Kleine-Albrandt v. Lamb

• Decision Date: 26 August 1992
• Docket Number: No. 53A05-9201-CV-21,A,KLEINE-ALBRAND,53A05-9201-CV-21
• Citation: 597 N.E.2d 1310
• Parties: Stephanieppellant-Plaintiff, v. Carl LAMB and Fitness and Exercise, Inc. d/b/a FX Fitness Center, Appellees-Defendants.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 1310

597 N.E.2d 1310

Stephanie KLEINE-ALBRANDT, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Carl LAMB and Fitness and Exercise, Inc. d/b/a FX Fitness

Center, Appellees-Defendants.

No. 53A05-9201-CV-21.

Court of Appeals of Indiana,

Fifth District.

Aug. 26, 1992.

Lisa A. Farnsworth, Student Legal Services, Bloomington, for appellant-plaintiff.

Carl Paul Lamb, Bloomington, for appellees-defendants.

SHARPNACK, Judge.

Stephanie Kleine-Albrandt appeals from a judgment against both Carl Lamb and Fitness and Exercise, Inc. ("F/X") which awarded Kleine-Albrandt damages and costs pursuant to Ind.Code Sec. 22-2-5-2, but which did not assess attorney's fees. We reverse.

Kleine-Albrandt raises the following dispositive issue on appeal:

Whether I.C. Sec. 22-2-5-2 grants the trial court discretion to deny attorney's fees to a nonprofit legal organization representing a prevailing plaintiff.

The facts before this court are limited as the parties waived a record of the evidence presented in small claims court. However, all of the essential facts to this appeal either appear in the record or are undisputed by the parties upon appeal. Kleine-Albrandt filed a complaint in small claims court against Lamb seeking recovery of actual damages, liquidated damages, court costs and attorney's fees pursuant to I.C. Sec. 22-2-5-1 (dealing, in relevant part, with the payment of wages to an employee after the employee voluntarily leaves the job), and she later joined F/X as a defendant.

F/X filed an admission of liability prior to the trial. At trial, Lamb failed to appear and the court entered judgment for Kleine-Albrandt and against both defendants. The court awarded liquidated damages of $67.50 plus $30 in court costs, but it did not assess attorney's fees. Kleine-Albrandt filed a motion to correct error which the trial court denied with the following order:

"[T]he Court concedes that the staff, interns and attorneys at Indiana University's Office of Student Legal services spent time in preparation for trial and that said services were performed superbly on behalf of their client, the Plaintiff; however, upon inquiry by the court, the testimony at trial was that any award of attorney fees would not be awarded to the Plaintiff, Mrs. Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt [sic], but rather would be deposited into a revolving interest-free student loan fund for the benefit of legal interns in the office of Student Legal Services. The Court believes such use of an award of attorney fees is neither "reasonable", as intended by the Indiana General Assembly upon amending Section 8 of this statute in Public Law 144--1986, nor within the meaning of "reasonable" as interpreted by the Indiana Court of Appeals. But rather such a mandatory award of reasonable attorney fees as prescribed by the statute is to ensure adequate legal representation in the employment circumstance addressed by the statute. In the case at bar, the Plaintiff received superior legal representation through the office of Student Legal Services, without being assessed for the services provided in this action, which is funded at least in part, by public funds. A part of the mission of this university office is to provide a working environment for Indiana University law students for professional practical experience prior to graduation, a goal wholeheartedly supported and encouraged by this Court, as well as benefiting [sic] other Indiana University students by providing free legal advice and counsel under certain circumstances. As admirable as such goals and policies are, the Court believes they do not fall within the meaning of "reasonable attorney fees" as referred to in Indiana Code 22-2-5-2...."

(Record, pp. 28-29)

We agree with Kleine-Albrandt's contention that the trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to assess a reasonable fee because such fees are mandatory when a plaintiff prevails on the merits of a claim under I.C. Sec. 22-2-5-2. Ind.Code Sec. 22-2-5-1 places upon an employer a duty to pay an employee who voluntarily leaves employment any wages due by the "next and regular day for payment of wages." Id. Ind.Code Sec. 22-2-5-2 provides the mechanism for enforcement of that duty as follows:

"Every such person, firm ... who shall fail to make payment of wages ... as provided in section 1 ... shall, as liquidated damages for such failure, pay to such employee for each day that the amount due to him remains unpaid ten percent (10%) of the amount due to him in addition thereto, not exceeding double the amount wages due, ... and in any suit so brought to recover said wages or the liquidated damages for nonpayment thereof, or both, the court shall tax and assess as costs in said case a reasonable fee for the plaintiff's attorney or attorneys."

(emphasis added) Under the plain language of the statute, once the plaintiff meets her burden of showing that the employer has improperly withheld her wages, she has invoked the penalty provisions of I.C. Sec. 22-2-5-2 and the court shall assess a reasonable attorney's fee without further showing. Fardy v. Physicians Health Rehabilitation Services, Inc. (1988), Ind.App., 529 N.E.2d 879, 883. The statute makes no exception for cases where the plaintiff has been provided legal services free of charge and we will not judicially graft such an exception onto the statute.

Lamb counters that the trial court correctly found that an award of attorney fees would not be reasonable here because Kleine-Albrandt did not personally incur liability for any fees, and because the money would be used by Student Legal Services for the benefit of third parties. However, the weight of authority refutes Lamb's contentions. Our supreme court recently addressed a similar issue involving an award of attorneys fees pursuant to a dissolution proceeding. Beeson v. Christian (1992), Ind., 594 N.E.2d 441. In that case, the trial court had awarded appellate attorney fees to Wife's attorney pursuant to I.C. Sec. 31-1-11.5-16, but the court of appeals had reversed the award on the basis that Wife's attorney testified that he had agreed not to charge Wife for his services. The supreme court based its decision to vacate court of appeals' opinion on the following reasoning:

" '[T]he statute permitting the award of attorney fees serves to insure equal access to the courts despite the relative financial conditions of the parties.' [P.B. v. T.D. (1990), Ind., 561 N.E.2d 749, 750] That public policy would be undermined if we were to hold that a party must be personally obligated to pay attorney fees before the trial court could order the other party to pay those fees. Such a policy might, in some circumstances, effectively eliminate the right to appeal in dissolution proceedings. This Court will not force a party in a dissolution action to choose between foregoing legal action or obligating that party to a fee agreement which such party could not meet.

This situation is analogous to some pro bono arrangements where an attorney agrees to represent a client and to accept a fee only if one is awarded by the trial court and paid by the other side. As here, the client is never legally obligated to pay the fee, and the attorney is paid only if the trial court awards them. Such an arrangement supports the process of allowing access to the courts to those with limited means."

Id. at 443.

Although the policy...