Kleespies v. State
| Decision Date | 22 May 1886 |
| Docket Number | 12,926 |
| Parties | Kleespies v. The State |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Clark Circuit Court.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs.
J. B Meriwether, for appellant.
F. T Hord, Attorney General, and F. B. Burke, Prosecuting Attorney, for the State.
In this case the appellant, George Kleespies, and one Louis Kleespies, were jointly indicted at the October term, 1885 of the court below, to wit, on the 26th day of October, 1885. The indictment contained two counts. The first count charged that at Clark county, "on the 1st day of July, 1885, and continuously from that day to the day of making this presentment, Louis Kleespies and George Kleespies did then and there, and during all of said time, unlawfully suffer and knowingly permit their building and room, then and there situated, to be used for gaming, and did then and there, and during all of said time, unlawfully suffer and knowingly permit" six named persons, whose names we omit, "and divers other persons to the grand jurors unknown, to play at a certain game called faro, for money and other articles of value."
The second count charged "that at said county, on the 1st day of July, 1885, and from that day to the day of making this presentment, Louis Kleespies and George Kleespies did then and there, and during all of said time, unlawfully rent their building and room, then and there situated, to be used for gaming."
Upon their joint arraignment and plea of not guilty, the appellant and Louis Kleespies were jointly tried by a jury, and a verdict was returned into court finding Louis Kleespies not guilty, and finding appellant guilty, as charged in the indictment, and assessing his fine at two hundred and fifty dollars. Over his motion for a new trial, the court rendered judgment against the appellant on the verdict for the fine assessed and costs.
Errors are here assigned by appellant upon the overruling of his motions to quash each count of the indictment and his motion for a new trial.
Appellant's counsel first insists that each count of the indictment is insufficient, because the description of the building and room therein was too general and vague, and did not inform the defendants what room or building was permitted by them to be used, or rented by them to be used, for gaming purposes. We do not think that this objection is well taken as to either count of the indictment. In each count the premises are described as the defendants' building and room, at Clark county. This follows, substantially, the language of the statute defining the offences, and is sufficient. Padgett v. State, 68 Ind. 46; Hamilton v. State, 75 Ind. 586.
It is further objected by appellant's counsel, that "the second count does not state to whom the room or building was rented for gaming purposes." It was not necessary that the count should state the name of the tenant. Under the statute, it is the renting of the room or building "to be used or occupied for gaming," which constitutes the public offence; and the renting for such use is charged in the second count with sufficient clearness and certainty. Section 2079, R. S. 1881. These are the only objections pointed out by appellant's counsel to either count of the indictment, and neither of such objections seems to us to be well taken.
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