Klayman v. Porter

• Decision Date: 29 August 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 20-3109 (RBW),20-3579 (RBW),21-965 (RBW)
• Parties: LARRY ELLIOT KLAYMAN, Plaintiff, v. JULIA PORTER, et al., Defendants. LARRY ELLIOT KLAYMAN, Plaintiff, v. JULIA PORTER, et al., Defendants. LARRY ELLIOT KLAYMAN, Plaintiff, v. MATTHEW KAISER, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

LARRY ELLIOT KLAYMAN, Plaintiff,
v.
JULIA PORTER, et al., Defendants.

LARRY ELLIOT KLAYMAN, Plaintiff,
v.
JULIA PORTER, et al., Defendants.

LARRY ELLIOT KLAYMAN, Plaintiff,
v.
MATTHEW KAISER, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action Nos. 20-3109 (RBW), 20-3579 (RBW), 21-965 (RBW)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

August 29, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

REGGIE B. WALTON United States District Judge.

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The plaintiff, Larry Klayman, an attorney proceeding pro se, brings these civil actions against the defendants, Julia Porter; Hamilton Fox, III; Lawrence Bloom; and Matthew Kaiser,^[1]alleging claims of tortious interference, see Complaint ¶¶ 37-41, Klayman v. Porter, Civil Action No. 20-3109 (“Porter I Compl.”); Complaint ¶¶ 36-40, Klayman v. Porter, Civil Action No. 203579 (“Porter II Compl.”); Complaint ¶¶ 45-49, Klayman v. Kaiser, Civil Action No. 21-965 (“Kaiser Compl.”), and abuse of process, see Porter I Compl. ¶¶ 42-47; Porter II Compl. ¶¶ 4146; Kaiser Compl. ¶¶ 50-55. Currently pending before the Court are: (1) the Defendants' Motion for an Injunction Against Vexatious Litigation by Plaintiff (“Defs.' Injunction Mot.” or the “defendants' motion for an injunction”), ECF No. 21; (2) the Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss (“Defs.' 12(b)(1) Mot.” or the “defendants' motion to dismiss”), ECF No. 58; (3) the Defendants' Motion for Interim Relief (“Defs.' Interim Relief Mot.” or the “defendants' motion for interim relief”), ECF No. 64; (4) the plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Sanctions (“Pl.'s Sanctions Mot.” or the “plaintiff's cross-motion for sanctions”), ECF No. 67; and (5) the defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiff's “Reply to Defendants' Reply” and Plaintiff's Subsequent “Addition” to Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' Reply (“Defs.' Strike Mot.” or the “defendants' motion to strike”), ECF No. 73. Upon careful consideration of the parties' submissions,^[2] the Court

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concludes for the following reasons that it must (1) grant the defendants' motion for an injunction, (2) grant the defendants' motion to dismiss, (3) deny as moot the defendants' motion for interim relief, (4) deny the plaintiff's cross-motion for sanctions, and (5) deny as moot the defendants' motion to strike.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

1. The Plaintiff's Prior Lawsuits

Before filing the three cases currently before the Court, the plaintiff previously filed three other lawsuits, two in this Court and one in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, all stemming from events involving the plaintiff's disciplinary proceedings conducted by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel in the District of Columbia (“ODC”), and all were dismissed. See generally Klayman v. Fox (“Klayman I”), No. 18-cv-1579 (RDM), 2019 WL 2396538 (D.D.C. June 5, 2019), aff'd, 830 Fed.Appx. 660 (D.C. Cir. 2020); Klayman v. Lim (“Klayman II”), No. 18-cv-2209 (RDM), 2019 WL 2396539 (D.D.C. June 5, 2019),

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aff'd, 830 Fed.Appx. 660 (D.C. Cir. 2020); Klayman v. Porter (“Klayman III”), No. 2020 CA 000756 B (D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 1, 2020).

The first of the three prior cases was filed on July 3, 2018, in Klayman I, and the plaintiff asserted claims of abuse of process, see Complaint ¶¶ 94-97, Civil Action No. 18-1579 (“Klayman I Compl.”), malicious prosecution, see id. ¶¶ 98-102, violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, see id. ¶¶ 103-08, and violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, see id. ¶¶ 10915. The plaintiff argued that the defendants-ODC officials, two of whom are included as defendants in the lawsuits currently before the Court-“conpir[ed] to disbar him or to force him to resign from the D.C. Bar (1) because they disagree with his ‘political beliefs [and] public interest activism' and hope to silence him and (2) because of his gender.” Klayman I, 2019 WL 2396538, at *1 (quoting Klayman I Compl. ¶ 1). The plaintiff requested both damages and injunctive relief. See Klayman I Compl. at 23. The Court in that case dismissed the plaintiff's claims, finding that “Younger abstention bars [the plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief; the ODC is non suis juris; and [the plaintiff's claims for damages are barred by the doctrine of absolute immunity.” Klayman I, 2019 WL 2396538, at *1.

