Klesowitch v. Smith

Decision Date17 March 2016
Docket NumberNo. 1–15–0414.,1–15–0414.
Citation402 Ill.Dec. 444,52 N.E.3d 365
Parties Miguel KLESOWITCH, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Chiquita SMITH, Defendant–Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Daniel J. Kallan, Joliet, for appellant.

Paul G. O'Toole, of Salvato & O'Toole, Chicago, and Lynn D. Dowd and Francis J. Leyhane III, Naperville, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice HOWSE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Plaintiff, Miguel Klesowitch, filed a complaint against defendant, Chiquita Smith, to recover damages for injuries he allegedly suffered as a result of defendant's negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on the issue of defendant's negligence only, leaving consideration of whether any of plaintiff's conduct was a proximate cause of his injuries and the amount of damages for trial. The parties engaged in discovery. Plaintiff supplemented his discovery responses on the eve of trial. At trial before a jury, the court admitted certain medical bills into evidence. Portions of those bills had been written off by the medical providers. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for the full amount of the medical bills admitted into evidence.

¶ 2 For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Plaintiff's complaint alleged that on June 24, 2008, defendant negligently drove her vehicle into the vehicle plaintiff was driving. Defendant drove her vehicle into an intersection without stopping at a stop sign and into the left side of plaintiff's vehicle. Defendant admitted not stopping because she did not see the stop sign. The complaint alleged plaintiff was injured physically, by expending large sums of money for medical expenses to be cured of said physical injuries, and by the loss of money from being unable to pursue his usual occupation. Defendant filed an answer and affirmative defenses alleging that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.

¶ 5 In September 2011 plaintiff served defendant with plaintiff's answers to interrogatories and answers to requests to produce. Only one interrogatory is pertinent in this appeal. Defendant asked plaintiff to state the amount of his medical bills incurred as a result of his personal injuries. Plaintiff responded with a list of medical providers and attached a “medical specials list.” The attached list contained the names of plaintiff's medical providers and the total amount of their medical bills. The amount listed for three medical providers was listed as “unknown.” The total listed on the medical specials list was for the total of the known amounts.

¶ 6 In July 2014 plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment “on the issue of liability only.” Plaintiff's motion asserted that at defendant's deposition, she “set forth testimony indicating that she was clearly at fault for the accident.” Plaintiff quoted portions of defendant's deposition testimony in which she stated she did not stop at the stop sign, did not see the stop sign, did not slow down prior to impact (at approximately 30 miles per hour), and did not see plaintiff's vehicle. Defendant also testified that she did not think there was anything plaintiff should have done to avoid the accident. Plaintiff argued that “the issue of liability is ripe for summary judgment.”

¶ 7 In August 2014 defendant filed a response to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Defendant's response asserted that during plaintiff's deposition, he “set forth testimony under oath that he was at least partially at fault for causing the accident.” Defendant quoted portions of plaintiff's deposition testimony in which he stated the speed limit where he was travelling was 30 miles per hour and his vehicle was travelling between 30 and 35 miles per hour at the time of the accident, he never saw the other car at any time prior to the collision, he did not slow down before entering the intersection, and he did not look to see if there was oncoming traffic in the intersection. Defendant argued summary judgment should be denied because of issues of material fact regarding liability. Defendant argued plaintiff's admitted actions “give rise to a clear question of fact regarding the fault for this collision” and that, as questions of material fact exist as to whether defendant “is completely and totally liable for the motor vehicle accident,” summary judgment should be denied.

¶ 8 Plaintiff filed a reply in which he noted that both plaintiff and defendant testified that plaintiff's vehicle was in the intersection when they impacted. Defendant testified their two cars impacted in the middle of the street intersecting her direction of travel and plaintiff testified his vehicle was completely in the intersection when the collision occurred. Plaintiff argued the sole proximate cause of the occurrence was that defendant failed to stop at the stop sign.

¶ 9 In September 2014 the trial court entered a written order on plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The order reads, in part, as follows: parties being present and the matter having been fully briefed it is so ordered that plaintiff's motion is granted as to negligence but is reserved/remains pending as to proximate cause and damages.” Later that month defendant filed a motion in limine and plaintiff filed three motions in limine.

