Klemme v. Drainage Dist. No. 5 of Crete Tp.

• Decision Date: 21 September 1942
• Docket Number: No. 26615.,26615.
• Citation: 43 N.E.2d 966,380 Ill. 221
• Parties: KLEMME et al. v. DRAINAGE DIST. NO. 5 OF CRETE TP.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

380 Ill. 221

43 N.E.2d 966

KLEMME et al.

v.DRAINAGE DIST. NO. 5 OF CRETE TP.

No. 26615.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 21, 1942.

Suit by William Klemme and others against Drainage District No. 5 of the Township of Crete to review a decision of the commissioners of defendant drainage district confirming the classification of plaintiffs' lands. From an order sustaining defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the plaintiffs appeal.

Reversed and remanded with directions.Appeal from Circuit Court, Will County; Roscoe C. South, judge.

William Jacobs, of Chicago, Howard C. Roe, of Chicago Heights, and Daniel Harrington, of Joliet, for appellants.

Krusemark & Krusemark, of Joliet, for appellee.

THOMPSON, Justice.

This is a case brought to this court to review an order entered by the circuit court of Will county dismissing an appeal brought to that court from the decision of the commissioners of appellee drainage district confirming the classification of appellants' lands.

The sole issue in this case is whether or not the circuit court has jurisdiction of an appeal by a land owner under section 24 of the Farm Drainage act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1941, chap. 42, par. 106) from an order of the drainage commissioners confirming classification of his lands. Prior to June 5, 1909, as the Farm Drainage act then stood, it is conceded that the county court had exclusive jurisdiction in such matters. It is also conceded that by an act of the legislature approved and in force June 5, 1909, entitled ‘An act to give circuit courts of this state, and the Superior Courts of Cook County, in term time, and judges thereof in vacation, concurrent jurisdiction with the county courts, in all matters pertaining to the organization of farm drainage districts, and farm drainage and levee districts, and the operation thereof, and to (repeal) all acts in conflict herewith’ (Ill.Rev.Stat.1941, chap. 37, par. 158), there was conferred upon circuit courts concurrent jurisdiction with county courts to try appeals of this nature, the above mentioned Court act having modified the Farm Drainage act to this extent by necessary implication. In 1919 sections 24 and 25 of the Farm Drainage act, relating to such appeals, was amended by the legislature and rewritten and changed in many particulars, but that portion thereof in regard to appeals being taken to the county court was retained therein and substantially reenacted as it stood prior thereto. Appellee contends that since the passage of this amendment in 1919 the county court has exclusive jurisdiction of appeals taken under section 24 of the Farm Drainage act, claiming that the amendment of section 24 repealed by implication to that extent the provisions of the Court act of 1909 giving the circuit court concurrent jurisdiction with the county court in drainage matters.

The above-mentioned act of 1909 has been before this court many times, and it has been construed as giving to the circuit courts concurrent jurisdiction with the county courts in all matters pertaining to the organization and operation of farm drainage districts. Boone's Pond Drainage District v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co., 268 Ill. 264, 267, 109 N.E. 21;Kline v. Barnes, 250 Ill. 404, 407, 95 N.E. 473;Mackinaw Drainage District v. Martin, 325 Ill. 400, 401, 156 N.E. 274. This is not disputed, but the question here presented for our decision is whether the 1919 amendment of section 24 of the Farm Drainage act has withdrawn from the circuit court this jurisdiction insofar as applies to appeals taken under that section. In approaching this question it should be borne in mind that repeals by implication are not favored, and it is only where two statutes are clearly repugnant to each other that the later one operates as a repeal of the former. Village of Atwood v. Cincinnati, Indianapolis & Western Railroad Co., 316 Ill. 425, 147 N.E. 449; People ex rel. Hall v. Pearson, 314 Ill. 392, 145 N.E. 644. Moreover, when the General Assembly amends a statute and no change is made in parts of it, the repeated portions, either literally or substantially, are regarded as a continuation of the existing law and not as the enactment of a new law upon the subject. City of Altamont v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 348 Ill. 339, 180 N.E. 809;People ex rel. Adams v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Co., 316 Ill. 452, 147 N.E. 494;Spiehs v. Insull, 278 Ill. 184, 187,155 N.E. 816;People v. Lloyd, 304 Ill. 23, 136 N.E. 505. It should also be borne in mind...