The plaintiff filed the second earlier case on September 24, 2018, in Klayman II, alleging claims of abuse of process, see Complaint ¶¶ 80-83, Civil Action No. 18-2209 (“Klayman II Compl.”), malicious prosecution, see id. ¶¶ 84-87, violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, see id. ¶¶ 88-93, violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, see id. ¶¶ 94-100, and fraud, see id. ¶¶ 10104. The plaintiff “allege[d] that [the d]efendants [ ] violated the common law and the U.S.

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Constitution by pursuing charges against him for attorney misconduct arising from his efforts to appear pro hac vice as counsel for Cliven Bundy, a criminal defendant, before the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada.” Klayman II, 2019 WL 2396539, at *1. Although the underlying factual allegations related to the plaintiff's ODC proceedings were slightly different from those alleged in Klayman I, the plaintiff lodged an identical argument that the defendants, “acting in concert and as joint tortfeasors, intentionally violated [his] statutory, constitutional, and other rights due to [his] political beliefs, public interest activism, and gender, pursuant to their own individual biases, prejudices, political views, loyalties, and allegiances.” Klayman II Compl. ¶ 1; compare id. with Klayman I Compl. ¶ 1. The plaintiff also requested both damages and injunctive relief in Klayman II. See Klayman II Compl. at 21. The Court dismissed Klayman II, finding that “for the same reasons set forth in [Klayman I], [it would] grant the motion to dismiss [the p]laintiff's complaint against the ODC and its staff based on Younger abstention, the non sui juris status of the ODC, and absolute judicial immunity[.]” Klayman II, 2019 WL 2396539, at *1.

The plaintiff then appealed both Klayman I and Klayman II, and the D.C. Circuit issued an opinion affirming the district court's opinions in both cases. See Klayman, 830 Fed.Appx. at 661. Specifically, the Circuit first held that the defendants were “immune from liability for damages on federal- or D.C.-law claims arising from their official actions of initiating and adjudicating disciplinary charges[,]” and to the extent the plaintiff alleged that they acted outside of the scope of their official duties, “[w]hether or not they had good reason to pursue charges, Disciplinary Counsel's inquiry into [the plaintiff]'s affairs and decision to seek disciplinary action ‘was plainly within the general matters . . . committed to [their] discretion' under D.C. law[.]” Id. at 662 (quoting Simons v. Bellinger, 643 F.2d 774, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1980)) (last

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alteration in original). Second, in affirming the district court's abstention ruling pursuant to Younger, the Circuit held that “[f]ederal-court abstention from interference with pending state proceedings (including D.C. proceedings) is appropriate ‘so long as there is no showing of bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstance' on the part of the state ‘that would make abstention inappropriate[,]'” Id. (quoting Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 435 (1982)), and that the plaintiff's allegations regarding extraordinary circumstances and bad faith were insufficient to “make abstention inappropriate in this case[,]” id. See id. at 663 (“The facts [the plaintiff] alleged-that he and the ODC defendants had diametrically opposed political affiliations, that he had several heated exchanges with some of the defendants, and that the Florida and Pennsylvania bars independently decided not to pursue [a particular] matter-do not amount to ‘extraordinary circumstances' justifying federal intervention.”); id. (finding with respect to the bad faith determination that “[the plaintiff] has made no ‘substantial,' nonconclusory allegations that the Disciplinary Counsel defendants have pursued the matters ‘with[out] any expectation of' sustaining the charges against him” (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 48 (1971)).

Finally, on January 31, 2020, the plaintiff filed his third prior complaint in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia, alleging abuse of process against two ODC officials and the ODC itself. See Klayman III, No. 2020 CA 000756 B, at 1. The plaintiff's arguments again stemmed from the disciplinary bar proceedings brought against him, see id. at 6-12, and the Superior Court addressed the issues of absolute immunity, referencing this Court's rulings in Klayman I and Klayman II, see id. at 7-10. The Superior Court dismissed the case, finding that “there is both an explicit rule which shields liability for parties in exactly the same position as [the defendants], as well as long followed legal precedent which instructs the [c]ourt to dismiss

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the instant action[,]” id. at 8 (citing DC Bar Rule XI, § 19(a)), and that it “d[id] not find persuasive [the p]laintiff's conclusory statements that [the defendants'] investigation and prosecution [ ] is ‘unethical conduct outside of the scope of their official duties[,]” id. at 9 (citation omitted).

2. The Pending Consolidated Cases

The plaintiff filed the three consolidated cases currently pending before the Court-Civil Action Numbers 20-3109, 20-3579, and 21-965-on October 2, 2020; August 26, 2020; and December 31, 2020, respectively. See Porter I Compl. at 1; Porter II Compl. at 1; Kaiser Compl. at 1; see also infra Section I.B (detailing the case transfer and reassignment history as to these actions). In each of these cases, the plaintiff alleges claims of tortious interference and abuse of process against...