtained by him and his wife to finance the construction of their home. In the alternative, he (sought) to recover one-half of the principal and interest of the note to The Yellow Cab Company said to total $19,537 as of August 31, 1973.

'The trial judge, sitting in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, found that the $14,800 contributed by the plaintiff from his own funds constituted a gift to the wife, to the extent of her interest in the realty, but that the proceeds of the $15,000 loan from The Yellow Cab Company did not constitute a gift. The trial judge apparently based his decision primarily upon a statement made by Mrs. Klavans that, if she had been requested to, she 'guessed' she would have signed the note. The trial judge held that to allow Mrs. Klavans the benefit of one-half of the proceeds of The Yellow Cab Company note as a gift would constitute unjust enrichment and held that as to the proceeds of that note there was a constructive trust in favor of the husband. . . .' 23 Md.App. at 145-46, 326 A.2d at 26.

Since no cross-appeal was taken by the husband from the chancellor's determination respecting the $14,800 contribution, we are concerned here only with the $15,000 derived from the Yellow Cab loan. In reversing the circuit court decision on the latter, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that there was insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of a gift which arose-to the extent of the wife's interest-when the husband paid the proceeds of the Yellow Cab note to the contractor. Thus, the court held, the decision of the chancellor was clearly erroneous, and the 'funds held in escrow belong one-half to each party.' 23 Md.App. at 146, 326 A.2d at 27. We agree.

In urging reversal, the husband advances these contentions, although not in this order:

(i) The Court of Special Appeals erred in holding 'clearly erroneous for insufficiency of evidence' the chancellor's ruling that the gift presumption had been rebutted.

(ii) The Court of Special Appeals erred in reversing the chancellor's finding of a constructive trust to avoid unjust enrichment to the wife at the husband's expense.

(iii) The Court of Special Appeals erred in refusing to hold that the loan and construction advances were made by the husband as the agent of the wife.

(iv) The Court of Special Appeals erred in rejecting recovery by the husband on the theory that he had made a contribution toward the payment of an encumbrance.

In the view we take of this case, our holding that the gift presumption applies is dispositive of the other issues, which, therefore, we need not reach. In short, our conclusion that there was a gift is mutually exclusive of those theories. Since a gift was made, the husband was not acting as the agent of the wife, no contribution was made, and there was no unjust enrichment of the wife justifying the imposition of a constructive trust.

With regard to the gift presumption, the Court of Special Appeals said below: 'Maryland has long held that when one spouse advances funds to purchase property which is placed in the names of both parties as tenants by the entireties there is a presumption that the spouse providing the funds intended to make a gift to the extent of his or her spouse's interest in the property.' 23 Md.App. at 146, 326 A.2d at 27. Accord, McCally v. McCally, 250 Md. 541, 545, 243 A.2d 538 (1968); Anderson v. Anderson, 215 Md. 483, 488-89, 138 A.2d 880 (1958); Reed v. Reed, 109 Md. 690, 692-93, 72 A. 414 (1909). This gift presumption, although characterized in a number of our earlier cases as being absolute, is, or course, rebuttable. See Lingo v. Lingo, 267 Md. 707, 713, 299 A.2d 11 (1973); Anderson v. Anderson, supra, 215 Md. at 489, 138 A.2d 880; cf. Ensor v. Ensor, 270 Md. 549, 557, 312 A.2d 286 (1973).

Although acknowledging that this is the rule applicable to 'a contribution on account of the purchase price of an estate by the entireties,' the husband argues that here the contribution was made 'on account of construction and improvements upon a previously existing estate by the entireties.' He relies upon Lingo for this argument. There, the parties-while yet married-had been engaged as joint venturers in the business of building houses for sale. Prior to their separation and divorce, they acquired ownership of a lot as tenants by the entireties, which was subsequently readied for construction following their separation. After the wife refused to join in a construction loan, the husband forged her signature to the necessary papers. On learning of this action, she notified the lending institution, which gave her husband three hours to pay off the loan of approximately $36,000. He accomplished this by selling some individually owned stock. The property was then sold, but the parties were unable to agree upon the amount each should receive. The wife claimed that she was entitled to one-half the proceeds on the basis that since the property was owned by the entireties, the loan payment was a gift to the extent of her interest therein.

The husband, however, maintained that before an equal division of the available proceeds should be made, he was entitled to reimbursement for the advancement. The essence of his argument was that considering 'their estrangement during virtually the entire period material to (the) transaction, (the advancement) was hardly intended to represent a gift, and was instead a desperate measure taken to prevent the property from 'going down the drain." 267 Md. at 709, 299 A.2d at 12. (emphasis added). Upon the narrow facts of that case, we upheld the circuit court ruling that the gift presumption had been rebutted by the husband. Hence, he was entitled to reimbursement.

In addition to relying upon Lingo for the distinction between a contribution on account of the purchase price paid to acquire the property and one made subsequently for construction and improvements, the husband attempts to draw two further parallels between Lingo and this case. First, since payment of the Yellow Cab note proceeds to the contractor theoretically avoided potential mechanic's liens, he argues that here the advancement was also in payment of an 'encumbrance.' Secondly, he points to his testimony before the chancellor that at the time he made the advancement, he and his wife were having 'marital difficulties.' He bolsters this with his testimony that his 'intent was to provide a house for the children . . . and to better their living conditions. It wasn't ever intended as a gift to Mrs. Klavans.' Finally, in language strangely reminiscent of the statement which we quoted previously from Lingo, he declared...

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