Klenk v. State

Decision Date14 November 1989
Docket NumberNo. 64A03-8906-PC-246,64A03-8906-PC-246
Citation546 N.E.2d 110
PartiesJames D. KLENK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Respondent-Appellee.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Jayme Walker, Legal Intern; David E. Vandercoy, Valparaiso University Law Clinic, Valparaiso, for petitioner-appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Jane A. Morrison, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for respondent-appellee.

GARRARD, Presiding Judge.

Klenk pled guilty to two counts of rape, one a Class B felony and one a Class A felony.

He now appeals from denial of his petition for post conviction relief and raises three issues.

First, he asserts the court failed to adequately advise him of his right to confrontation before accepting the plea. We agree that the right encompasses both the cross examination of witnesses and their physical confrontation by the accused. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie (1987), 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40. For this reason the better practice for a court in preparing to consider a guilty plea is, certainly, to expressly mention both aspects. That does not mean, however, that the plea is rendered involuntary if the court fails to use a specific word or term.

On the contrary, our decisions have uniformly held that the precise statutory language need not be used. See, e.g., Frazier v. State (1986), Ind., 500 N.E.2d 1187. Moreover, a reviewing court should look to the facts and circumstances surrounding the taking of the plea to determine whether an adequate advisement has been given. Douglas v. State (1987), Ind., 510 N.E.2d 682. Thus, our supreme court has expressly held that an accused was adequately advised of his rights of confrontation where neither aspect was expressly mentioned but the accused was advised of his right to a public trial by a jury and had been involved in pretrial depositions of witnesses. Mathis v. State (1980), 273 Ind. 609, 613, 406 N.E.2d 1182, 1184.

Here the court advised Klenk of his right to cross examine the prosecution's witnesses and to subpoena and present his own witnesses. In addition the court discussed with Klenk his rights to speedy trial, public trial, trial by jury and the prosecution's burden of proof. The proceeding itself was for a change of plea, the case having been set for a trial to commence that day. Under the circumstances we find Klenk was adequately advised of his right of confrontation. It was clearly implicit under the circumstances that Klenk was entitled to be present at the trial and confront those witnesses called to testify for the state.

Klenk next complains that he was inadequately advised concerning the possible penalties for his offenses. There was no plea agreement as to the particular sentence to be imposed on either offense. Klenk admits, and the record demonstrates, that as to each offense the court advised him of the minimum possible sentence, the maximum possible sentence and the possible additional fine. In addition, the court explained that the sentences might be imposed concurrently or consecutively, what those terms meant, and that it was a matter for the court's discretion to determine which would be adjudged.

Klenk contends this was inadequate and asserts the court was required to advise him of the presumptive sentence for each offense and that sentence could not be reduced below the presumptive sentence unless the court determined that mitigating factors outweighed any aggravating factors. We disagree.

We first point out that the statute, IC 35-35-1-2(a)(3), requires advisement of the maximum possible sentence, the minimum possible sentence and any possibility of consecutive sentences. The court complied with the statute.

More significantly the advice given was that necessary to a knowing, intelligent and voluntary plea. An accused should know the minimum possible sentence. Then he understands the...

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3 cases
  • Cates v. Superintendent, Indiana Youth Center
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana
    • August 17, 1990
    ...(N.D.Ind.1983); and Neeley v. Duckworth, 473 F.Supp. 288 (N.D.Ind.1979). As the Indiana Court of Appeals reasoned in Klenk v. State, 546 N.E.2d 110, 111-112 (Ind.App.1989), a reviewing court will look to the facts and circumstances surrounding a defendant's plea in order to determine whethe......
  • Hampton v. State, 82A01-9210-PC-355
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • June 14, 1993
    ...94 L.Ed.2d 40, 53; Hart v. State (1991), Ind., 578 N.E.2d 336, 337; Miller v. State (1988), Ind., 531 N.E.2d 466, 470; Klenk v. State (1989), Ind.App., 546 N.E.2d 110; Casada v. State (1989), Ind.App., 544 N.E.2d 189, 192, trans. denied. "For this reason the better practice for a court in p......
  • Stamm v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • June 25, 1990
    ..."encompasses both the cross-examination of witnesses and their physical confrontation by the accused". Klenk v. State (1989) 3d Dist.Ind.App., 546 N.E.2d 110, 111. 1 Precise language need not be used if the facts and circumstances surrounding the taking of the plea indicate that an adequate......

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