Kleban v. National Union Fire Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 27 March 2001 |
Parties | Thomas A. KLEBAN, Appellant, v. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA., Appellee. |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Delano M. Lantz, Harrisburg, for appellant.
Walter F. Kawalec, III, Philadelphia, for appellee.
Before POPOVICH, JOYCE and BROSKY, JJ.
¶ 1 Thomas Kleban, Appellant, appeals from the order dated July 7, 2000 wherein the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of National Union Fire Insurance Company, Appellee. We affirm. Before reviewing the merits of the case, a recitation of the factual and procedural history is in order.
¶ 2 This case has its genesis in an accident that occurred on July 2, 1989, when Appellant dove into a pool, severing his spine and rendering him a quadriplegic. Appellant brought suit on September 20, 1990 in the Superior Court of New Jersey. Appellant named the pool manufacturer ("Heldor") and the pool owner, Prudence Simonds as defendants in his complaint. At the time of the accident, Appellee insured Heldor under a policy that provided general liability coverage. The insurance policy contained a self-insured retention clause that provided that Heldor was responsible for the first $250,000.00 per occurrence and Appellee was responsible for the remainder of a judgment or settlement up to the policy limits of two million dollars.
¶ 3 On December 7, 1990, Heldor filed for bankruptcy and an automatic stay was issued pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code. Appellant filed for relief from the automatic stay in order to pursue his negligence action. The parties stipulated to an order of the bankruptcy court lifting the stay.
¶ 4 Appellant settled his case against Prudence Simonds and proceeded to a jury trial against Heldor. A verdict was returned on July 29, 1994 in favor of Appellant in the amount of $8,780,000.00. Heldor was found to be 10% responsible, thus its liability was $878,000.00.
¶ 5 Appellee paid all of the judgment in favor of Appellant and against Heldor in excess of $250,000.00, the self-insurance retention. Five years later, on March 1, 1999, Appellant instituted the current action by filing a complaint against Appellee contending that Appellee is responsible for the $250,000.00 that it withheld. Appellee filed an answer and new matter to the complaint. Appellant responded with a reply to new matter. On March 2, 2000, Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment. On April 3, 2000, Appellant filed an answer to the motion for summary judgment and also a cross-motion for summary judgment and motion to compel the production of documents. Following oral argument, the trial court granted Appellee's motion for summary judgment and denied both the cross-motion for summary judgment and the motion to compel the production of documents by order dated July 7, 2000. This timely appeal followed.
¶ 6 Appellant presents the following issues for our consideration:
¶ 7 In reviewing a trial court's grant of summary judgment, our scope of review is plenary and our standard is as follows:
In reviewing the grant of summary judgment, we look to whether the trial court committed an error of law. Summary judgment may be granted only in cases where it is clear and free from doubt that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The moving party has the burden of proving the nonexistence of any genuine issues of material fact. The record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. The entry of summary judgment is proper where the incontraverted allegations in the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions of record, and submitted affidavits demonstrate that no issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Kafando v. Erie Ceramic Arts Co., 764 A.2d 59, 61 (Pa.Super.2000), citing Rush v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 732 A.2d 648, 650-51 (Pa.Super.1999)
.
¶ 8 Appellant brought this action pursuant to the Direct Action Statute, 40 P.S. § 117, which states in pertinent part:
[T]he insolvency or bankruptcy of the person insured shall not release the insurance carrier from the payment of damages for injury sustained ... [if] execution against the insured is returned unsatisfied in an action brought by the injured person ... because of such insolvency or bankruptcy, then an action may be maintained by the injured person, ... against such [insurer], under the terms of the policy, for the amount of the judgement in the said action, not exceeding the amount of the policy.
40 P.S. § 117. (Emphasis added). Since the Direct Action Statute directs that an action may only be maintained against the insurer to the degree that it complies with the terms of the policy, an evaluation of the policy is in order.
¶ 9 The insurance policy between Appellee and Heldor contains the following "Endorsement # 3", titled, "Self Insured Retention." In pertinent part it states:
National Union Fire Insurance Policy, GL-590-18-20, issued to Heldor.
¶ 10 Although we have been unable to find any Pennsylvania state law on point in this matter, Appellee cites to federal caselaw to support its position. While we recognize that federal court decisions are not binding on this court, we are able to adopt their analysis as it appeals to our reason. Chester Carriers, Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, 2001 WL 21308, at 5 (2001) citing, Willard v. Interpool, 758 A.2d 684 (Pa.Super.2000)
. In In re Amatex Corp., 107 B.R. 856, 871-872 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1989), the court addressed the issue of whether a self-insured retention...
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