Kleinrichert v. State, 673S128
Decision Date | 27 June 1973 |
Docket Number | No. 673S128,673S128 |
Parties | Jerome KLEINRICHERT, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Robert S. McCain, Fort Wayne, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., David H Kreider, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.
OPINION ON PETITION TO TRANSFER
This is a criminal petition to transfer to this Court filed pursuant to Appellate Rule 11(B), Rules of Appellate Procedure. Jerome Kleinrichert was indicted for pandering by the Allen County Grand Jury on March 3, 1970. He was convicted and sentenced to the Indiana State Prison for a period of not less than one (1) nor more than ten (10) years and fined One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00). The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Third District on February 9, 1973. Kleinrichert v. State (1973), Ind.App., 292 N.E.2d 277. Petitioner specifies the following as error:
(1) The trial court erred in granting the prosecuting attorney's oral motion for a continuance on the day the cause was set for trial.
(2) The trial court erred in denying petitioner's motion to produce evidence.
(3) There was insufficient evidence at trial to sustain his conviction.
(4) The trial court weighed the indictment as evidence of petitioner's guilt.
(5) Petitioner received an illegal sentence.
The State's sole witness against petitioner was a prostitute who failed to appear at trial on December 9, 1970. When the subpoenaed witness did not appear, the prosecuting attorney orally moved for a continuance. The trial court granted the motion. Petitioner contends that the trial court was without authority to grant the oral motion for a continuance. The relevant statutes at issue here are: IC 1971, 35--1--26--1, Ind.Stat.Ann. § 9--1401 (Burns, 1956); IC 1971, 35--1--26--2, Ind.Stat.Ann. § 9--1402 (Burns, 1956) which read in applicable part as follows:
(Emphasis added.)
Petitioner urges that the above statutes mandate that the prosecutor's official statement be in writing. The Court of Appeals took the position that the statutes recognize that the prosecutor's motion may be oral. With this position we agree. The plain language of § 9--1402 authorizes such oral motion, '. . . but the defendant may require the same to be in writing.' The record of this case discloses no such request made by defendant-petitioner. At the time the motion for continuance was made, the court had before it a subpoena which had been personally served upon the prosecuting witness. The prosecutor stated that he had learned only the day before that a letter sent to the witness had been returned. He stated that Inez Bonner was the sole witness for the State and that she would testify to all essential elements of the crime charged; that without her testimony the State would be forced to dismiss the case. These facts are sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements of § 9--1401 and § 9--1402.
Petitioner further contends that the decision of the trial court to grant the oral motion for continuance is in direct conflict with Art. 1, § 12 of the Constitution of the State of Indiana and Criminal Rule 4(D), Criminal Rules of Procedure. The constitutional guarantee of the right to a speedy trial is procedurally implemented by Criminal Rule 4(D) which provides:
The original trial date set for this cause was December 9, 1970. Upon granting the motion for continuance, March 5, 1971, was the new date set for trial. The second trial date was within the ninety days provided for by Criminal Rule 4(D). We, therefore, find no error upon this issue.
Petitioner alleges error in that the trial court refused his requests for production of certain index cards in the possession of the prosecuting attorney. The prosecuting witness kept a card file containing the names, birthdays, fractions of one hundred dollars paid and the dates of visitation of her male customers. Three of these cards were entered into evidence at trial. Petitioner filed a broad motion to discover 'all records held by the State of Indiana, which reflect names and dates of acts of prostitution committed by the State's material witness Inez Bonner, which said records may also reflect amounts of money received for said acts of prostitution.' Petitioner's motion alleges that Jerome Kleinrichert '. . . has a special need for production of the prostitution records . . .' However, petitioner demonstrated no 'special need' for the production of the evidence. He did not lay any foundation to discover the evidence for impeachment purposes. The State resisted the petitioner's motion on the grounds that the bulk of the card file contained information unrelated to the prosecuting witness's direct testimony. The motion for the production of the evidence was properly denied by the trial court. However, the Court of Appeals, in treating this issue states:
292 N.E.2d at 284. (Emphasis added.)
The Court of Appeals cites Yeary v. State (1971), Ind., 273 N.E.2d 96, for the above proposition. The facts of Yeary were materially different from the instant case. In Yeary, the appellant-defendant sought to discover a statement that the prosecuting witness had made to police, concerning an alleged rape. The court ordered the prosecution to produce the statement. The prosecution did not produce, alleging that the statement was not in its possession. This Court in Yeary stated:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Garrymore
...8. Incidentally, the Indiana courts have construed their version of the Lenihan exception similarly. In Kleinrichert v. State, 260 Ind. 537, 297 N.E.2d 822 (1973), cited in Lenihan, 184 Mont. at 342, 602 P.2d at 1000, the Supreme Court of Indiana stated: "Normally, this Court will not consi......
-
Decker v. State
...exception to the rules requiring proper in-trial objection as a prerequisite to raising the issue on appeal, citing Kleinrichert v. State (1973) 260 Ind. 537, 297 N.E.2d 822. That the error complained of relates to the violation of a right guaranteed by the constitution does not, in and of ......
-
Daniels v. State
...that bias or prejudice exists, but must rely upon the record to show evidence thereof. Clemons v. State, supra; Kleinrichert v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 537, 297 N.E.2d 822. In this case, we find that the record shows that the court was not acting with bias or prejudice against defendant when......
-
Smith v. State
...the use of a post-conviction petition. Brown v. State (1992) 2d Dist.Ind.App., 587 N.E.2d 693.9 See, e.g., Kleinrichert v. State (1973) 260 Ind. 537, 297 N.E.2d 822, 826 (our Supreme Court refused to apply waiver and stated that a court of review " 'cannot ignore a fundamental error which i......