Klien v. Long

Decision Date21 September 2001
Docket NumberDEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS,PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,No. 00-2235,00-2235
Citation275 F.3d 544
Parties(6th Cir. 2001) DAVID B. KLEIN,, v. PAUL LONG, BLACKMAN TOWNSHIP POLICE OFFICER; PHILLIP ROGERS, BLACKMAN TOWNSHIP POLICE SERGEANT, Argued:
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit. No. 98-74686--Arthur J. Tarnow, District Judge. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Frank G. Becker (argued and briefed), Frank G. Becker & Associates, Southfield, MI, for Appellee.

Ernest R. Bazzana (argued), Mary Massaron Ross (briefed), Plunkett & Clooney, Detriot, MI, for Appellants.

Before: Nelson and Moore, Circuit Judges; Katz, District Judge.*

OPINION

Moore, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellee David B. Klein was arrested on June 10, 1998 for nonaggravated, domestic assault. Alleging that he was arrested without probable cause in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, Klein brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants-Appellants Paul Long, a police officer, and Phillip Rogers, a police sergeant, of Blackman Township, Michigan. The defendants moved for summary judgment, and, after a hearing, the district court denied the motion and a subsequent motion for reconsideration/rehearing, effectively finding that the defendants were not protected from suit by qualified immunity. For the following reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court denying qualified immunity as to both Long and Rogers.

I. BACKGROUND

On the evening of June 10, 1998, David Klein argued with his wife, Therese Klein, about her disciplining of their twelve-year old son, Matthew, for fighting with his fourteen-year old brother, Jeffrey, over the television remote control. After a tense dinner, the Kleins retired to the family room, where Mr. and Mrs. Klein further argued about a trip to Florida planned for the upcoming weekend; Mr. Klein's voice was raised "a few octaves," and Mrs. Klein was crying. Joint Appendix ("J.A.") at 51 (David Klein Dep.). The argument escalated when Mrs. Klein instructed Matthew to go upstairs to take a shower, and Mr. Klein, disagreeing with this instruction, "put [his] hands firmly on [Matthew's] shoulders and sat him back down on the couch." J.A. at 55 (David Klein Dep.). Mrs. Klein then went into the kitchen to make a phone call. According to Mrs. Klein, she planned to call the police. J.A. at 254 (Therese Klein Dep.). Mr. Klein testified, however, that he thought Mrs. Klein was going to call a friend to talk about the argument, and "want[ing] the matter kept private," he followed Mrs. Klein into the kitchen and "grabbed the phone from her," causing her finger to be scratched. J.A. at 60-61, 95-96 (David Klein Dep.). After this incident, Mrs. Klein left the house, drove to the highway, and called 911 from her cell phone. J.A. at 255 (Therese Klein Dep.). Mrs. Klein testified that she was crying during the call and that she told the 911 operator that Mr. Klein had been "grabbing and pushing" her and the children. J.A. at 255-56 (Therese Klein Dep.). The dispatcher sent out a "domestic call," and both Long and Rogers responded. J.A. at 305 (Rogers Dep.).

Long and Rogers met a visibly upset Mrs. Klein in front of the house, and immediately noticed that her finger was bleeding. J.A. at 306-07 (Rogers Dep.). After questioning Mrs. Klein about what had happened and how her finger was cut, the officers followed her into the house where they found Mr. Klein doing dishes with Jeffrey. Mr. Klein was asked to wait in the garage while Rogers further questioned Mrs. Klein and also questioned the children. According to Mrs. Klein, she reiterated to Rogers what she had told the 911 operator: Mr. Klein was grabbing and pushing her and the children, he had prevented her from calling the police, and, while taking the phone from her, he had cut her finger. J.A. at 254-57 (Therese Klein Dep.). In addition, Mrs. Klein testified that she told the police that her husband "just needed to leave the premises for the evening and cool down." J.A. at 257 (Therese Klein Dep.). Following these interviews, Rogers placed Mr. Klein under arrest for nonaggravated, domestic assault, handcuffed him, and drove him to the Jackson County Jail, where he was detained for twenty hours.1 The Jackson County prosecutor chose not to prosecute Mr. Klein for domestic assault.