¶ 10 Plaintiff's first motion in limine sought, in part, to bar all evidence that his hospital bills were paid for by the federal government or that his medical bills or expenses were paid or may be paid in the future by insurance or any collateral source. Plaintiff's second motion in limine sought to bar any evidence of any prior or subsequent injuries to plaintiff or prior or subsequent conditions of any parts of plaintiff's body other than plaintiff's left knee, including but not limited to plaintiff's right knee and hip. Defendant's expert testified in an evidence deposition, over objection, that plaintiff had a total right hip replacement and total right knee replacement in 1998. Plaintiff argued no evidence linked those prior conditions to the injuries plaintiff allegedly sustained as a result of the accident in 2008.

¶ 11 Plaintiff's third motion in limine sought to bar any evidence that referred to defendant being unable to avoid the accident, or to plaintiff failing to avoid the accident, or the accident being unavoidable. Plaintiff argued any such evidence would be irrelevant because the issue of liability had already been adjudicated on the merits when the trial court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. As a result, plaintiff argued, the “negligence of either party is not at issue. The only matters at issue are causation and damages.”

¶ 12 The trial court granted plaintiff's first motion in limine as to collateral source payments; granted plaintiff's second motion in limine as to prior injuries; and denied plaintiff's third motion in limine as to evidence of plaintiff's role in the accident. The trial court ruled that if the summary judgment ruling (which had been entered by a different judge) “only went to the negligence of the defendant, then contributory negligence can be raised before the trier of fact to ascertain any percentage of fault of the plaintiff.”

¶ 13 Defendant's motion in limine sought, in pertinent part, to bar all evidence as to (1) medical bills which had not been disclosed, and (2) medical bills without competent medical evidence as to the reasonableness and necessity of said bills. Defendant's memorandum of law in support of her motion in limine argued that if plaintiff intends to claim the full amount of bills in excess of what his health insurance actually paid, “there must also be a foundation concerning the usual and customary amount.” Defendant requested an order barring plaintiff from claiming a bill above what was actually paid absent competent testimony as to the usual and customary amount to establish reasonableness.

¶ 14 Regarding defendant's motion concerning bills without evidence of reasonableness, defendant's attorney asserted that the bills he received from plaintiff's counsel do not reflect “any specific payment,” that plaintiff testified that the bills were paid through health insurance, and that health insurance does not always pay 100% of bills it receives. Defense counsel argued the motion was asking to know how much insurance paid, and that any amount on a bill that insurance did not pay—in other words the difference between what was billed and what insurance paid—be supported by competent testimony that the unpaid amount or total bill was reasonable, customary, and necessary. Defendant's attorney asserted the bills he received did not show zero balances “or any payments that have been made through insurance.” Plaintiff's counsel noted that plaintiff testified the bills were paid. The trial court ruled as follows:

“THE COURT: If the evidence is that the bills are paid and there are no outstanding balances, that's prima facie evidence that the services that were provided were fair and reasonable and that the amounts that were billed are fair and reasonable. It's a rebuttable inference, but there's an inference to that.
If there are bills that are outstanding that have not been paid and the plaintiff is seeking to be compensated for that, then you need a medical care provider to testify to lay a foundation for them, that the services were provided, the amounts are fair and reasonable in the community, and they expect to be paid.
With regard to medical care, insurance—insurers negotiating something less with the medical care provider, I allow for the full amount of the bill that has been paid.
And then again, the trier of fact will ascertain whether or not all of the services that the plaintiff is claiming, the left knee replacement, and the defense is saying that it was not precipitated or caused by this accident, then it will be for the trier of fact to determine if it was or if it wasn't;
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3 cases
  • Verci v. High
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • December 18, 2019
    ...An injured plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable medical expenses. Klesowitch v. Smith , 2016 IL App (1st) 150414, ¶ 44, 402 Ill.Dec. 444, 52 N.E.3d 365. In order to recover such expenses, the plaintiff must prove (1) that she has paid or become liable to pay a specific amount and (2)......
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    ...of a person having knowledge of the services rendered and the usual and customary charges for such services." Klesowitch v. Smith, 52 N.E.3d 365, 376 (Ill.App. 1st Dist. 2016) (quoting Arthur, 833 N.E.2d at 853). Here, plaintiff intended to rely on life care planner Santo Steven BiFulco to ......
  • Passarella v. Nfi Interactive Logistics, LLC
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • October 20, 2016
    ...collateral source rule, which under Illinois law is both a rule of evidence and a substantive rule of damages. Klesowitch v. Smith, 52 N.E.3d 365, 375 (Ill.App. March 17, 2016). As a rule of evidence, the rule prevents the jury from learning anything about collateral income. Id. "As a subst......

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