On October 29, 1998, Klein brought suit against Long and Rogers in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable seizure and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, and a false imprisonment claim under state law. On June 30, 1999, the defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming that they had probable cause to arrest Klein. The defendants did not raise the affirmative defense of qualified immunity in their motion for summary judgment, but Klein mentioned qualified immunity in his response to the motion and the defendants subsequently raised the defense in their reply to Klein's response. The district court held a hearing on the summary judgment motion on October 20, 1999, at which the qualified immunity issue was discussed. In regard to the issue, the district court judge specifically stated that "[e]ven under your immunity argument, which is a question of law for the Court, before I can make my determination of immunity, I've got to know what the facts are. And to determine the facts, I give the question to the jury. That's my understanding of how immunity works." J.A. at 167-68 (Hearing Tr.). The district court then denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment "for reasons as set forth in the record." J.A. at 12 (Order Den. Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J.). Unfortunately, the district court judge did not explain in denying the defendants' motion whether he was ruling on the defendants' defense of qualified immunity or whether he was simply denying the motion on its merits.

Following the denial of their summary judgment motion, the defendants moved for a reconsideration/rehearing of the motion based on their failure to raise qualified immunity as an affirmative defense in the original motion. The defendants claimed that their failure to raise qualified immunity was "a palpable defect which, if corrected, will result in a different disposition of the case." J.A. at 131 (Defs.' Mot. for Recons./Reh'g). The district court denied the defendants' motion for reconsideration/rehearing, stating only that the defendants "failed to demonstrate a palpable defect by which the Court has been misled or that correcting any such defect would result in a different disposition of the case." J.A. at 13 (Order Den. Defs.' Mot. for Recons./Reh'g). The defendants filed a timely interlocutory appeal.

II. ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction

A district court's denial of a motion for summary judgment is generally not appealable because the applicable statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, only vests appellate courts with jurisdiction over a district court's "final decision." The Supreme Court has held, however, that under the collateral order doctrine, "a district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable 'final decision' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). In Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995), the Supreme Court clarified that the Mitchell decision was "explicitly limited . . . to appeals challenging, not a district court's determination about what factual issues are 'genuine,' . . . but the purely legal issue what law was 'clearly established.'" Interpreting Johnson, we have stated that "in order for an interlocutory appeal to be appropriate, a defendant seeking qualified immunity must be willing to concede to the facts as alleged by the plaintiff and discuss only the legal issues raised by the case. Only if the undisputed facts or the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff fail to establish a prima facie violation of clear constitutional law may we decide that the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on an interlocutory appeal." Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 299 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1264 (2000) (quoting Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 563-64 (1998)).

In this case, the district court did not explicitly deny a claim of qualified immunity. However, because the district court recognized that the defendants were presenting the affirmative defense of qualified immunity at the hearing on defendants' motion for summary judgment and because the court denied defendants' motion for reconsideration/rehearing based on qualified immunity, the district court effectively denied defendants' claim of qualified immunity. See Christophel v. Kukulinsky, 61 F.3d 479, 485 (6th Cir. 1995) ("[A] defendant's right to appeal the denial of qualified immunity does not turn on the phrasing of the district court's order. . . . Even when the district court denies summary judgment without stating its reasons for doing so, a court of appeals may decide the legal question underlying the qualified immunity defense."). The defendants in this case concede that we must view the facts as alleged by Klein. Appellants' Br. at 8. We therefore have jurisdiction to review the district court's denial of summary judgment to determine whether, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Klein, the defendants violated Klein's clearly established rights. See Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1157 (6th Cir. 1996).

B. Standard of Review

We review a district court's denial of qualified immunity de novo. Flagner v. Wilkinson, 241 F.3d 475, 480 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, _ U.S. _ , 122 S.Ct. 678, __ L.Ed.2d__ (2001).

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